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Abstract: This dissertation is born out of the premise that the 2008 global financial crisis 
marked a watershed in the history of the international monetary system (IMS), where emerging 
market and developing countries (EMDs) would become permanently influential actors. In 
particular, it looks at the experience of Brazil in this context to evaluate this premise. Drawing 
on in-depth semi-structured interviews with current and former Brazilian policy-makers, this 
dissertation aims to explain the impact of external constraints on Brazilian economic policy-
making from 1994 to 2014 and their role in determining Brazil’s position in the IMS. The 
puzzle is that Brazil has remained an unprivileged player in the power structures of the IMS 
while its economic power and position with regard to debt and trade varied over the period of 
analysis. For Brazil there was a particular hope that the aftermath of the 2008 crisis had 
fundamentally changed Brazil’s position in the IMS given the ease with which Brazil traversed 
the crisis. However, subsequent events have proven this view to be inaccurate, and that while 
the crisis generated circumstances in which Brazil appeared to have greater influence in the 
IMS, it did not precipitate any decisive structural change. Whilst Brazil did not change, it was 
nonetheless able to retain some of the political influence it acquired during the context of the 
crisis even when its domestic economic performance began to deteriorate substantially and 
some of the old external constraints re-emerged. The experience of Brazil thus serves to shed 
light on the understudied role of EMDs in the IMS and helps to better understand which factors 
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The 2008 global financial crisis increased the influence1 of emerging market and developing 
countries (EMDs) and in so doing it had a clear impact on the underlying power relations in 
the international monetary system (IMS). When the crisis broke, EMDs suddenly found 
themselves in a relatively better situation than developed economies. The improved position of 
EMDs was the result of the crisis disproportionately affecting developed economies, partly due 
to it originating in the US, combined with the fact that EMDs were in general more resilient in 
comparison to previous crises episodes.  
As a result of this unprecedented situation, EMDs played an important part in the management 
of the crisis since they represented a source of financial resources and economic dynamism. 
US President George Bush recognised this change when he invited the leaders of the G20 
countries for a meeting in Washington in November 2008. In September 2009, the G20 
officially replaced the G8 as the main international forum for economic cooperation. At the 
time of the crisis, EMDs’ weight spread to other forums, such as the Financial Stability Forum 
(FSF), which was transformed into the Board (FSB) in April 2009, and the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). In addition, 
long-waited reforms in the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) – the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) – were approved, increasing the voting power of EMDs at 
the expense mainly of over-represented European countries.  
                                                
1 The concepts of “power,” “influence,” and “autonomy” are discussed in Chapter 1. 
 2 
The inclusion of several EMDs in global monetary governance in the wake of the crisis was 
supported by the international system shifting towards multipolarity. The decade leading up to 
the global financial crisis witnessed an ever-increasing share of EMDs in global trade, 
investment and finance. According to a World Bank (2011, p.1) report, EMDs’ share in 
international trade flows went from 30 per cent in 1995 to 45 per cent in 2010. Most 
importantly, much of this expansion was due to an increase in trade among developing 
countries. As of 2010, more than one-third of foreign direct investment in developing countries 
originated from developing countries (World Bank 2011, p.1). EMDs became holders of two 
thirds of all foreign exchange reserves, in stark contrast to the previous decade when advanced 
economies held two-thirds (World Bank 2011, p.1). The creation of sovereign wealth funds 
(SWFs) as well as other pools of capital further added to EMDs’ financial power.  
The faster recovery of EMDs’ economic growth in the face of a US slowdown, triggered by 
the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007, nurtured the hypothesis that the global economy 
was decoupling from the US (Bergsten 2008; IMF 2007, chap.4; IMF 2008, chap.1; Dooley & 
Hutchison 2009). With the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, however, the 
crisis turned global and EMDs directly felt its impact, particularly through trade and financial 
channels. Even so, they began to recover faster and regained their pre-crisis growth levels much 
earlier than advanced economies, resuscitating the argument that EMDs had gained relative 
autonomy from their developed peers (Akyüz 2012, pp.4–5). The growing significance of 
EMDs as engines of global growth was labelled the “new normal” (El-Erian 2009). 
Against this background, the crisis unsurprisingly re-launched the debate in the academic 
literature about the role of EMDs in the IMS, which began from the premise of a large 
asymmetry between EMDs’ economic size and their role in the IMS. As Eichengreen (2011a, 
pp.121–122) noted “as the world economy becomes more multipolar, its monetary system, 
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logic suggests, should be similarly more multipolar”. A multipolar IMS would have meant a 
better distribution of power across regions, which implied a transformation in global 
governance away from US-domination and, consequently, a change in the currency landscape. 
In particular, scholars suggested that the exorbitant privilege2 of the greenback in the IMS 
would soon be shared with other currencies, particularly the euro and the renminbi (Calleo 
2009; Dailami & Masson 2009; Eichengreen 2011a).  
A similar statement echoed in international institutions. The World Bank (2011, p.7) reported 
that “even though the role of emerging markets in international finance is growing, there is a 
great disparity between their economic size and their role in the international monetary 
system”. By the same token, a discussion paper of the IMF staff pointed out that “the shift to a 
multipolar IMS would be consistent with ongoing global adjustment” (Maziad et al. 2011, 
p.19). Both the World Bank and the IMF thus reiterated the conclusions of this academic 
literature that the future IMS would no longer be dollar dominated. “The most likely scenario 
for the international monetary system,” a World Bank (2011, pp.125–126) report said, “is a 
multicurrency system centred around the US dollar, the euro, and the renminbi”. In similar 
lines, the IMF staff said “it is possible to envisage a system where the US dollar and euro 
remain the main global currencies, while a set of regional currencies emerge in different trading 
blocs or regional financial centers” (Maziad et al. 2011, p.18). 
The World Bank and the IMF’s reports deemed the shift towards multipolarity as a necessary 
condition to achieve a better distribution of costs and benefits in the IMS, and so reduce global 
imbalances (World Bank 2011; Maziad et al. 2011). The unequal share of responsibilities was 
ultimately associated with the contrast between the international role of the dollar and the role 
                                                
2  The term exorbitant privilege was coined by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Charles de Gaulle’s Minister of 
Economy, to refer to the advantages of the dollar being the key international reserve currency (Eichengreen 2011a, 
p.4; Cohen 2012, p.17). See Chapter 1 for a discussion of the benefits of issuing an international reserve currency. 
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of EMDs’ currencies, despite their growing presence in the global economy (World Bank 2011, 
pp.7–8). According to the IMF staff, “the limited role of EM [emerging market] currencies in 
international transactions stands in sharp contrast to their growing weight in the global 
economy, which is in itself a source of stress to the functioning of the IMS” (Maziad et al. 
2011, p.3). 
In this light, international institutions were categorical about the future of the IMS and the role 
reserved for EMDs. The World Bank (2011, p.7, emphasis added) maintained that “as 
emerging economies account for an ever-growing share of the global economy and participate 
more actively in cross-border trade and finance, one sees that their currencies – particularly the 
renminbi – will inevitably play a more important role in the international financial system”. 
This claim was reiterated by the IMF staff, who argued that “it seems likely – if not inevitable 
– that emerging market currencies will account for a larger share of international reserves” 
(Maziad et al. 2011, p.6, emphasis added). In particular, they highlighted that “key EM 
currencies with potential for internationalisation are the Brazilian Real, Chinese Renminbi, 
Indian Rupee, Russian Ruble, and South African Rand” (Maziad et al. 2011, p.10). 
Much of the academic literature on the subject equally suggested that there was space for other 
contenders (besides the euro and the renminbi) to challenge the dollar’s supremacy. In one 
example, Eichengreen (2011a, p.8) argued, “where the Renminbi leads, other emerging market 
currencies, such as the Indian Rupee and Brazilian Real, could eventually follow”. In a similar 
line, Cohen (Cohen 2009a, p.21) said, “several states around the world today are thought to 
harbour ambitions to amplify their monetary power – including, most prominently, the four 
BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and above all China)”. He then suggested these countries 
could promote the internationalisation of their currencies (Cohen 2009a, p.21).  
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Politically, this discussion about persistent imbalances in the IMS was put at the centre of the 
G20 agenda during the French presidency in 2011. President Nicolas Sarkozy (2011) identified 
the “instability of the international monetary system and commodity price volatility” as one of 
the challenges to be addressed, recognizing that “we’ve been living with the instability of the 
international monetary non-system since 1971”. He summarised the French position saying 
that “the emergence of new economic powers will inevitably lead to the emergence of new 
international currencies” (Sarkozy 2011, emphasis added). 
New economic powers were almost always associated with the BRIC countries, which in 2010 
officially became BRICS after the inclusion of South Africa. Since the 2008 crisis the BRICS 
have represented one of the main sources of pressure for reform in the prevailing IMS. First, 
they revived the idea of increasing the role of IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDR) as a reserve 
currency, thus moving away from a dollar-centric IMS. Second, they pushed for reforms in the 
IMF and the World Bank, increasing their role in global financial governance. The influence 
they exerted, according to two observers, was going to “make it impossible for the United 
States to successfully resist a reshaping of the international monetary system toward a more 
multilateral and managed one” (Dailami & Masson 2009, p.14, emphasis added).  
These events following the crisis and the reinvigorated academic debate concerning the rise of 
a multi-currency international system fuelled the idea that the 2008 crisis marked a watershed 
in the history of the IMS, where EMDs would permanently become more influential actors. 
However, this shift in the balance of power was to be a temporary one. First, as the global 
financial contagion was staunched, forums such as the G20 began to lose steam and relevance. 
Second, as the worst of the crisis passed and the need for financial resources diminished, 
reforms in the IMF and the World Bank slowed down. Third, already in 2010 international 
conditions for EMDs began to deteriorate and so did their economic performance. On the one 
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hand, the monetary policies of developed countries to deal with the crisis had negative effects 
for EMDs, which the Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega dubbed a “currency war” 
(Wheatley & Garnham 2010). On the other hand, EMDs’ economies further deteriorated with 
the end of the commodity prices’ boom from 2011 onwards. Thus, the pressure EMDs could 
exert at the time of the crisis proved dependent on an international context that gradually 
disappeared. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the 2008 global financial crisis did not substantially 
alter the underlying power structures in the IMS in favour of EMDs. At the same time, however, 
it seems that some of the gains achieved by EMDs during the crisis will be permanent. While 
the hierarchical core of the system remains the same, the crisis catalysed a rearrangement in 
the balance of power to recognize the rise of one of the EMDs: China.  
The process of including China in global governance did appear to have opened a general 
window of opportunity for other EMDs to increase their influence. For instance, while EMDs 
were generally under-represented in the IMF’s quota shares, the major incongruence came 
from China, which made the reform unavoidable. The 2010 reform made China the third largest 
shareholder, and also put Brazil, Russia and India among the top ten members of the IMF. To 
that extent, the pressure for including China in the IMS benefited other under-represented, but 
less powerful, EMDs.  
At the same time, China benefited from the association with other EMDs to legitimise its 
agenda of becoming a significant player in international monetary affairs. The launch of the 
New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) with the 
other BRICS countries in July 2014 are examples of such politically motivated projects. China 
has also used the EMDs’ general dissatisfaction with the IMS to validate reforms that 
ultimately increased its own power. For example, one outcome of the debate about the necessity 
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of moving away from a dollar-centric system was the inclusion of the Renminbi in the IMF’s 
SDR basket in December 2015. To that extent, China’s ascension as a monetary power leans 
considerably on the general EMDs’ discourse.  
China’s rise as a key player in international monetary relations has received extensive attention 
in academic literature (Helleiner & Kirshner 2014; Subramanian 2011). In particular, its 
ascension as an international creditor (Drezner 2009; Chin & Helleiner 2008) and its 
government’s decision to internationalise the renminbi have been subject to much debate in 
recent years (Eichengreen 2011b; Prasad & Ye 2012; Cohen 2014). 
The close association between China and other EMDs, particularly the other BRICS countries, 
has sometimes led to misperceptions about the balance of forces in the IMS. Helleiner and 
Pagliari (2011, p.175) state that “China and other emerging powers within the developing 
world seized the opportunity of the crisis to demand a greater role in discussions about the 
future of international financial regulation to match their growing weight in global financial 
markets”. In another example, Dailami and Masson (2009, p.2) claimed the BRICs are one of 
the three poles of economic power, together with the United States and the Euro area. They 
argued:   
Backed by rapid economic growth, growing financial clout, and a newfound sense of 
assertiveness in recent years, the BRICs are a driving force behind an incipient 
transformation of the international monetary system away from a US-dominated system 
toward one that is more regionally based and in which developing countries have a major 
say (Dailami & Masson 2009, p.2). 
 
The problem with this line of analysis is that, without China, the BRICS group cannot be 
conceived as a threat to the US-dominated IMS. China alone, however, has the economic 
weight to challenge the system. Therefore, if academic literature is interested in understanding 
monetary power of other EMDs, research needs to advance toward other EMDs than China. 
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Other EMDs’ monetary power differs from China’s power not only because of their lower 
economic weight but because of the role of their currencies in the IMS hierarchy. Still, EMDs’ 
experience during the 2008 crisis suggests that it is possible for a country to have some 
influence in the IMS without issuing an international currency. This influence occurs through 
other channels, such as influencing international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, 
shaping the international agenda in forums like the G20 and pressuring for modifications in 
policy prescriptions. Thus, scholars have to face the challenge of explaining the role of states 
that have neither the ambition nor have the potential to internationalise their currencies. 
The aim of this dissertation is to examine the constraints faced by EMDs in the IMS through 
the lens of what came before, during and after the 2008 crisis by conducting a case study on 
one of the largest EMDs other than China: Brazil. Brazil is an interesting case because it fits 
very well into the inflated claims directed at EMDs during the 2008 crisis. Among EMDs and 
the BRICS, Brazil received particular attention during the crisis, with the media portraying it 
as a success story as one of the last countries to enter the crisis and one of the first to come out 
of it (The Economist 2009). International leaders also recognized Brazil as a key actor in global 
governance in the aftermath of the crisis: “Who today could imagine solving the problems of 
the world without Brazil?” asked the President of France Nicolas Sarkozy in December 2008 
(quoted in Latin America News 2009). Besides considerable media coverage, worldwide 
interest in Brazil was also reflected in the launch of a series of books on the “rise of Brazil”. A 
few examples are Brazil as an economic superpower: understanding Brazil’s changing role in 
the global economy, edited by Lael Brainard and Leonardo Martinez-Diaz (2009b); Brazil 
under Lula: Economy, Politics, and Society under the Worker-President, edited by Joseph L. 
Love and Werner Baer (2009); The New Brazil, from Riordan Roett (2011); Starting Over: 
Brazil since 1985, from Albert Fishlow (2011); and Brazil on the Rise: a story of a country 
transformed from Larry Rohter (2012).  
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In this context, Brazil is particularly useful to understand the issues around the non-China 
EMDs because it is simultaneously distinctive in its monetary history whilst sharing some 
features with other states, such as dealing with the many constraints imposed by the IMS for 
EMDs’ economic policy-making in general. Accordingly, the question this dissertation aims 
to answer is: How have Brazil’s policymakers managed Brazilian monetary, financial and 
exchange rate policies since 1994 in the context of the power structures of the international 
monetary system? The main objective of this dissertation is thus to investigate how Brazil’s 
unprivileged position in the IMS has affected the autonomy of Brazilian policy-makers from 
1994 to 2014 and how the 2008 crisis fits into this trajectory.  
The period of analysis begins in 1994 because that year was a milestone in Brazil’s economic 
history, with the conclusion of the Brady Plan (which restructured Brazil’s external debt) and 
the launch of a new currency, the Real, which put an end to a long period of very high inflation. 
Implicitly, the start of the analysis in 1994 suggests that before that year Brazil’s economic 
policy was extremely constrained by external factors, with little or no degree of autonomy. It 
is only after 1994 that the Brazilian government began to have more autonomy to pursue 
domestic objectives without being permanently constrained by external debt and high inflation.  
Nevertheless, the period inaugurated after 1994 for Brazil coincided with the start of an 
extremely turbulent time for EMDs in general when many of them faced severe financial crisis. 
After Mexico in 1994, East Asia in 1997 and Russia in 1998, Brazil had its own financial crisis 
in 1999, which precipitated a fundamental change in its macroeconomic policy framework. 
The new arrangement became known as the “macroeconomic tripod,” which combined 
inflation targeting, a floating exchange rate and a fiscal policy aimed at maintaining a primary 
surplus. Despite the unfavourable scenario in the late 1990s, which imposed an additional 
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source of stress for policy-makers, inflation did not return and the Brazilian economy gradually 
entered into a more promising phase.  
This propitious period was invigorated when China took off in 2003. As a result, the terms of 
trade improved considerably for Brazil, lowering traditional external constraints for economic-
policy making. This scenario allowed Brazilian policy-makers to pursue policies like 
international reserves accumulation, which gradually made the Brazilian economy more robust 
against external shocks. A landmark in this process was Brazil’s repayment of its debt to the 
IMF in December 2005. 
Thereafter, the Brazilian economy entered into a very buoyant period and, against all Brazil’s 
historical odds, performed relatively well during the 2008 financial turmoil. While EMDs in 
general were less affected than its developed peers, Brazil’s resilience was nonetheless 
remarkable considering the country’s experience in previous international crises. 
Astonishingly, amidst the greatest global financial crisis since 1929, Brazil became a creditor 
for the IMF in October 2009.  
However, after an exceptional GDP growth of 7.5 per cent in 2010, Brazil’s performance began 
to slow. This poor growth was not, however, exclusive to the Brazilian economy, as other 
EMDs also started to have less impressive economic results. Significantly, some prevalent 
trends that had existed until 2010 gradually changed, particularly the upward trend of 
commodity prices. Still, Brazil’s poor economic results strongly contrasted with the trajectory 
it had been pursuing since 2006. 
In contrast to what the immediate aftermath of the 2008 crisis might have suggested, the years 
after 2010 clearly show that Brazil remained an unprivileged player in the power structures of 
the IMS. This insight raises several questions relating to the place of external constraints in 
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Brazilian economic-policy making, since on the surface it appeared that the government had 
acquired a greater level of autonomy, particularly from 2006 onwards.  
There is, in fact, a heated debate among economists to determine whether Brazil’s improved 
performance after 2006 was the result of a change in the macroeconomic policy framework, 
which arguably gave a greater role to more interventionist policies (Barbosa & Souza 2010; 
Morais & Saad-Filho 2011). This debate raises questions, for instance, about the level of 
autonomy Brazilian governments have had to pursue domestic objectives. Ultimately, the 
matter of autonomy – or of the perception of autonomy – can be related to varying degrees of 
external constraints over time. Put differently, there is an issue of whether Brazil’s autonomy 
is actually dependent on international variables, which then means the government alone has 
little power.  
Moreover, the fact that Brazil’s debt settlement with the IMF coincided with an improvement 
of Brazil’s economic performance in the following years also raises the issue about the level 
of intervention of the IMF in Brazil’s policies. In other words, how much were Brazilian policy-
makers actually constrained by having an agreement with the Fund and to what extent did the 
end of the agreement represent a gain of autonomy for Brazil? 
In order to understand how Brazilian policy-makers have dealt with the change in the external 
constraints from 1994 to 2014, a qualitative assessment of their experience is imperative. The 
dissertation is based on 39 interviews with 37 former and current Brazilian policy-makers3, 
totalling approximately 41:30 hours. 4  All interviews were conducted in Portuguese and 
translated by the author. Interviews lasted on average one hour. The first round of interviews 
                                                
3 Two participants were interviewed twice.  
4 Some interviews were not recorded (at the request of participants or for other reasons). These interviews are not 
considered in the statistics. 
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took place in January-February 2014 and the second round from December 2014 to April 2015. 
The second round included 5 interviews with Brazilian representatives in the IMF, the World 
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington D.C. A final interview was 
conducted in September 2015 with the Brazilian former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
(1995-2002).  
The participants were mainly current or former policy-makers at the Central Bank of Brazil, 
Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, known as Itamaraty. There were 8 
participants from the Central Bank, including 3 former governors and 3 former directors. There 
were 7 participants from the Ministry of Finance, including 3 former Finance Ministers and 2 
directors of International Affairs. There were also 7 participants from Itamaraty, including 1 
former Foreign Minister, 1 former Secretary-General for External Relations (Vice-Foreign 
Minister). Other participants associated with the government were from the Institute of Applied 
Economic Research (IPEA, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica e Aplicada), a Brazilian 
government-led economy research organization; the Brazilian Economic and Social 
Development Bank (BNDES, Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social); the 
Minister of Planning; and the Foreign Policy Advising to the President of Brazil. Four 
participants were neither former nor current policy-makers (at the federal level), but renowned 
Brazilian economists who work in Universities and think tanks (in Brazil and abroad).  
At the time of the interviews, 13 participants were policy-makers of the Dilma Rousseff 
government (2011-present) (plus 5 representatives in Washington D.C.); 17 interviewees were 
policy-makers during the Lula government (2003-2010); 13 during the Cardoso government 
(1995-2002); and 10 were from previous governments. From the total of 37 interviewees, 15 
are (or were) career members of the government, such as diplomats and analysts at the Central 
Bank, meaning they are less likely to have a clear political bias.  
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Each interview was conducted with open-ended questions, questions which varied in subject 
according to the period that participants were members of the government. While the focus of 
the interviews was the interviewees’ job as policy-makers, many of the interviewees were also 
interested in discussing “the role of Brazil in the international monetary system”. These 
conversations with senior Brazilian policy-makers, who together form a broad spectrum of 
professional experiences and ideological perspectives, have proven fundamental to the 
orchestration of this research and have indicated which topics are especially important to 
consider when discussing the position of Brazil in the IMS.  
The qualitative material obtained through the interviews was supplemented with concurrent 
quantitative research. The quantitative research collected data about Brazil’s economic 
performance for the period under analysis – including GDP growth, inflation, trade flows, 
balance of payments, interest and exchange rates. Tracking the record of these indicators 
allowed me to challenge the perception of Brazilian policy-makers about the position of Brazil 
in the IMS. In addition, I gathered primary and secondary sources on the events that affected 
Brazil’s position in the IMS from 1994 to 2014. Most of this literature review was conducted 
in the earliest stages of the research and contributed to identify the major topics to be addressed 
in the interviews. The literature review also included an investigation of the main personalities 
on those events and was the guide to select the interviewees. Whenever possible, my 
preparation for the interviews started by a study of the participant’s professional and research 
background to foresee any ideological bias they might have shown. This triangulation approach 
was used to increase the credibility and the validity of the results presented in this dissertation. 
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. The first chapter reviews the international 
political economy (IPE) literature on money and power, pointing out an important gap in the 
theory. Whilst IPE theory recognises the existence of a hierarchy in the IMS, it tends to focus 
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on the top of the pyramid, overlooking in terms of detailed analysis the cases of EMDs. The 
second chapter offers a historical context for the deeper analysis of Brazil after 1994. It 
considers the position of Brazil in the IMS from 1944 to 1994 from three perspectives: the 
relations with the United States; constraints arising from external debt; and constraints rising 
from inflation. The third chapter covers the period from 1995 until 2005, which corresponds to 
a consolidation phase of Brazil in the IMS. The fourth chapter covers the years from 2006 to 
2010, which were the peak years of Brazil’s influence in the IMS. The fifth chapter covers the 
period from 2011 to 2014, which marked a decrease in Brazil’s influence in comparison to the 
previous period. The final chapter sets out some conclusions.   
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CHAPTER 1. MONETARY POWER BEYOND 
INTERNATIONAL CURRENCIES: WHAT IS LEFT FOR 
EMERGING MARKETS AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIES? 
 
 
1.1   INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the US dollar was officially recognised as the key international currency at the 
Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, its demise has often been predicted. In 1960, the Belgian-
American economist Robert Triffin (1957; 1960) warned that the persistent US deficits 
necessary to maintain the Bretton Woods System (BWS) would eventually undermine 
confidence in the US dollar. After the US government terminated the dollar’s gold 
convertibility in 1971, Charles Kindleberger deemed it to be the end of the dollar era. At the 
end of the 20th century, the launch of the euro – the first credible alternative reserve currency 
to the dollar – again rekindled ideas about the imminent erosion of the dollar-centric 
international monetary order (Chinn & Frankel 2007). Most recently, the 2008 global crisis 
precipitated a new wave of predictions about the inevitable fall of the dollar and scholars 
continue to bet as to whether the dollar will have to share its dominance with not only the euro, 
but also the renminbi in the near future (Eichengreen 2011a; Cohen 2009b; Cohen 2009a; 
Helleiner & Kirshner 2009a; Prasad & Ye 2012; World Bank 2011; Angeloni et al. 2011). 
The reason why the dollar’s demise has been the subject of so much scrutiny and consideration 
is because the ability to issue the key international reserve currency is one of the main sources 
of power in the international system. As Cohen (2004, p.xii) makes clear, “though seemingly 
technical in nature, the management of money in fact is anything but neutral in its implications 
for the distribution of wealth and power across the globe”. In other words, the existence of a 
key currency in the international monetary system (IMS) means that not all currencies are 
equal. If the power of states is partly determined by the currencies they issue, clearly states 
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enjoy different levels of monetary power. There exists a hierarchy between states rooted in the 
nature of the currencies they issue. 
While the existence of a hierarchy in the IMS has long been recognised (Kindleberger 1970; 
Gilpin 1987; Strange 1994; Andrews 2006), the reasons for its change (or lack thereof) over 
time are still the subject of study and debate (Andrews 2006; Cohen 2015; Kirshner 1995). 
Indeed, the debate over the dollar’s future is a principal example of how the relations between 
money and power are yet unclear. While leading scholars maintain that for the foreseeable 
future the dollar will, in Cohen’s (2015, p.244) words, “remain supreme,” just a few years ago 
several scholars also highlighted the existence of potential challengers, such as the euro and 
the renminbi, envisaging the possibility of a multipolar currency system (Cohen 2009a; Calleo 
2009; Dailami & Masson 2009; Eichengreen 2011a; Angeloni et al. 2011; World Bank 2011).  
The idea of a multipolar currency system gained impetus during the 2008 crisis when scholars 
and international institutions predicted not only the dollar’s demise but also an increased 
participation of emerging markets and developing countries (EMDs) in the IMS (World Bank 
2011; Maziad et al. 2011; Dailami & Masson 2009). While some specialists discussed the 
possibility of using EMDs currencies more widely (Maziad et al. 2011; World Bank 2011), the 
debate about the participation of EMDs in the IMS was mingled with – and somewhat more 
focused on – the issue of reforming global financial governance, particularly regarding the rise 
of the G20 and the need for reform in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank, the two Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) (Helleiner 2010). Discussions concerning 
the reformation of the BWIs implied increasing the share of EMDs and were largely founded 
on a narrative that the 2008 crisis was ultimately a failure of major economies and global 
institutions to identify and address failures in global financial markets (Helleiner & Pagliari 
2011, p.183; G20 2008).   
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According to this narrative, the absence of adequate financial regulation was at the crux of the 
2008 crisis (Helleiner & Pagliari 2011; Helleiner 2010; G20 2008). This view is not unfounded 
as financial deregulation has been identified as having precipitated crises in the recent past. 
After sticking rigidly to the IMF’s prescription of capital account liberalisation, a series of 
Asian countries faced severe financial crises in the 1990s, which were reproduced shortly after 
in other EMDs, such as Russia, Brazil and Argentina. Since then EMDs have become more 
careful in their acceptance of the IMF’s recommendations and have resisted liberalising their 
financial systems. To their delight, these countries were among the least hard-hit by the 2008 
crisis and began to recover faster than developed countries (Gallagher 2015; World Bank 2011; 
Canuto 2010). 
The context of the 2008 crisis in fact catalysed EMDs’ formal and informal participation in 
global governance. Following the elevation of the G20 as the main forum for international 
macroeconomic cooperation in September 2009, thus replacing the G8, EMDs’ participation 
was expanded into several other forums. Furthermore, the crisis prompted the enactment of 
long-awaited reforms in the BWIs, which resulted in higher participation of EMDs. Although 
this increase in EMDs’ participation in the IMS was only incremental, it was, nevertheless, 
very significant, particularly from a symbolic perspective.  
However, the core of the IMS has essentially remained the same (Cohen 2015; Helleiner 2014). 
The US persists as the dominant power in the IMS, issuing the key international reserve 
currency and ruling, through its veto power, the preeminent global financial institution, the 
IMF. Meanwhile, some of the initiatives that appeared to be inaugurating a new era of global 
financial governance in the aftermath of the crisis – such as the rise of the G20 – proved to be 
less transformative than initially thought.  
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If the interactions between money and power are unclear for the core of the IMS, it seems that 
they are even more obscure for the rest of it. While much of the discussion around the US’ 
power in the IMS is based on the worldwide influence of the US dollar, this kind of analysis 
cannot be emulated for EMDs. This may explain why China has been hitherto the preferred 
case of analysis of EMDs in the IMS, for it is the only EMD that issues a currency with the 
potential for global use. 
The mechanisms enjoyed by other EMDs to influence the IMS, however, remain largely 
unknown. Apart from China, the vast majority of EMDs is very unlikely to ever issue 
currencies that will be used internationally. Yet, in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, EMDs 
states had some power – unrelated to the international use of their currencies – to exert some 
kind of influence in the IMS. Thus, EMDs’ experience suggests that there are other channels 
of influence in the IMS than the issuing of an international currency.  
In this light, the purpose of this chapter is (i) to discuss in which ways EMDs are constrained 
by the power structures in the IMS and (ii) to investigate the circumstances that allowed EMDs 
to have influence in the context of the 2008 crisis, despite being unprivileged players. This 
chapter begins by discussing the concepts of monetary power and currency hierarchy, 
highlighting the challenges faced by EMDs. Next, it reviews how the IMS that emerged in 
1944 and was renewed in 1973 has both revealed and reinforced American power and how the 
IMS has constrained EMDs’ economic policy-making. It then looks at EMDs’ influence in the 
IMS during the crisis to show (i) how previous studies have generally overlooked the 
subordinated position of EMDs’ currencies and (ii) to make an argument for considering more 
fully their participation in global financial governance and on their capacity to influence 
ideas/policy prescriptions. The last section concludes the chapter.  
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1.2   MONETARY POWER AND CURRENCY HIERARCHY  
Monetary power happens, in Andrews’s words (2006, 8) when “one state’s behaviour changes 
because of its monetary relationship with another state. The ultimate international conflict in 
monetary relations arises from balance of payment constraints and the need for adjustment. 
National economies are financially linked through the balance of payments so that the surplus 
of one country necessitates the deficit of another. For most states, eliminating a trade imbalance 
involves the subordination of domestic policy to the external adjustment in order to generate a 
sufficient amount of international money to finance the deficit. Classically, options to mitigate 
an external imbalance involve the devaluation or depreciation of the domestic currency, the 
imposition of monetary or fiscal austerity (to reduce domestic demand and, hence, imports) or 
the establishment of direct controls to limit import volumes or outward flows of capital. Each 
of these options carry a burden of some kind, economic and/or political. Since no government 
would willingly subordinate its domestic goals to external adjustment, the foundation of 
monetary power can be understood as the capacity a state has to avoid adjustment costs when 
it faces a balance-of-payments’ disequilibrium (Cohen 2009a, p.5). 
There are two relevant dimensions of monetary power: internal and external (Cohen 2015, 
pp.54–56). The internal dimension of monetary power refers to the capacity a state has to 
isolate itself from external influence or coercion and so formulate and implement its domestic 
politics, i.e. the greater capacity the state has, the more it enjoys autonomy. The external 
dimension of monetary power relates to the capacity of a state to control the behaviour of 
others, i.e. the state has a degree of influence over other states. As Cohen (2015, p.30) explains, 
“conceptually, influence and autonomy may be understood as two distinct (albeit interrelated) 
dimensions of power; … the logical complement of influence is autonomy”. While 
complementary, these dimensions are not inversely correlated. It is possible for a state to have 
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autonomy without having influence; however, it is hard to think that a state could exert much 
control over other states without some degree of autonomy. 
In monetary relations, power is fundamentally related to the notion of autonomy. Since, as 
Cohen (2015, p.48) noted, “the ultimate foundation of monetary power lies in a capacity to 
avoid the costs of payments adjustments,” a state is considered powerful insofar as it can isolate 
itself from external influence or coercion and so formulate and implement its domestic policies 
(Cohen 2015, p.48). As monetary relations are inherently reciprocal, when a state reaches a 
degree of operational independence it automatically creates a potential influence. 
The most illustrative example of a state that has managed to avoid the burden of external 
adjustment is the United States. For more than three decades, the US’ current account balance 
has been in persistent deficit (except for a small surplus registered in 1991) (Figure 1). Saudi 
Arabia, West Germany and Japan have all financed the US trade deficit in the past. And largely 
due to China’s current massive dollar holdings, the US has been able to delay adjusting its 
current account deficit in the present. A deficit in the current account essentially means that 
total US expenditure – government, enterprises, and individuals – exceeds its income. 
America’s unmatched capacity to avoid making the external adjustment represents the fact the 
US enjoys more monetary power than any other state (Chin & Helleiner 2008, pp.92–93; Cohen 
2009b, p.29). 
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FIGURE 1: UNITED STATES’ CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (PER CENT OF GDP), 1970-2014  
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. Elaborated by the author. 
America’s supreme monetary power is closely linked to the role of the US dollar in the IMS. 
By adding to the US government’s ability to finance its deficits over time, the dollar amplifies 
America’s capacity to delay external adjustment.  Put differently, because the dollar is accepted 
worldwide for public and private transactions, the US government does not need to make the 
adjustment most states do when they face an external imbalance.  
According to Cohen (2015, pp.48–49), there are two ways a state can avoid adjustment costs: 
by deflecting the burden of adjustment on to others; or by delaying it. Indeed, instead of 
generating an external surplus to compensate its deficits, the US government can print money 
to pay its international obligations (deflect) or issue more external debt (delay) as long as the 
dollar continues to be accepted as an international currency. This macroeconomic flexibility is 
known in the literature as the exorbitant privilege, a term coined in the 1960s by Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing, Charles de Gaulle’s Minister of Economy, to refer to the advantages of the dollar 





























































Alongside the exorbitant privilege, other benefits of issuing an international currency include 
i) reduction of transaction costs for companies and residents; ii) international seigniorage gains; 
iii) political leverage; and iv) international reputation, or soft power5. The advantage of lower 
transactions costs means that companies can expand their businesses abroad at a reduced cost 
and that residents can use their own money when travelling abroad, warranting a net positive 
impact to the issuing country. International seigniorage, for its turn, represents a real-resource 
reward for the issuing country, as explained by Cohen (2012, p.16): 
Since no interest is paid on the cash liabilities of a central bank, holdings of its notes and 
coins abroad represent the equivalent of an interest-free loan to the issuing country. … 
The second component, rather more substantial, derives from foreign accumulations of 
financial claims denominated in the home money, an increase of effective demand for 
assets. Typically motivated by liquidity considerations, the added demand has the effect 
of driving the cost of borrowing below what it might be otherwise.  
That means whenever non-nationals acquire some amount of national money, either actual cash 
(bank notes and coins) or financial claims denominated in the domestic money, this generates 
cross-border seigniorage for the issuing country of an international currency. Eichengreen 
(2011a, p.3) has put it succinctly: “it costs only a few cents for the Bureau of Engraving and 
Printing to produce a $100 bill, but other countries have to pony up $100 of actual goods and 
services in order to obtain one”.  
Political leverage and international reputation are benefits derived from issuing an international 
currency that cannot be easily measured. When independence from external influence is 
achieved, the consequent dependence of other countries gives leverage to the issuer of an 
international money. According to Cohen (2012), leverage can be exercised directly or 
indirectly. Direct leverage, which has been named enforcement by Kirshner (1995, p.116), “is 
the manipulation of the rules of the system in order to sanction (or support) member states”. 
                                                
5 The concept of soft power was coined by Joseph Nye in Bound to Lead  (1991) and refers to the ability to get 
what you want through attraction or co-option rather than coercion. 
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Indirect leverage, or entrapment according to Kirshner (1995), works through systemic 
infrastructure to change material-incentive structures. For instance, as states accumulate 
foreign reserves, they acquire an interest in the stability and value of that currency, creating a 
certain affinity between their interests and those of the country issuing the international 
currency. Finally, an international currency can also endorse intangible forms of influence for 
its issuer, contributing to a state’s international reputation (soft power).  
An international currency not only brings the issuing state benefits, but also the potential risks 
of (i) currency appreciation; (ii) external constraint on monetary autonomy; and (iii) policy 
responsibility. First, increased international demand can lead to an undesired exchange-rate 
appreciation. While this overvaluation may be convenient for consumers, enhancing their 
purchasing power, it can easily jeopardise the competitiveness of a country’s exports. Second, 
the excessive accumulation of liquid foreign liabilities can create an unwelcome external 
constraint on domestic monetary autonomy. Third, the worldwide envied exorbitant privilege 
may lead to a burden of policy responsibility, i.e. international monetary leadership may 
compel a state to change its domestic economic policy to contain a crisis (Cohen 2012, pp.19–
20).  
While the net balance of issuing an international currency can be positive or negative (Cohen 
2015), there is little doubt about the advantages of a state having monetary monopoly or 
exclusivity within its borders (Cohen 2004). Having monetary monopoly means that the 
national currency retains exclusivity in the domestic context, a situation that contrasts when a 
state subordinates or shares its monetary sovereignty (Cohen 2004). Subordination here refers 
to a vertical hierarchy among states, in the form of a bilateral exchange-rate peg or, in its 
stronger version, a currency board. In its extreme, subordination corresponds to the full 
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adoption of a foreign currency, what is called dollarisation6. Sharing represents a horizontal 
alliance among states. It can be achieved by fixing mutual exchange rates or by replacing 
existing monies with a joint currency. While intuitively a horizontal alliance may seem better 
than a vertical one, it requires building a collective governance to manage the money – a 
challenge that the euro experience has made demonstrably clear. 
In light of the pitfalls of both subordination and sharing, states have an incentive to retain their 
monetary monopoly. There are, moreover, several advantages to monetary exclusivity – 
benefits that in many ways mirror those associated with issuing an international currency, but 
at the domestic level, namely: (i) availability of monetary policy instruments for 
macroeconomic management; (ii) reduction of domestic transactions costs; (iii) seigniorage 
gains; (iv) political symbol to promote national identity; and (v) independence from external 
influence or constraint. Except for the reduction of domestic transaction costs, which can be 
considered a benefit to both the government and societal actors, all of the remaining benefits 
of monetary sovereignty support the effective power of the government.  
While states have thus many incentives to enforce the use of the domestic currency within their 
domestic borders, the reality is that domestic currencies are subject to international 
competition. As a result, a few popular currencies may expand their domains beyond the 
jurisdiction of the countries that issue them (currency internationalisation), but less popular 
currencies are likely to suffer a direct invasion of traditional territorial domains – partially or 
totally – consequently weakening their use and influence (currency substitution) (Cohen 1998, 
p.93).  
                                                
6 Although the term is derived from the use of the US dollar by several economies, the term dollarisation refers 
to any situation in which a foreign currency replaces the national currency.  
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The hierarchy of the different currencies around the world has been associated with the image 
of a pyramid (Cohen 1998; Cohen 2004; Cohen 2015) (Figure 2). According to Cohen (2015, 
p.16), the currency pyramid is useful because it “is narrow at the peak, where one or a few 
moneys dominate, and increasingly broad below, reflecting varying degrees of competitive 
inferiority”. Cohen (2015, pp.15–19) defines seven categories of currencies based on the 
purposes of their international use (medium of exchange, unit of account and store of value by 
public or private agents) and their international reach (global, regional, little, or none).  
FIGURE 2: THE CURRENCY PYRAMID 
 
Source: Cohen 2015, 16. 
Following these features of purposes of use and geographic reach, Top currencies, which is a 
term borrowed from Susan Strange’s classical typology of international currencies, are “those 
whose use dominates for most if not all types of cross-border purposes and whose popularity 
is more or less universal, not limited to any particular geographic region” (Cohen 2004, p.14). 









between the pound and the dollar during the interwar period, and solely occupied by the 
greenback since World War II.  
Immediately below the Top currencies are the Patrician currencies, a group of currencies 
which have substantial and widespread use for cross-border purposes, but one that are 
somewhat less dominant and universal. For most observers, today’s examples of Patrician 
currencies probably would be the euro and the yen.  
Next are Elite currencies, which are “of sufficient attractiveness to qualify for some degree of 
international use but of insufficient weight to carry much direct influence beyond their own 
national frontiers” (Cohen 2004, p.15). This group of more peripheral international currencies 
likely includes the British pound, the Swiss franc and the Australian dollar.  
Below the Elite currencies are the Plebeian currencies which, while retaining exclusivity in 
the domestic context, are of little importance abroad. Broadly speaking, Plebeian currencies 
are issued by smaller developed economies, by some middle-income emerging-market 
economies and by wealthier oil-exporters.  
The three bottom ranks in Cohen’s Currency Pyramid are currencies which, besides having no 
international use, gradually have their domestic terrain invaded by international currencies. 
Currencies that lose their domestic appeal as a store of value are called Permeated currencies. 
Currencies that are rejected by nationals not only as a store of value but also as a medium of 
exchange and unit of account are named Quasi-currencies, which have a domain more de jure 
than de facto. The last rank corresponds to Pseudo-currencies, which are currencies that exist 
in name only – such as the Panamanian Balboa – so that a stronger foreign currency is the 
favoured legal tender within national borders.  
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While these categories are very useful to illustrate the existence of a currency hierarchy in the 
IMS, they are not easy to implement for analytical purposes (Cohen 2015, p.16). Not 
surprisingly, studies about monetary power have been thus largely constrained to the analysis 
of countries that issue international currencies (or that have potential to be internationalise), 
repeatedly addressing the cases of the dollar, the euro and, more recently, the yuan. Despite the 
interest in EMDs’ influence in the IMS following the 2008 crisis, and the suggestion by some 
that EMDs’ currencies might increase their international role, little has been said about the 
nature of their currencies – i.e. the fact that they occupy a lower position in Cohen’s currency 
pyramid – and the implications of this condition on their monetary power.  
Recent studies by the World Bank and the IMF have demonstrated an increase in the 
international demand for EMDs’ currencies (World Bank 2011; Maziad et al. 2011). The 
economic approach of those studies considers the internationalisation of EMDs’ currencies in 
a broad sense, overlooking the idea that each of the six roles of currency internationalisation 
involves different benefits and costs for the issuing states (Figure 3).  
FIGURE 3: THE ROLES OF INTERNATIONAL MONEY  
 Functions 
Level of analysis Medium of exchange Unit of account Store of value 
Private Foreign exchange trading, Trade invoicing Investment 
trade settlement   
Official Intervention Anchor Reserve 
Source: Cohen 2015, 9. 
As Cohen (2015, p.78; 2009a) has pointed out, some roles have a greater impact on states’ 
monetary power than others. He has identified three particular roles as being especially 
significant: first, the two store-of-value roles, which enable the state to delay or deflect 
adjustment costs; second, the currency’s role in trade invoicing and settlement, which is the 
link between the two store-of-value roles. What economic studies show, however, is that the 
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demand for EMDs’ currencies has increased predominantly in global financial markets (World 
Bank 2011, p.132; Maziad et al. 2011, pp.6–12). Arguably, these currencies are not working 
as international currencies since they do not serve as medium of exchange, unit of account or 
store of value (Prates 2005, p.274). Rather, these currencies function as financial assets, and 
the increased international demand for EMDs’ currencies should actually be seen as a 
manifestation of their subordinated role in the IMS. 
While there seems to be a consensus among specialists that EMDs face different constraints 
than developed economies, the idea of a currency hierarchy is by no means unanimous. Instead, 
the greater vulnerability of EMDs is commonly attributed to their institutional weaknesses and 
poor macroeconomic record, which includes external debt defaults and high inflation. In one 
seminal example of this perspective, Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003, p.3) introduce the 
concept of “debt intolerance” to explain why “many emerging market economies experience 
overall debt levels that would seem quite manageable by the standards of the advanced 
industrial economies”. In their view, EMDs’ restricted access to international capital markets 
is a symptom rather than a cause of their debt intolerance (Reinhart et al. 2003, p.59). The 
solution then is to rectify the institutional failings that make a country intolerant to debt, even 
though the authors recognise that debt intolerance is a condition that can be difficult to shed. 
Under the surface, Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003, p.59) seem to be also describing an 
IMS as somewhat hierarchical and rigid, where the process to “graduate to greater 
creditworthiness … is seldom fast or easy”. 
While the importance of sound policies and credible institutions must not be underplayed, 
EMDs’ challenges in the IMS are not restricted to their own faults. The concept of “original 
sin,” introduced by Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999), better encapsulates EMDs’ problems. 
Original sin refers to the inability of a country to borrow from others using its own currency 
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due to the structure of global portfolios and international financial markets (Eichengreen et al. 
2007, p.160). This concept of the original sin is based on the costs and returns to portfolio 
diversification at the global level, which denote a limited appetite of international investors for 
international currencies. To that extent, Eichengreen et al. (2007, p.160) point out that 
“emerging market economies are volatile because they find it difficult to denominate their 
obligations in units that better track their capacity to pay, such as the domestic currency or the 
domestic consumption basket”. 
A major consequence of the original sin is the risk of currency mismatches, which correspond 
to the “differences in the values of the foreign currency-denominated assets and liabilities on 
the balance sheets of households, firms, the government, and the economy as a whole,” as 
defined by Eichengreen et al. (2007, p.130). If countries with original sin incur a foreign debt, 
they face a currency mismatch on their national balance sheets, the cost of which is always 
high, as explained by Eichengreen et al. (2005, pp.27–28): 
Movements in the real exchange rate will then have aggregate wealth effects. This makes 
the real exchange rate a relevant price in determining the capacity to pay. Since the real 
exchange rate is quite volatile and it tends to depreciate in bad times, original sin 
significantly lowers the creditworthiness of a country. Moreover, the wealth effects limit 
the effectiveness of monetary policy, as expansionary policies may weaken the exchange 
rate, cause a reduction in net worth and will thus be either less expansionary or even 
contractionary. 
 
To avoid having currency mismatches, many EMDs have pursued policies of reserve 
accumulation to insure themselves against potentially disrupting financial consequences. Yet 
international reserve accumulation is also costly, particularly considering that the yield on 
reserves is normally lower than the cost of funds.  
In addition, the original sin correlates with some other macroeconomic asymmetries that 
characterise what Ocampo (2001, p.12) has called “incomplete” domestic financial markets. 
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These are related to the size and depth of developing countries’ domestic financial markets, 
which means they traditionally face higher speculative pressures and are unable to provide 
long-term financing (this last feature has been referred to as “domestic original sin” by 
Eichengreen et al. (2005, p.25)). As a result, since EMDs’ agents are unable to borrow in their 
domestic currencies, they are forced to incur foreign-currency denominated debt if they want 
access to international markets, which is generally necessary given the characteristics of their 
domestic financial markets. 
To that extent, the underlying dynamics behind the currency hierarchy give rise to broader 
asymmetries in the IMS, which have essentially “centre-periphery” dimensions (Prates 2005, 
p.281). Since international currencies increase the policy autonomy of the issuing states, these 
states are less constrained by external conditions to pursue domestic goals while at the same 
time their policies have a greater impact on the global economy (Prates 2005, p.276). That 
means global shocks (of economic activity, financial flows, commodity prices and of the 
exchange rate of major currencies) are largely determined by the policies of centre economies. 
“These externalities,” Ocampo (2001, p.10) argued, “are strongly felt in the developing world, 
which must adjust to them but lack the degrees of freedom that the ability to supply 
international currencies provides”. There is, thus, a dichotomy between states that are business-
cycle and policy “makers” and “takers,” closely related to the existence of a currency hierarchy 
(Ocampo 2001; Prates 2005). 
There is nothing perverse about the currency hierarchy and competition in the sense that some 
currencies are preferred over others. Currency internationalisation, as Cohen points out (2015, 
p.9), “may be regarded as a quite natural demand response to prevailing market structures and 
incentives”. There is considerable agreement among specialists regarding the features which 
make currencies attractive outside their borders, and it is clear that only a few currencies are 
 31 
able to meet those requirements. On the economic side, aspects related to (i) the confidence in 
the money’s future value; (ii) well-developed financial markets; and (iii) a broad and large 
transactional network are the most important features to make a currency internationally 
demanded. On the political side, domestic considerations about political stability and effective 
governance as well as international considerations about the issuing country’s military capacity 
are equally relevant. Such economic and political attributes change over time, and that is why 
“no currency has ever enjoyed a permanent dominance for international use,” in Cohen’s 
(2015, p.13) words. 
In addition, given the mutually endogenous relationship between currency and power (Cohen 
2015, p.132), it seems unlikely that the IMS can evolve to a stage in which, for example, the 
key international currency is issued by a supranational organisation, so that the exorbitant 
privilege is enjoyed by no single state. By the same token, most states will resist abdicating 
from their monetary sovereignty; hence, the IMS will continue to be inherently hierarchical. 
Consequently, the challenge is how to deal with the consequences of such hierarchy in a context 
of globalisation and financial integration, or of the “integration between unequal partners,” as 
Ocampo (2001, p.12) stated. As the next section shows, this problem has so far been 
unsatisfactorily addressed from the perspective of EMDs. 
 
1.3   THE IMS SINCE 1944: AMERICAN HEGEMONY AND CONSTRAINTS 
FACED BY EMDS 
At its most fundamental level, the IMS is the set of written and unwritten rules that governs 
economic interaction of public and private actors worldwide. It specifies not only the accepted 
means of payments for international transactions, but also stipulates the institutions and ideas. 
In Eichengreen’s (2008, p.1) words, the IMS is the “glue that binds national economies 
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together,” being responsible for ordering and stabilising foreign exchange markets, for 
encouraging the elimination of balance-of-payments problems, and for providing access to 
credit in the event of disruptive shocks. In addition, Gilpin (1987) states that an efficient IMS 
must deal with three technical problems: liquidity creation, adjustment and confidence-
building measures. Since the IMS stipulates the nature of international money, the policy 
instruments that are acceptable to adjust the balance of payments and the legitimacy of national 
policy objectives, it is clear that every monetary regime generates both costs and benefits for 
its players (Gilpin 1987; Strange 1994; Block 1977).   
The current IMS, for instance, is rooted in the US economic prominence of the post-War 
period, when the previous monetary regime, the gold standard, was replaced by a new one – 
one which favoured US interests. Despite having been an international gathering of 44 nations, 
the Bretton Woods Conference and the international monetary arrangement that resulted from 
it was essentially the outcome of an Anglo-American battle, also known by its main architects: 
Britain’s John Maynard Keynes and the US’ Harry Dexter White (Boughton 2002; Steil 2013). 
Ultimately, White’s plan was accepted with minor changes. 
Mirroring White’s influence at the Bretton Woods Conference, a major modification of the 
BWS in comparison to the previous gold standard was the central role assumed by the US 
dollar, which became the only currency pegged to gold, while most other currencies were 
pegged to the dollar.7 In this system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates, central banks 
supplemented their gold reserves with international reserves holdings, most of which were 
denominated in dollars. The US could consequently incur deficits equivalent to the amount of 
dollars that the rest of the world demanded. This amount could be adjusted by the US interest 
                                                
7 This highly pro-American idea contrasted with Keynes’s desire to create a new world currency, the “bancor,” 
which was going to be issued and controlled by a supranational organisation. 
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rate, making it more or less expensive to buy dollars. Yet although the US was clearly the main 
state to benefit under the BWS, its exorbitant privilege was limited by the dollar’s fixed value 
against gold (Isard 2005; Eichengreen 2008).  
EMDs had a strong incentive to fully participate in the BWS since they were dependent on 
international funding, and thus expected to have access to the newly created BWIs, the IMF 
and the World Bank. The establishment of exchange rate stability, while fundamental to restore 
international trade in the developed world, created a handful of problems for EMDs. By joining 
the system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates, EMDs’ currencies normally experienced a 
real exchange rate overvaluation because of the inflation differential with the US. The higher 
level of inflation in EMDs was, in general, rooted in money creation to finance government 
expenditures, since other sources of public financing were scarce due to underdeveloped 
domestic financial markets (which, for its turn, was one of the reasons why EMDs were so 
eager in having access to international capital).   
Economic authorities in EMDs often tried to circumscribe real exchange rate overvaluation by 
introducing trade and exchange rate controls, but eventually balance of payments crises were 
unavoidable (Edwards & Santaella 1993, p.408). The sources of these instances of external 
disequilibrium were twofold: on the one hand, expansionary fiscal policies led to an increase 
in the demand for tradable goods, augmenting imports; on the other hand, real exchange rate 
overvaluation decreased the country’s exports competitiveness. The result was a worsening in 
the current account and an erosion of international reserves that sooner or later forced a balance 
of payments’ adjustment. 
Furthermore, being traditionally exporters of primary products, EMDs were also more 
vulnerable to external shocks in terms of trade. According to Eichengreen and Kenen (1994, 
p.30), developing countries had lobbied for a network of commodity agreements to stabilise 
 34 
the prices of primary products, but ended up agreeing to the foundation of the Compensatory 
Financing Facility (CFF) within the IMF. The CFF was designed to provide reserve credit to 
primary-producing countries in case of an unexpected drop in their exports earnings, which can 
be considered a second best solution since it remedied the consequences of the problem rather 
than the problem itself. The manner in which the CFF was established is only one example in 
which EMDs’ complaints were in vain. Despite their active role in financial and trade matters, 
as registered by Eichengreen and Kenen (1994, p.31), their demands were consistently 
suffocated and their problems were circumscribed in order to avoid disturbing the vitality of 
the developed world. 
In the early 1970s, the end of the dollar-gold system precipitated the breakdown of the BWS. 
Amidst massive flows from the dollar, the Nixon administration closed the gold window in 
August 1971, suspending the conversion of dollars to gold. The dynamics of the BWS relied 
on a very specific political and economic context of the post-war that gradually changed to 
pressure the basic requirements for its functioning (Eichengreen 2008, chap.4). In particular, 
the restoration of current account convertibility in Western Europe in 1958 and the rising 
international capital mobility that resulted from the development of the Euro-markets and other 
financial innovations added to the change in the political circumstances that challenged the 
international cooperation behind the Bretton Woods arrangement. On the one hand, West 
Germany and other industrial countries saw their support for the dollar increasingly at odds 
with their economic objectives at home, particularly regarding price stability. On the other 
hand, the US government was having its autonomy circumscribed by the BWS, since its 
expansionary policies were considered incompatible with pegging the dollar to gold, which 
triggered the flight from the dollar in the early 1970s. In this context, the US government 
decided to break its commitment in a unilateral act and simply communicated its decision to 
the international community, including the IMF (Eichengreen 2008, p.131). 
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In the post-Bretton Woods system, the dollar remained as the key international currency but it 
was no longer tied to any real commodity. The suspension of the dollar’s convertibility into 
gold granted the US a greater degree of policy autonomy because it allowed the US to incur 
recurring current account deficits. This elevated degree of freedom combined with the central 
position of the US in the IMS added to the instability of the system. The US faced no external 
constraints to pursue its domestic monetary policy objectives in interest and exchange rates, 
but the results of these objectives, due to the central role of the US dollar in the IMS, affected 
the whole world.  
An illustrative example of when US domestic priorities distressed the IMS was in the aftermath 
of the second-oil shock in 1979. Being a net oil importer at that time, the increase of oil prices 
by OPEC triggered inflationary pressures in the American economy. The US Federal Reserve 
Board responded by increasing American interest rates to contain the rise in domestic prices. 
While the primary goal of the US government was to hold inflation, the rise of American 
interest rates enlarged Latin American external debts, which were denominated in dollars and 
based on floating interest rates.  
The exorbitant privilege the US government has enjoyed because of the key international role 
of its currency is only one way in which the organisation of the IMS meets American interests. 
Besides assigning a central role to the US dollar, the Bretton Woods Conference also 
established the creation of two international financial institutions: the IMF and the World Bank. 
The IMF was founded to promote and monitor international economic policies as well as to 
provide short-term financial assistance to meet temporary balance of payments needs. The 
World Bank, by contrast, was designed to finance economic reconstruction and development. 
Both institutions are organised through a quota system and, unsurprisingly, the US holds the 
largest share in each.  
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American influence in the BWIs, particularly in the IMF, occurs not only through formal 
channels – such as voting and procedures – but also through informal rules that allow the US 
to set the agenda and control certain outcomes (Stone 2011, p.13). Stone (2011, p.55) shows 
how informal governance practices that “centralize decision making authority, limit effective 
participation and restrict the flow of information” have allowed the US to exert a decisive 
influence over the IMF (see also Copelovitch 2010). Other factors, such as the fact that the 
BWIs are located in the US capital, also add to the US’s tremendous organisational advantage 
over other countries. 
The US has been able to exert influence in the IMS further through the diffusion of ideas and 
policy prescriptions. In money matters, ideas are particularly important because of their 
distinctive relationship with “market sentiment,” as noted by Kirshner (2003, p.13), and “the 
overwhelming influence of that sentiment on the ability to practice macroeconomic policy”. In 
other words, while certain policies may be possible from an economic theory perspective, they 
will only be sustainable if market actors judge them as “credible”. The perception of credible 
policies, for its turn, changes over time and seems to be driven more by political than economic 
reasons. For instance, while there is no clear evidence that free capital flows is the best policy 
option8, the IMF’s recommendation changed in the late 1990s from capital controls to the 
elimination of capital controls (Kirshner 2003, p.6; Gallagher 2015, pp.69–70; Fritz & Prates 
2013, pp.3–4). Hence, pursuing financial liberalisation became a way for states to create policy 
credibility, signalling to the market that they were pursuing the “right” policies.  
Despite some changes from the original BWS, the core of the prevailing IMS has remained the 
same: its focal point has remained firmly centred on the US and the use of the dollar. Once 
                                                
8 “The competing argument,” as well noted by Kirshner (2003, p.5, footnote 3), “is not that capital flows are bad 
but rather that completely deregulated capital would lead to a suboptimally high level of flows”.  
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established, the IMS is very rigid and network externalities work in favour of the dominant 
power. In Cohen’s (2015, p.132) words, “currency internationalization does influence state 
power; state power does influence currency internationalization,” in a mutually endogenous 
relationship. In the case of the current IMS, leading scholars have recognised that the key role 
of the US dollar “has both reflected and reinforced America’s global prominence” (Helleiner 
& Kirshner 2009b, p.1). Furthermore, US monetary power is reinforced by a system largely 
dominated by American ideas and international institutions where the US has veto power, both 
of which contribute to the IMS’ inertia.  
The US power in the IMS contrasts with the power of other countries for which the global 
monetary arrangement was given. EMDs in particular have historically faced high external 
constraints not only because of the nature of their currencies (as discussed in the previous 
section), but also for being international debtors rather than creditors, particularly in the BWIs. 
Besides having to deal with the disadvantages of issuing non-international currencies, EMDs 
have often had to subordinate to the BWIs’ policy prescriptions in order to obtain the 
international resources on which they depended. To be sure, they needed to follow a certain set 
of “desired” macroeconomic policies not only to receive loans from the BWIs but also to be 
able to attract private international capital flows.  
Adhering to these mainstream policy recommendations, however, proved to be self-defeating 
for many EMDs in the late 1990s. After sticking rigidly to the so-called Washington 
Consensus9, many EMDs faced severe financial crises in the late 1990s. Disappointed by the 
response of global financial institutions and in the absence of perspectives for substantial 
                                                
9 The term Washington Consensus was coined by John Williamson in 1989 and originally referred to a set of 10 
economic policy prescriptions agreed by Washington-based institutions (including not only the IMF and the 
World Bank but also the US government) to Latin American countries. The set of policies included trade 
liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation. Subsequently, the term has been widely (and wrongly) used as a 
synonym with “neoliberalism” and “market fundamentalism” (Williamson 2004; Williamson 2000).  
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reforms to reduce the instability within the IMS, most EMDs, particularly in Asia, started 
policies of international reserve accumulation as a self-insurance balance of payments strategy 
(Aizenman et al. 2004; Rodrik 2006). In 2008, EMDs accounted for some 65 per cent of global 
reserves, against only 28 per cent in 1990 (Aizenman et al. 2010, p.1). 
Self-insurance policies also aimed to reduce dependence on the BWIs. EMDs gradually 
reduced their exposure to debt denominated in foreign currency by improving their debt 
profiles and paying-off their debts with the IMF. Further, they created and deepened 
mechanisms of monetary and financial regional cooperation. Following Asia’s example, where 
the ten10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus China, Korea 
and Japan (ASEAN+3) launched the Chiang Mai Initiative in 2000, South American countries 
began to invest in their own mechanisms for monetary and financial cooperation, such as the 
Mercosul Structural Convergence Fund (FOCEM, Fundo para Convergência Estrutural do 
Mercosul) (2005), the Local Currency Payment System in Mercosul (SML, Sistema de 
Pagamentos em Moeda Local) (2008) and the Banco del Sur (2009).  
The ability to pursue these self-insurance policies was made possible by a particular set of 
international economic conditions. China’s integration into the global economy led to a boom 
in commodity prices since the early 2000s which has mostly benefited EMDs, which 
traditionally are commodity exporters. The commodity run up represented an improvement in 
terms of trade for EMDs and, hence, translated into lowered external constraints. Moreover, 
the commodity boom was coupled with a moment of abundant international liquidity caused 
by America’s loose monetary policy. A considerable part of these resources was directed to 
EMDs, which offered higher rates of return than their developed peers. Such favourable 
                                                
10 The ten ASEAN members are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand and Vietnam.  
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international conditions helped EMDs to reduce their exposure to debt denominated in foreign 
currency and accumulate international reserves so that these countries were less vulnerable to 
external shocks when the 2008 crisis erupted. 
As a result of these policies, the interval between the EMDs’ crises in the late 1990s and the 
2008 global financial crisis corresponded with a period when EMDs relatively reduced their 
dependence on global financial institutions and increased their autonomy in terms of economic 
policy-making. This enlarged autonomy served to lessen the relative power of the US as it 
represented a decrease in EMDs’ dependence. While this unprecedented greater degree of 
autonomy was welcome, it did not change the underlying power relations of the IMS rooted in 
the currency hierarchy previously discussed. As the next section shows, studies on EMDs’ 
influence in the IMS during and immediately following the 2008 crisis have generally 
overlooked the continued subordinated position of EMDs’ currencies, focusing instead on their 
participation in global financial governance and on their capacity to influence ideas/policy 
prescriptions.   
 
1.4   EMDS’ INFLUENCE IN THE IMS DURING THE 2008 CRISIS: HOUSE 
OF CARDS 
The 2008 global financial crisis differed from other crisis episodes in two principal ways. First, 
EMDs were much less vulnerable to external shocks than they had been previously (Canuto 
2010, p.40; Canuto & Giugale 2010, p.9; Helleiner & Pagliari 2010). Second and most 
importantly, the crisis originated in the US financial system (Bordo 2008, p.2; Helleiner 2010). 
The origins of the crisis were rooted in America’s lax financial regulation and supervision, 
practices which were, for their turn, supported by the principles of financial liberalisation that 
had been vaunted by the economic mainstream (Helleiner 2010, pp.628–630). Financial 
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deregulation allowed the creation of some financial innovations in the American financial 
system, which transformed high-risk mortgage assets (now popularly known as subprime) into 
prime assets. Problems arose when US housing prices began to decline and those high-risk 
borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages were unable to refinance their debts. The default of 
those debts unveiled the existence of toxic assets in many American and European financial 
institutions. Governments bailed out key financial institutions to prevent cascading effects 
bankruptcies in their financial system, along with large fiscal stimulus packages (Bordo 2008, 
pp.3–4).  
For some observers, the crisis was symptomatic of America’s decline, not the least because it 
represented a failure of the American model of deregulated financial markets (Helleiner & 
Pagliari 2011, p.183; Helleiner 2010, pp.629–630; James 2010). To be sure, scepticism 
concerning the continuation of an US financial leadership arose not only because of the crisis 
but rather as the final straw in an ongoing legitimacy crisis that had started a decade before 
with the financial crises in EMDs (Helleiner 2010, pp.627–629). The mainstream interpretation 
for the 1997-8 crisis blamed policy mistakes within developing countries, where the crisis had 
originated, underplaying the role played by speculative global financial flows (Helleiner 2010, 
p.628; Helleiner & Pagliari 2011). Yet by the 2008 crisis, these unregulated financial markets 
were ultimately acknowledged as a source of international instability even by the most 
enthusiastic supporters of free market finance, such as Alan Greenspan, who was chairman of 
the US Federal Reserve from 1987 to 2006 (Helleiner 2010, p.628). As noted by Helleiner 
(2010, p.629): 
In contrast to 1997–8, the epicenter of this crisis was in their markets, generating massive 
taxpayer bailouts of private financial institutions and severe effects on their economies. 
These developments provoked strong political pressure within each country to tighten 
regulation on financial markets, both at home and internationally. When the crisis spread 
from the transatlantic region to the world economy as a whole, policy-makers elsewhere 
echoed the criticisms in the core, often reminding British and American policy-makers 
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of points they had raised after the East Asian crisis.  
 
Due to their former experiences with financial crises, EMDs’ financial systems were in general 
better isolated than those of their developed peers and were less contaminated by toxic assets. 
With many American and European financial institutions going bankrupt during the crisis, 
banks located in EMDs climbed in the rank of largest world banks, serving to increase their 
home governments’ influence in international regulatory politics (Helleiner & Pagliari 2011, 
p.176). In this context, EMDs’ reduced vulnerability was translated into greater autonomy, 
making them increasingly significant actors in global financial markets. 
The prospects for a change in the IMS balance of power were further increased because, for 
the first time, EMDs were part of the solution rather than the problem, i.e. they were creditors 
in the IMS. In this condition, EMDs were able to fund part of the financial rescue for US and 
European institutions through their sovereign wealth funds, central banks holding reserves, and 
state-owned development banks (Helleiner & Pagliari 2011, pp.175–176). This creditor 
position in the context of the crisis called attention to the EMDs’ economic power, and 
particularly that of China’s, while at the same time exposing US financial dependence on 
foreign support (Helleiner 2010, p.629; Chin & Helleiner 2008, p.88). 
The most symbolic representation of EMDs’ prominence during the crisis was the elevation of 
the G20 from a minister gathering to a leaders summit in November 2008, by a request of US 
President George W. Bush. This recognition of the importance of EMDs subsequently spilled 
over into other forums. The deliberations under the G20 influenced the expansion of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) to include Australia, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, 
Russia and Korea in March 2009. Following the April 2009 G20 summit in London, the 
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Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was also enlarged to include all members of the G20 that were 
not members of the FSF, which then became Financial Stability Board (FSB).  
The elevation of the G20 propagated EMDs’ influence over the BWIs. Following the reform 
of the IMF’s quota and voice in April 2008, in 2010 the Fund agreed (with more than 95 per 
cent of the total voting power) to enact wide-ranging reforms that increased the participation 
of EMDs, mostly at the expense of European countries.11 (The 2010 reform entered in force 
only in December 2015, after a 5-year delay of the US Congress in ratifying it). The 2010 
reform not only placed Brazil, China, India and Russia among the top 10 IMF shareholders, 
but it also ended the category of appointed Executive Directors hitherto enjoyed by US, Japan, 
UK, Germany and France. In 2010, the World Bank also approved a reform that gave 
developing countries more influence, besides agreeing to the first general capital increase 
(USD 86 billion) for more than 20 years. In 2012, the IMF embraced a new institutional view 
supporting the use of capital account regulation, therefore echoing EMDs’ views. 
Being part of the solution, i.e. having economic firepower during the global crisis, gave EMDs 
the opportunity to put their demands on the table with more power than ever before. In 
particular, they were successful in pressuring for reforms in the traditional BWIs, not only to 
increase their quotas but also to influence IMF’s recommendations. This unprecedented weight 
of EMDs in using international cooperation to their interest has been interpreted as a sign of 
their increased power in the IMS (Gallagher 2015; Helleiner & Pagliari 2011). 
According to several scholars, another major sign of EMDs’ increased relative power was their 
capacity to influence a change in the IMF’s recommendation for capital account liberalisation, 
one of the central pillars of the so-called Washington Consensus (Gallagher 2015; Helleiner & 
                                                
11 One exception was Spain, for example, whose share rose from 1.68 per cent to 2 per cent in the IMF reform. 
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Pagliari 2011). The IMF and the international community eventually recognised that easy 
monetary policies in developed countries, particularly the quantitative easing in the US, were 
creating negative spillovers for developing economies, which experienced a surge of inflows 
in the aftermath of the financial meltdown. The Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega 
identified these excessive capital flows as a “currency war,” which besides increasing volatility 
for EMDs also overvalued their currencies and served to weaken their international competition 
and their capacity to recover from the crisis. To counteract these spillovers, Brazil and other 
EMDs developed a series of regulations to mitigate the effects of cross-border financial flows, 
and these policies were eventually deemed legitimate by the IMF.  
Some prominent specialists have perceived this autonomy of some EMDs’ authorities to go 
against the mainstream view and implement domestic regulations to insulate their economies 
from exogenously determined volatility as a form of power. Helleiner and Pagliari (2011, 
p.177), for instance, argue that not only has China been reinforcing its “power-as-autonomy” 
by lessening the dependence of domestic firms on US and European markets, but also other 
EMDs, such as Brazil and India, have increased their ability to pursue independent regulatory 
paths. In a similar line, Gallagher states that “changes in global economic governance of capital 
flows were in part a function of countervailing monetary power, whereby at the national level 
EMDs were able to counter political pressure and sophisticated global capital markets to 
manage their financial stability between 2009 and 2012” (Gallagher 2015, p.12).  
In addition, the strengthening of the BRICS’ group and the creation of new international 
financial institutions (IFIs) reinforced the growing claims about EMDs’ monetary power. 
During the 6th BRICS Summit in Fortaleza, in July 2014, the BRICS states founded two 
institutions: the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement 
(CRA). With a focus on funding infrastructure and sustainable development, the NDB’s initial 
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authorised capital totalled US$100 billion, with an initial subscribed capital of US$50 billion, 
which was equally distributed amongst the founding members as were the voting rights. The 
CRA is a currency reserve pool to provide liquidity in case of balance of payments difficulties, 
worth US$100 billion. Unlike the equal distribution of the NDB, the CRA is funded 41 per 
cent by China, 18 per cent from Brazil, India, and Russia, and 5 per cent from South Africa.  
The creation of a developing-country alternative to global development finance has been 
welcomed by most critics of the prevailing IMS (Stiglitz 2014; Griffith-Jones 2014). Born out 
of resentment over the BWIs, the BRICS’ institutions were seen as a way to balance economic 
and political power in the global economy. These institutions may potentially generate a more 
balanced view on policy prescriptions in the future, since they will project the perspectives and 
beliefs of their members in key policy areas, such as macroeconomic policies, economic 
development and social policies. Moreover, the NDB in particular represents an additional 
source to supplement funding for infrastructure projects in EMDs, whose current supply falls 
short of demand, impairing economic growth. 
Albeit symbolic, these EMDs’ achievements were insufficient to trigger an actual change in 
the system as the NDB and the CRA have so far failed to occasion a significant departure from 
an US-centric IMS. This is due to two particular reasons. First, all of the start-up funding for 
the NDB was in dollars, contrasting with only 10 per cent of the World Bank’s paid-in capital 
for instance (Steil 2014b). Second, big loans from the CRA will be contingent on the IMF’s 
approval and therefore fail to reduce the role of the US dollar and from the traditional BWIs. 
In Eichengreen’s (2014) words, “the CRA is empty symbolism”. Thus, despite being based on 
a critical discourse about the prevailing IMS, the NDB and the CRA did little to overturn the 
previous balance of power in the currency hierarchy.  
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If we accept that monetary power is the capacity of a state to avoid the burden of adjustment 
to external imbalances, a burden which is strictly related to a state’s position in the currency 
hierarchy, it seems that little has changed in the IMS’s balance of power in the post-crisis 
period. Nearly a decade after the 2008 crisis, the dollar remains supreme and there is little 
threat from other competitors – at least for the moment. As Cohen (2015, p.159) said: 
Were Europe to get a real grip on its prolonged crisis, the euro might yet stage an effective 
challenge to the dollar; China’s RMB might eventually take a place commensurate with 
the size of the Chinese economy; conceivably, even the currencies of other emerging 
market economies, such as India or Brazil, could begin to attract international use. The 
message is simply that none of this has happened yet. Loose talk about the shape of the 
currency system as it presently exists is misleading and a deterrent to serious analysis. 
Multipolarity is not (yet) the new normal.  
 
To that extent, it should be of no surprise that as international conditions began to change, new 
external constraints gradually terminated EMDs’ previously celebrated economic policy 
autonomy. There were two main global reversals that impaired economic performance of the 
developing world. First, in February 2014 the US Federal Reserve began a gradual reduction, 
or taper, of its policy of buying bonds which it had started after the crisis to boost their 
economic recovery, known as quantitative easing. This change in American monetary policy 
triggered a capital outflow from EMDs, which was further reinforced when the Fed announced 
in December 2015 the first rise in US interest rates since they were brought effectively to zero 
in 2008. Second, the big boom of commodity prices ended. Prices began to slow down in 2011, 
but remained at high levels until 2014. Then, oil and metal prices plunged, in part the result of 
a reduction in Chinese demand, worsening terms of trade for commodity-exporting countries.   
These setbacks in the global economy progressively exposed EMDs’ weaknesses and recalled 
expectations around their growing influence. In August 2013 Morgan Stanley dubbed the term 
“fragile five” (Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, India and Turkey) to describe currencies that 
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“will face headwinds over the medium term from various factors ranging from high inflation, 
high Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER), external vulnerability from initial conditions, and 
vulnerability to further external deterioration based on a heavy reliance on fixed income flows 
and/or China related risks” (Lord 2013, p.16). Weaker currencies meant increasing constraints 
to finance EMDs’ current account deficits, at a moment when external funding became costly 
and scarcer. Once again, much of EMDs’ vulnerability centred around the nature of their 
currencies and the interrelated fact that, ultimately, they persisted as business-cycle and policy 
takers. 
Symptomatic of EMDs’ loss of prestige was the decline of the G20 as the main forum for 
international macroeconomic cooperation. From 2011 onwards, the two annual summits held 
in 2009 (London and Pittsburgh) and 2010 (Toronto and Seoul) gave place to one annual 
summit, in which multiple topics began to be included on the agenda. In the November 2011 
Cannes Summit, the G20 adopted “an ambitious but rather vague agenda,” according to Grevi 
(2011, pp.1–2), an agenda that was soon left at the sidelines given the spiralling of the Eurozone 
crisis. As the risk of global financial contagion disappeared and the epicentre of the crisis 
moved from the US to the EU, the G20 lost its priority on the agenda of developed economies, 
since the Eurozone crisis had its own management committee, the Troika (formed by the IMF, 
the European Commission and the European Central Bank). In the developing world, 
meanwhile, EMDs’ economies struggled to deal with the monetary spillovers of the developed 
world’s monetary policies. EMDs were left to “twist in the wind,” said Steven Englander, head 
of currency trading for major industrialised nations at Citigroup Inc. (quoted in Goyal 2014). 
In sum, the general assessment about EMDs’ influence in the IMS after the 2008 crisis suggests 
there are at least two main areas for further research. First, as put forward by Cohen, more 
attention should be given to the prevailing currency hierarchy and its underlying power 
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relations to avoid further illusions about EMDs’ actual monetary power. Second, the debate 
about monetary power needs to go beyond currency power in order to understand the case of 
EMDs (China excepted). That means clarifying to what extent EMDs’ influence in global 
financial governance and ideas/policy prescriptions can be considered a sort of monetary 
power. The case study of Brazil which follows in the next chapters will serve to shed some 
light on these debates. 
 
 
1.5   CONCLUSION 
The 2008 crisis and its immediate aftermath created a puzzle to understand EMDs’ influence 
in the IMS. Since EMDs were relatively less affected by the crisis than developed economies, 
many argued that the IMS had been in the midst of a major transformation in which EMDs 
would have a greater say. Indeed, it was the first time that EMDs were able to influence the 
agenda of global financial governance and also to confront mainstream ideas. Yet once the 
worst of the crisis had passed, EMDs’ influence began to lose steam. This is not to say that in 
hindsight EMDs’ influence during this period should be considered null and void. In the 
aftermath of the 2008 crisis, the BRICS group gained relevance, particularly in light of the 
creation of two new international financial institutions, the NDB and the CRA. Led by EMDs, 
these new institutions potentially represent a potential threat to the dollar-centric IMS 
structured around the BWIs. As it soon became evident, however, the new IFIs broke little 
ground with the previous arrangement, not least because they failed to reduce the dependence 
on the dollar.  
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The currency hierarchy must be the starting point for any monetary power analysis because it 
explains the differences between states in the IMS. As argued in this chapter, a basic distinction 
among states is whether they issue international or non-international currencies. Issuing an 
international currency gives a state a series of advantages, particularly helping them to avoid 
adjustment costs when they face balance of payments disequilibrium (Cohen 2015; Cohen 
2009a). 
While currency power is central to the analysis of monetary power, it circumscribes the 
possibilities for understanding the role of states whose currencies are not internationally 
relevant nor will they be in the foreseeable future. Since only a few currencies are able to meet 
the requirements for internationalisation, the existing framework to analyse a state’s monetary 
power excludes most countries in the IMS.  
This gap in the theory needs to be addressed if academic literature wants to understand the role 
played by states like Brazil, India, Russia and other EMDs with low prospects of issuing global 
currencies. While these states will likely never issue an international currency, they nonetheless 
carried some influence in monetary affairs in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis. 
This influence, however, is much less powerful than the influence from states that issue 
international currencies. To that extent, while currency power should remain central in 
determining a state’s monetary power and the hierarchy in the IMS, monetary power theory 
needs to advance in order to better qualify the power of states in the base of the currency 
pyramid. 
One way to improve the understanding about the role of EMDs in the IMS is to incorporate 
formally the role of ideas and global financial institutions in the monetary power analysis. 
Since the organisation of the IMS concerns not only the accepted means of payments but also 
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the institutions and ideas that govern worldwide interactions, it seems reasonable to consider 
the latter two features.  
As argued in this chapter, part of the inertia working in favour of the status quo system are the 
institutions and ideas, features that have so far mainly reflected US influence and interests. If 
changes in terms of currency are of little significance, the same cannot be said about institutions 
and ideas. While the change in institutions and ideas did not challenge the core of the IMS, 
many scholars seem to agree that EMDs’ influence has nonetheless increased.  
In this light, perhaps some distinction between sorts of monetary power could be useful to 
understand the case of EMDs; such as hard and soft monetary power, or economic and political 
monetary power. In this sense, hard/economic monetary power would be Cohen’s definition of 
monetary power and soft/political monetary power would be the power to influence institutions 
and ideas in monetary affairs.  
The power EMDs had during the crisis to exert influence over institutions and ideas was based 
on a temporary hard/economic monetary power (in the sense of autonomy). Even when this 
autonomy faded away, some of the soft/political power acquired during the period of the crisis 
remained, as is evidenced by the reforms implemented in the BWIs and the creation of the new 
IFIs under the BRICS. Such differentiation would make it possible to recognise that even 
without any significant alteration in the IMS hierarchy, EMDs nonetheless increased their 
influence through other channels than the currency. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE POSITION OF BRAZIL IN THE IMS FROM 
1944 TO 1994: EXTERNAL DEBT, INFLATION AND THE 
RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
2.1   INTRODUCTION 
The Brazilian economy has changed considerably over the past three decades. In 1986 the rate 
of annual inflation hit 2,700 per cent and in 1987 the government declared a moratorium on its 
external obligations, tarnishing Brazil’s image among international creditors. The Brazilian 
government’s agreement with the IMF was suspended in 1984 after it had failed six times in 
less than two years to reach the economic targets agreed with the Fund. Yet by the 2000s Brazil 
was being hailed as a success story, playing a significant role in the global economy in the 
aftermath of the 2008 crisis. In the eyes of the international community, Brazil had become an 
important participant in the IMS and a model of economic policy and development for other 
states.  
Taking this contrast into account, this chapter aims to provide an overview of how external 
constraints have historically played a major role in the direction of Brazil’s economic policies. 
Many of the topics addressed in this chapter have already been debated extensively in academic 
literature although unfortunately the greater part of this scholarship is available only in 
Portuguese. What makes this account of this transformative period distinct is that it analyses 
the international political economy (IPE) literature on the international monetary system (IMS) 
to consider the underlying power relations between Brazil and the world’s most powerful 
monetary states. In short, the objective in this chapter is to illustrate how the arrow of power 
has mainly pointed in one direction: from the IMS to Brazil. 
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The unprivileged position of Brazil in the IMS was manifested primarily through recurring 
foreign currency shortages as well as the dependency of both the government and private 
companies on international funding. The temporary resolution of these problems frequently 
depended on the direct blessing of the US government or on its indirect support through the 
Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs), the IMF and the World Bank, where the US is the major 
shareholder. In addition, access to credit lines of international private creditors, not only in the 
US but also in Europe and Japan, was generally conditional on a good relationship with the 
IMF.  
The subordination of domestic priorities to external constraints led to a politicisation of 
Brazilian relations with international creditors, particularly the IMF. The reason why 
international monetary and financial problems and domestic politics became so intertwined is 
because they had a direct impact on the quality of life of the population. The economic policies 
put in place from the 1980s to the early 1990s to deal with the problems of external debt and 
inflation precipitated the deepest recession in the recorded economic history of Brazil, which 
is known as the “lost decade”. Although the reality is more complex, a vast majority of 
Brazilians associate these economic policies with the IMF’s conditionalities, which has created 
crucial domestic political constraints on Brazilian governments’ relations with the IMF in 
Brazil. 
The analysis in this chapter terminates in 1994 as this year represented a major turning point 
for Brazil. First, the external debt restructuring was completed in April 1994 with the issuance 
of the Brady bonds. Second, the Real Plan was launched in July 1994 and permanently brought 
down inflation. In the preceding years, in the words of a high-ranked official at the Ministry of 
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Finance: “when you had to think about inflation 24 hours a day, you had no time to think about 
[anything else]”.12 
Understanding Brazil’s past as a polity that traditionally had its economic policy fundamentally 
conditioned by external problems is essential for conducting a post-1994 analysis. For instance, 
comprehending the politicisation of Brazil’s relations with the IMF allows us to see the weight 
of Brazil’s pre-payment of its debt with the Fund in 2005 or, more symbolically, Brazil’s rise 
a creditor of the Fund in 2009, amidst the world’s more severe global financial crisis. As a 
former foreign affairs minister said:   
Brazil could have the foreign policy it had [during the Lula government] because 
somehow we managed … to get rid of three mortgages, or at least two and were trying 
to get rid of a third. One was the democratic deficit. Brazil had the military government, 
which of course was a limitation for many things. I think Brazil, for several years, did 
not even run for the Security Council to avoid problems, it thought it could be refused, 
etc. Second, was the economic mortgage, the economic instability, inflation at the level 
that it was withdrew all the country’s credibility. I will not say this argument was 
expressly used, like “you cannot run for the Security Council because you have 
inflation”. It was not like that, but it created an image of Brazil as a fragile country. … 
And the third mortgage, which has not been fully redeemed, but somehow began to be 
rescued that is the social mortgage, the big social inequality. Brazil had a Gini index 
among the worse in the world. It is still bad, but improved, and has continuously been 
improving.13 
 
In this light, this chapter reveals in which ways Brazilian economic policy-making was 
constrained by the IMS from 1944 to 1994. The first section looks at Brazil’s relations with the 
United States, which consolidated its position as the issuer of the key international reserve 
currency in the post-war period. The second section addresses Brazil’s historical dependency 
on international funding, which resulted in a major external debt crisis in the 1980s that was 
only resolved in the mid-1990s without the IMF’s support. The third section analyses the 
                                                
12 Non-attributable interview with a high-ranked official at the Ministry of Finance.  
13 Non-attributable interview with a former foreign affairs minister.  
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inflation problem and how Brazilian policy-makers overcame it, also without backup from the 
Fund. The fifth section concludes the chapter.  
 
2.2   INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES OVER BRAZILIAN 
ECONOMIC POLICY-MAKING 
Since the United States’ ascent as the main economic and political power in the post-war 
period, Brazil’s relations with the US government have been strategically crucial for Brazil, 
not least because of the US’ direct and indirect power in the IMS. Thus, many economic policy 
decisions made by the Brazilian government since the establishment of the Bretton Woods 
System (BWS) in 1944 were designed to accommodate Brazil’s position in the system. Being 
part of the BWS was necessary not only to have access to the resources of the BWIs, but also 
to receive official assistance from the US government. In addition, being part of the BWS 
worked as a quality stamp to attract international private capital. The power dynamics of this 
relationship lay in the fact that in these circumstances the Brazilian government had virtually 
no choice but to adapt its economic policies to conform to the arrangement designed by the 
US. 
The pressure exerted by the US (and by the IMS that the US designed) on Brazil should not 
necessarily be conceived as a bad thing. For instance, there is some evidence that Brazil’s first 
embryo of a central bank had its origin in Brazil’s participation in the Bretton Woods 
Conference (Malan 1983; Armijo 1993, p.263). The Superintendence of Money and Credit 
(SUMOC, Superintendência da Moeda e do Crédito) was created in 1945, to work together 
with the Bank of Brazil and the Treasury as Brazil’s monetary authorities. This institutional 
arrangement lasted until 1964, when the SUMOC was replaced by the Central Bank of Brazil.  
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At other times, however, the need to fit into the BWS created serious burdens for the Brazilian 
government. One example was the government’s effort to maintain a fixed exchange rate 
system, a condition Brazil had agreed to when it signed the Articles of Agreement of the IMF 
in July 194414 even though that system began to create an external imbalance for the Brazilian 
economy as early as June 1947. The external imbalance resulted from the Brazilian currency’s 
appreciation in real terms against the dollar, given the differential between domestic and US 
inflation. To avoid devaluing the cruzeiro, the Brazilian currency of the time, which would 
have in theory compromised Brazil’s commitment to the BWS,15 the government introduced 
several import and foreign exchange controls in July 1947 (Vianna & Villela 2011, p.5). 
Even when in practice its commitment to a fixed exchange rate was unsustainable, the Brazilian 
government maintained the formal commitment to the BWS. Accepting this constraint came 
with a significant cost: exchange rate controls caused serious distortions in the price system as 
well as in the orientation of economic activities, encouraged corruption, and gave rise to a 
dollar black market (Pechman 1983, pp.76–77). Yet despite these drawbacks, Brazilian 
monetary authorities nonetheless espoused ties to the BWS on the belief that Brazil would 
benefit from economic support from the US government if they acted according to American 
rules. 
The US government’s decision to support Brazil or not, however, was grounded more in 
domestic reasons rather than in the Brazilian government’s actions. For example, the creation 
of the Joint Brazil-United States Commission (CMBEU, Comissão Mista Brasil Estados 
Unidos), in December 1950, was not a result of lobbying on the part of the Brazilian 
                                                
14 The Articles of Agreement of the IMF were promulgated in Brazil in May 1946 (Decreto no 21.177). 
15 The Brazilian government kept its commitment with a fixed exchange-rate even in the face of several “illegal” 
devaluations carried out by some European countries during the dollar shortage in the post-war period 
(Eichengreen 2008, chap.4). 
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government to gain American support (as it had been doing since the end of the war), but rather 
of a change in the US’ foreign policy priorities which occurred in 1949 (Vianna 1986, pp.194–
195).  
To be sure, the CMBEU represented not only a major qualitative change in the US’ position 
towards Brazil, but also a possibility for the Brazilian government to finance some key 
infrastructure projects (Vianna 1986, p.195). The CMBEU began its activities in July 1951 
with the aim of designing projects that would be financed by the World Bank and the Export 
and Import Bank (Eximbank). A substantial by-product of the CMBEU’s efforts was the 
creation of the Brazilian Economic Development Bank (BNDE, Banco Nacional de 
Desenvolvimento Econômico) in 1952.16 
The end of the CMBEU in July 1953 was also more related to American domestic politics than 
to actions of the Brazilian government (Neto 1990, p.164). In particular, since the late 1940s, 
a tension had arisen between the World Bank and the Eximbank regarding the financing of 
Latin America’s development (Vianna 1986, p.199). The Republican victory in the 1952 US 
election served to increase the leverage of the World Bank over the Eximbank, removing the 
latter’s influence from the field of developing financing. This in turn changed the US position 
regarding the Third World and soon after it dropped its support of the CMBEU (Vianna 1986, 
p.207; Abreu 2000, p.13).  
Brazil’s subordinated position in relation to the US was also manifested in subtle acts of its 
post-war governments, such as the decision to appoint Ministers of Finance and high ranked 
officials to the Brazilian economic team that would please US authorities (Vianna 1986, p.195). 
When Café Filho assumed the presidency in August 1954, for instance, he appointed Eugenio 
                                                
16 In 1982, it was renamed to the Brazilian Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES, Banco Nacional 
de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social).  
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Gudin as the Finance Minister, hoping Gudin’s international influence would help Brazil to 
attract international resources (Neto 1990, p.152). Gudin was very well regarded in the 
international financial community not least because he was a fierce critic of the developmental 
proposals, which often mistreated international capital. 
The developmentalist ideas were broadly associated with the objective of overcoming 
underdevelopment through state-led industrialisation. These ideas contrasted with the thinking 
that Brazil should stick to its agricultural vocation and aim to reduce state intervention, a point 
of view often referred to as liberalism.17 In the domestic debate, advocates of this latter position 
associated developmentalist ideas with populism, a matter that has since been subject to debate 
in the Brazilian literature (Bresser-Pereira 1991; Fonseca 2011). Likewise, advocates of the 
developmentalist ideas labelled their opponents as submissive or surrenders to international 
interests (“entreguistas”) in contrast to their self-proclaimed nationalist stance. These differing 
views were at the core of the Brazilian domestic political game and, not surprisingly, affected 
Brazil’s relations with its international creditors. To that extent, Brazil’s domestic debate on 
economic development was integrally associated with its position in the IMS. 
Echoing this debate, Brazil’s relations with the IMF have been historically surrounded by a 
myth that the Fund – and behind it the US – wish to subjugate Brazil through the imposition of 
conditionalities for the release of loans. This idea was inaugurated in 1959, under President 
Juscelino Kubitschek, who decided to halt negotiations for a loan from the Fund whilst selling 
domestically the idea that Brazil was breaking with the IMF. Kubitschek’s refusal to undertake 
the Fund’s requirements was perceived by the Brazilian people as a declaration of 
independence from US imperialism, with obvious political dividends (Almeida 2003, p.5). As 
                                                
17 To consider two opponent views is a pragmatic way to read a much more complex and endless debate in Brazil 
(see for example Fonseca 2004; Bresser-Pereira 2006; Bresser-Pereira 1991; Bielschowsky 1988). 
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this chapter will show, this myth of subjugation repeatedly influenced economic decisions in 
Brazil. 
On certain occasions, it is true that the US government made explicit use of its monetary power 
to influence economic decisions in Brazil. For instance, in the period preceding the military 
coup and most notably during the presidency of João Goulart (1961-1964), the US radically 
changed its conditions for providing external support. Before Goulart took over, in early 1961, 
the US government had, in the context of the Alliance for Progress, helped Brazil to conclude 
agreements with European countries and the IMF and had also made a loan to the Brazilian 
government without conditioning it to an IMF agreement (Loureiro 2014, p.329). After Goulart 
took office, however, the US government would only offer its financial assistance on the 
condition that Brazil re-established its relations with the IMF (Loureiro 2014, p.334). This 
change was grounded in American suspicions of Goulart’s links with communists and the fear 
that his actions could ideologically contaminate Brazil’s government and society (Loureiro 
2014, p.336).  
During the first eight months of Goulart’s administration, the US still released – under strict 
conditions – substantial financial assistance to Brazil. The reason for this more “cooperative 
approach,” as described by Loureiro (2014, p.337) is three-fold: it was due to Goulart’s 
moderate position at the beginning of his government; the fact that Brazil was too important of 
an asset to the US to be easily dismissed; and because of Goulart’s limited power under the 
parliamentary form of government, a form of government that the US believed was soon to be 
consolidated with a plebiscite scheduled for early 1965.18 
                                                
18 João Goulart assumed power after Jânio Quadros resigned in late August 1961. The rise of Goulart displeased 
not only Washington but also many segments in Brazil, particularly the military, because of Goulart’s past as 
Minister of Labour (June 1953 – February 1954) and his left-wing ideas. In the light of a very delicate political 
balance, Goulart assumed the presidency under a parliamentary regime – with fewer presidential powers – and a 
plebiscite was scheduled to decide Brazil’s system of government. 
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By mid-1962, however, when it was clear that Goulart was going to regain his presidential 
powers,19 the Kennedy administration changed its approach and used the monetary power of 
the US to influence the political orientation of the Brazilian government (Loureiro 2014, 
p.338). Knowing it had the financial resources Brazil needed, the US government opted to 
strengthen the anti-Goulart forces, rather than directly destabilising Goulart. In one clear 
example, the US government conditioned its aid on the ban of leftists in government positions 
(Loureiro 2014, p.339).   
By mid-1963, when Goulart dropped his formerly moderate stance, the US government 
engaged in a clear destabilisation campaign against him. In Loureiro’s (2014, p.348) words: 
“Alliance funds were released only to anti-Goulart forces, particularly state governors, and 
resources to the federal government were curtailed, except for the rescheduling of a few debts”. 
This increased difficulty in obtaining foreign loans contributed to the already unstable political 
and economic environment that helped to foster the American-supported coup d’état (Spektor 
2010, p.149; Fico 2008, pp.86–88). In March 1964, the US government launched “Operation 
Brother Sam” which was intended to support the military overthrow of president Goulart that 
began at dawn on 31 March 1964. As there was no resistance to the coup, the operation was 
disabled shortly after on 2 April 1964. 
After the military took over with the full support of the US, Brazil experienced a great increase 
in voluntary capital inflows (mostly foreign direct investment) and external loans. From 1964 
to 1967 Brazil received significant loans from the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and it became the fourth largest recipient of net external aid, standing only behind 
India, Pakistan and South Vietnam (Resende 1990, p.219; Hermann 2011b, p.62).  
                                                
19 The plebiscite to decide Brazil’s system of government happened two years before originally scheduled and 
presidentialism was restored in January 1963. 
 59 
Brazil’s unprivileged position in the IMS was also revealed in moments where the Brazilian 
economy was affected by cycles determined by US monetary policy. Aside from obvious 
episodes such as the increase in US interest rates after the second oil price shock, which 
triggered the external debt crisis in Brazil and in several other Latin American countries, there 
were also some more subtle circumstances in which Brazil assumed a cycle-taker position.  
In this regard, Brazil’s large-scale involvement in international financial markets in the late 
1960s can be associated with the increase in international liquidity generated by US 
expansionary policies at that time. The upsurge in the supply of international credit allowed 
countries like Brazil, which previously had no regular access to international financial markets, 
to become borrowers on a large and increasing scale (Batista 1987, p.11).  
From 1967 to 1973, Brazil’s medium- and long-term external debt rose from USD 3.3 billion 
to USD 12.6 billion, whereas the share of loans from private sources in the total public debt 
climbed from 26.9 to 64.1 per cent (Batista 1987, p.4). While part of this rapid increase in 
Brazil’s foreign debt was due to a deliberate policy of attracting capital pursued during the 
government of Castelo Branco, the strong expansion of credit supply in international markets 
had an equally significant role on capital inflows. Thus, increasing external indebtedness in 
Brazil at that time cannot, in Batista’s (1987, p.11) words, “be seen as an isolated phenomenon 
or as the result of a fully planned strategy of the Brazilian economic authorities”. 
US influence over Brazil was not merely through direct assistance and political and economic 
pressure, but also occurred through indirect channels and in particular through the BWIs. In 
the words of a former finance minister: 
Because who conducted, for example, the entire external debt crisis was the US Treasury; 
not the IMF or the World Bank. The US Treasury delegated to the World Bank the 
structural reforms, etc. and delegated to the IMF the negotiation of the debt. But always, 
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and directly, under the Treasury command. [The IMF and the World Bank] did exactly 
what the Treasury wanted.20  
 
At the heart of Brazil’s asymmetric relations with the US were Brazil’s currency-related 
problems. On the one hand, issuing a non-international currency meant that Brazil was always 
subject to foreign currency shortages to close its balance of payments. On the other hand, both 
the government and the private sector were dependent on international funding. As the most 
powerful state in the IMS, the US was in a privileged position to help Brazil with its currency 
issues. Recognising the US’ privileged position since the inauguration of the BWS, Brazilian 
governments often adjusted their economic policies to the interests of the US government to 
benefit from its support. 
 
2.3   THE OLDEST KIND OF SLAVERY: DEBT 
Brazil is a country that was born in debt. After proclaiming independence in September 1822 
the new Emperor, Dom Pedro I, found the public coffers empty because his father, Dom João 
VI, took all the country’s metallic reserves with him on his return to Portugal. As if this was 
not enough, the Portuguese government only agreed to recognise Brazil’s independence upon 
the payment of £2 million, a sum it claimed was an equitable compensation for its loss of 
territory. The loans that followed to finance the new state and to indemnify Portugal opened a 
long cycle 21  of Brazilian external debt (Abreu 1999, p.2; Silva 2010, p.49). Brazil has 
consequently been in a weak position relative to the IMS throughout its history. 
                                                
20 Non-attributable interview with a former finance minister. 
21 According to Abreu (1999), the history of Brazil's foreign debt is characterized by the occurrence of two long 
cycles of debt: the first goes from 1824 to 1943 and the second from mid-1960s until 1994. 
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While dependence on external capital was long a traditional feature of the Brazilian economy, 
a major turning point occurred after the first oil shock in 1973. At that time, when the whole 
world was adjusting to the inflationary consequences of rising oil prices, the Brazilian 
government decided to maintain a high growth strategy 22  despite being an oil importing 
country. This strategy was materialised through the Second National Development Plan (II 
PND), which consisted of an expansive investment program that aimed to increase Brazil’s 
energy capacity and the production of raw materials and capital goods. Leaving aside the heated 
academic debate on the rationality and on the long-term results of this policy (Bonelli & Malan 
1976; Lessa 1978; Castro & Souza 1985; Carneiro 1990; Aguirre & Saddi 1997; Fonseca & 
Monteiro 2008), the maintenance of a high growth strategy implied an immediate increase in 
the Brazilian external debt to cover the substantial increase in the current account deficit 
produced by higher oil prices.  
This strategy of growth through the expansion of external debt was possible because of the 
prevailing high liquidity in international financial markets that resulted from the prevailing 
petrodollar recycling. In this context, the profile of Brazilian debt underwent a fundamental 
change. First, the originally predominantly private external debt was replaced by public 
external debt, a process that became known as “nationalisation” of the external debt (Cavalcanti 
1988, p.15; Cruz 1984). On the one hand, this change arose because public enterprises, state 
governments and various public agencies contributed to much of the foreign borrowing as part 
of the government’s strategy to sustain relatively high growth rates. On the other hand, 
                                                
22 Behind the choice of an economic growth policy was the need to legitimise the military regime through rising 
living standards. 
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Brazilian law allowed private business enterprises to pay their debts in the local currency to 
the Central Bank, which then became responsible for the debt.23  
Second, external debt subject to variable interest rates began to represent more than half of 
total public external debt. Variable interest rate loans increased from 16.5 to 56.3 per cent from 
1971 to 1978 while the share of concessional loans, for example, decreased from 35.8 to 5.9 
per cent during the same period (Batista 1987, pp.24–26). As a consequence of these changes, 
Brazil’s external position, particularly for the public sector, became extremely vulnerable to 
alterations to international conditions. 
These external conditions further deteriorated in 1979 with the second oil price shock, a crisis 
that was further exacerbated when coupled with the sharp increase in international interest rates 
that resulted from the tightening of US monetary policy. This time, Brazil’s external debt 
immediately increased not only in reaction to higher oil prices but also due to this rise of 
international interest rates since Brazilian debt was at the time based mainly on floating interest 
rates. Additionally and in contrast to the first oil shock, it was more difficult for indebted 
countries in the late 1970s to raise new loans both because international capital was attracted 
to industrialised countries as a result of the rise in interest rates there, and because international 
investors reassessed the risk associated with indebted economies, given the increased cost of 
servicing their debts (Hermann 2011a, p.78). 
Despite the adverse conditions that resulted from the second oil shock, the Brazilian 
government managed to keep financing its balance of payments deficit by contracting new 
loans until 1982, when Mexico declared a moratorium on its external debt. The Mexican 
moratorium happened in August, just before the IMF’s Annual Meeting scheduled for the first 
                                                
23 Due to the need of resources, the Central Bank rolled over the debt instead of paying it off, which contributed 
to increase the public share of the external debt. 
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week of September, when private creditors and debtor countries thought a solution was going 
to be provided. The expectation was however proven wrong, as a Brazilian representative at 
that meeting related: 
Mexico broke in August 1982, and two or three weeks later was the IMF’s meeting in 
Toronto … And everyone held their breath, because what began to circulate was that it 
was going to have a way out. Because Citibank was going to break, Barclays was going 
to break, all the major banks were going to break, so it was going to have a solution. And 
then, the Secretary of the Treasury, Donald Regan, said more or less the “drop that, I 
have nothing to do with it”. So when the IMF’s communiqué came out and there was 
nothing, not a line credit, not anything, then there was panic.24 
 
After Donald Regan frustrated the expectations of private creditors and debtor countries for a 
way out of the crisis, the inflow of private capitals to developing countries, including Brazil, 
dropped sharply as they became too risky of an investment. Consequently, the remaining 
voluntary capital flows that had allowed Brazil to finance its deficit from 1979 to 1982 
vanished, prompting a huge external debt crisis. In contrast to the mid-1970s, when the 
Brazilian government had the chance to choose between different policy options, there was 
only one option to address Brazil’s economic woes: Brazil had to turn to the IMF. In the words 
of a high member of the Ministry of Finance at that time: 
Minister [of Finance] Galvêas was planning to leave Toronto and inaugurate a subsidiary 
company of the Bank of Brazil and he cancelled everything and returned to Brazil to 
manage the crisis. Because the credit lines began to dry up quickly, and we needed a 
strategy to deal with it. And the strategy was: let’s make a deal with the IMF to preserve 
the minimum of international reserves and begin the negotiations with the banks. That 
was end of September 1982.25 
 
                                                
24 Non-attributable interview with a former finance minister.  
25 Non-attributable interview with a former finance minister.  
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Despite the urgency for financial resources, the government waited until December 1982 to 
announce its agreement with the IMF. The reason for the delay was the upcoming elections in 
November which represented the first opportunity since 1960 for the Congress and the 
Electoral College to choose a civilian president after two decades of military rule. The 
government believed that announcing a package deal with the IMF could potentially impair the 
result of this extremely important election:  
It was fundamental for the government to win the 1982 elections and thus Figueiredo 
[the then president] vetoed any idea of going to the IMF at that time. And he said to 
Galvêas [the then Finance Minister] and Delfim [the then Minister of Planning] 
something like: “find a way!” I do not know the exact words, but it was “no IMF”.26    
 
The determination of the government to delay announcing its agreement with the IMF until 
after the elections depleted Brazil’s international reserves and worsened the crisis. The 
Brazilian government only managed to avoid declaring a moratorium in 1982 because it 
obtained a bridge loan from the US’ Treasury, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
and a number of American commercial banks (Cerqueira 2003, p.25).  
After reaching the agreement with the IMF in December 1982 for an Extended Fund Facility 
(EFF) and formulating a detailed economic program for 1983, the Brazilian representatives 
requested the commitment of the creditor banks to support on a voluntary basis the financial 
needs of Brazil. In February 1983, the Brazilian government also reached a formal agreement 
with the international private banks, which was conditioned to the IMF’s EFF agreement 
(Cerqueira 2003, pp.26–27). 
Despite the resources raised in these negotiations, the Central Bank of Brazil began to delay 
payments in foreign currency as early as February 1983. In July, the Central Bank “centralised” 
                                                
26 Non-attributable interview with a former finance minister.  
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the foreign exchange market to prevent a further depletion of international reserves. By this 
measure, local debtors deposited local currency into the Central Bank which then scheduled 
debt payments according to its priority and to the availability of foreign currency. This measure 
lasted until March 1984 when the previous exchange rate regime was restored (Cerqueira 2003, 
p.38). As a former finance minister said: 
And then [the government] began to manage a crisis in which the country was bleeding 
without great chances of reversal, because the crisis was only getting worse, and the 
country began to adopt defensive strategies. That is when it does, for the first time in the 
post-war era, the centralization of the exchange rate … and at some point the reserves 
were exhausted and the government starts to use the Bank of Brazil.27 
 
Besides delaying the payments, Brazil also failed to achieve the targets set by the IMF,28 a 
failure which led to the IMF and international banks’ temporary suspension of issuing new 
money to Brazil. Between March and July 1983, the Brazilian government only managed to 
meet its external obligations because it made an incredible effort to earn foreign currency as 
part of the austerity programme agreed with the IMF in December 1982 (Baer 2013, p.84; 
Cerqueira 2003, p.33). Then a second round of negotiations began in mid-1983, which resulted 
in an agreement with the Paris Club, in late 1983, and with the banks, in January 1984, both of 
which were dependent on the agreement with the IMF that was reviewed in November 1983 
(Cerqueira 2003, pp.35–38, 102). 
One of the reasons for the persistent insufficiency of resources was the misconception of both 
the Brazilian government and the creditors about the magnitude of the crisis. According to one 
close observer at that time: 
                                                
27 Non-attributable interview with a former finance minister. 
28 The reasons for that will be discussed in the next section. 
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The negotiation also started from an assumption that was proven wrong; that what we 
lived was a panic, not a structural change. And panic is resolved by super short-term 
measures. So what is the problem: everyone is crazy because Mexico did not pay, let’s 
sit down and talk, breath for a year, and then the wheel starts spinning again; the idea 
was that everything would go back to the previous status quo. Thus, what Brazil did was 
negotiate the 1983 maturities.29  
Gradually, however, the international perception about the crisis changed, as not only Brazil 
but many other Latin American countries began to enter into deep economic recessions. To 
that extent, the debt crisis began to become unsustainable not only from an economic point of 
view but also from a political one. In June 1984, the ministers of foreign affairs and finance of 
eleven30 Latin American countries met in Cartagena and demanded co-responsibility between 
creditors and debtors to find a solution for the Latin American external debt problem. 
According to a senior Brazilian diplomat, the Cartagena meeting was “hard fought by 
Americans; the Americans strongly pressed the Colombian government not to host such a 
meeting, but Colombia went on”.31 After two other meetings, however, the group dissolved, as 
Mexico and Chile preferred to negotiate their debt on their own. One senior Brazilian diplomat 
reflected on this meeting: “it was an interesting, peculiar moment. [Was it] ineffective? That is 
the question, because you can say that, in a way, that political pressure, although exerted for a 
short period, contributed to the Baker Plan”.32  
Arguably the stronger source of pressure to change the management of the Latin American 
debt crisis came from the creditors and through the Baker Plan. The Baker Plan originated from 
the proposals set forth by the US Secretary of the Treasury James Baker during the IMF annual 
meeting in Seoul in 1985 to combat the international debt crisis. In a way, the Baker Plan was 
a three-year delayed response that private creditors and debtor countries had expected after the 
                                                
29 Non-attributable interview with a former finance minister. 
30  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. 
31 Non-attributable interview with a senior diplomat.  
32 Non-attributable interview with a senior diplomat. 
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Mexican moratorium. The Baker Plan did not end up succeeding, but it represented the 
recognition by creditor states that something needed to be done about the debt crisis. As a high 
member of the Ministry of Finance at that time said: 
What experience came to show is that the problem was much more serious. It was a 
structural imbalance problem in the debtor countries, requiring much deeper structural 
reforms. And, moreover, [it was necessary to] restore growth. Because as the wheel did 
not start to spin again, all these countries began to enter into a process of a sharp drop of 
growth, recession, unemployment; all this was unsustainable in the medium and long 
term from the political and social point of view. Then entered a new diagnosis: the 
problem is long-term financing. And then comes the Baker Plan.33  
Thus, by 1985 both debtor and creditor states were in agreement that there was a serious need 
to change the approach to tackling the debt crisis.  
In the case of Brazil, in 1984, for the first time since 1979, the external constraint somewhat 
lessened. This was a result both of better international conditions, such as the reduction in 
international interest rates and a fall in the price of oil, and of domestic reasons, such as the 
good performance of Brazilian exports that year and a considerable increase in oil domestic 
production that diminished the burden of oil imports.34 In addition, Brazil continued deepening 
contractionary economic policies. Nevertheless, Brazil continued to miss the targets set by the 
IMF and its debt problem persisted. In the words of a high member of the Ministry of Finance 
then: 
There began to grow the idea that the problem was of debt overhang; that is, the debt was 
too large, and you need a strategy to reduce the size of the debts. A parallel with German 
war reparations was made. And it was something similar: Germany took over war 
reparations that were incompatible with its capacity to generate current account 
surpluses, etc.35  
                                                
33 Non-attributable interview with a former finance minister. 
34  This is one crucial point in the debate about the decision made in 1974 of growing under unfavourable 
conditions. In short, advocates of that decision argue that it paid off when Brazil began to increase its oil 
production, reversing a previous structural disadvantage. 
35 Non-attributable interview with a former finance minister.  
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The return of a civilian government in March 1985 added to the difficulty of subordinating 
domestic policies to the external problem at a time of economic crisis. Despite the slightly 
better circumstances in 1984, the Brazilian government failed in its efforts to renew its 
agreement with the Fund. Without the IMF agreement, the third round of negotiations with 
Brazil’s other creditors was impaired. The negotiations with the IMF were supposed to have 
resumed when the civilian government came to power; however, the new administration 
embraced a strong anti-IMF rhetoric and refused to accept any agreement that would result in 
recessionary policies (Bacha 1987, p.22; Cerqueira 2003, p.41).  
Remarkably, the Brazilian government managed to continue negotiations with international 
banks and the Paris Club even without the IMF’s support. After a period of interim measures 
(January 1985-September 1986), a new agreement with the banks was reached in September 
1986 (Cerqueira 2003, pp.41–42). Following the completion of this new agreement with the 
banks, the Paris Club also decided to resume the negotiations with Brazil and an Agreed Minute 
was signed on January 1987 (Cerqueira 2003, p.103). 
In February 1987, however, negotiations with the banks and the Paris Club were interrupted 
once again with the announcement of a technical moratorium36 by the Brazilian government. 
The moratorium had a very negative impact on Brazil’s image amongst its international 
creditors. In particular, Brazil broke the trust of the Bank Advisory Committee and the Paris 
Club, both of which had agreed to continue negotiations with Brazil despite the lack of the 
Fund’s endorsement. According to a former finance minister who was working in one of the 
banks affected by the Brazilian moratorium: “I experienced in London the feeling that arose 
                                                
36 The technical moratorium meant the unilateral decision to stop paying the interest on medium- and long-term 
commercial debt, besides the suspension of profits remittance and dividends payments of international companies. 
All measures were taken for an indefinite period. 
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against Brazil, even a certain revolt. … The image of Brazil went deeply down; the moratorium 
was really a shock”.37 
To be sure, the anti-IMF feeling was often mixed with a general aversion towards international 
creditors and in particular towards private banks. To an extent, it was the idea – one frequently 
kindled by the government – that the Brazilian crisis was the result of an international 
conspiracy to subjugate the country (Almeida 2003, p.8). In the case of the moratorium, a 
former finance minister remembered: “To give greater solemnity to the moratorium, Sarney 
[the Brazilian President] treated it as a matter of State, and brought the National Security 
Council to approve the moratorium. There was a meeting of the National Security Council, 
looked like the country was going to a war”.38 
In September 1987, the Finance Minister Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira tried to reopen the 
negotiations with creditors, suggesting for the first time the concept of “securitisation,” an idea 
which was to be advocated in the Brady Plan two years later. At that time, however, the 
proposal was considered a “non-starter” by the US Treasury, as reported by The New York 
Times on 9 September 1987 (Kilborn 1987). 
Despite Brazil’s damaged image, negotiations with the Bank Advisory Committee were 
resumed again in October 1987. According to Cerqueira (2003, p.46), one of the motivations 
for reopening the dialogue with Brazil was to avoid downgrading Brazil’s debt in American 
banks’ portfolios. The possible reduction of Brazil’s classification to value impaired would 
mean a loss realisation for the banks who would then have had to increase reserve requirements 
or write-off the Brazilian asset portfolio (Cerqueira 2003, p.46). Thus in December 1987 the 
government signed an Interim Finance Agreement whereby 114 creditor banks offered a 
                                                
37 Non-attributable interview with a former finance minister.  
38 Non-attributable interview with a former finance minister. 
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bridge-loan of US$3 billion to help Brazil pay the US$4.5 billion of accrued interest from 
February to December 1987 (Cerqueira 2003, p.46).   
The negotiations eventually resulted in an agreement with the Paris Club in July 1988 and with 
the banks in September 1988 which effectively ended Brazil’s moratorium. Despite this 
breakthrough, Brazil once again began in late 1988 to fail to make its payments and in July 
1989 an “unofficial” or “veiled” moratorium began. Although the Brazilian government was 
committed to regularising its obligations to its creditors, it argued that the payment could not 
undermine the goals of financial stabilisation and growth recovery (Cerqueira 2003, p.65). The 
regularisation began in January 1991 (Cerqueira 2003, p.65). 
Meanwhile at the international level, a solution for the debt crisis was devised with the 
formulation of the Brady Plan, which was developed in early 1989 by the US Secretary of the 
Treasury Nicholas Brady. The Brady Plan consisted of converting bank loans into new bonds, 
the so-called Brady bonds, which were then tradable in the market. These bonds were 
collateralised by US Treasury 30-year-zero-coupon-bonds purchased by the debtor country and 
normally with the assistance of the IMF. Mexico was in 1989 the first state to restructure its 
external debt under the Brady Plan, followed by Venezuela in 1990 and Argentina in 1992. 
In November 1993, Brazil also reached an agreement with its creditors under the Brady Plan 
to restructure its debt – although without the IMF’s support. The process began in April 1991 
when Brazil signed an agreement to regularise its interest due. In July 1992 it reached the main 
agreement with both the Bank Advisory Committee and the Paris Club and in January 1993 
this agreement was forwarded to the international creditor banks. Between January and 
February 1993, the chief negotiator of the external debt, Pedro Malan, together with other 
representatives of the Brazilian government ran a road show to present the agreement to the 
main international financial centres. After the acceptance of creditors in November 1993, the 
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Brazilian government only needed to buy the US Treasury bonds to serve as collateral for the 
Brazilian Brady bonds.  
The normal practice under the Brady Plan was for countries to first reach an agreement with 
the IMF and then use part of the money supplied by the IMF to buy the zero-coupon bonds that 
were specially issued by the US Treasury (Boughton 2012, p.425). Brazil, however, did not 
have an agreement with the IMF and thus “began quietly (through a leading US-based 
investment bank) purchasing existing US Treasury zero-coupon bonds in the secondary market 
using its own dollar reserves,” as noted by Boughton (2012, p.425). “We needed two and a half 
billions of dollars,” a Central Bank director at that time said, “we had at least 10 times that in 
reserves, so why bother making an agreement with the Fund? We bought directly the US 
Treasury bonds”.39 Under these circumstances, the Brazilian government not only decided to 
buy the guarantees for the Brady Plan without the IMF but also turned the situation to its 
political advantage, as a close participant at that time said: 
I think in January [1994] we already had the feeling that we were going to be able to buy 
everything in the market, easily. So we began to mistreat the IMF … it was opportunistic 
because we had managed to close the Brady Plan without the support of the IMF, without 
having the obligation to do the agreement, being able to say that the IMF was against 
it…40 
 
The issuance of the Brazilian Bradies41 occurred in April 1994. The agreements included the 
transference of the external debt responsibilities from the Central Bank to the Federal 
government. As a result, the Central Bank became accountable only for the functions of a 
                                                
39 Non-attributable interview with a former Central Bank governor. 
40 Non-attributable interview with a former Central Bank governor.  
41 There were seven different bonds: Discount bond; Par bond; Flirb (Front-Loaded Interest Reduction Bond); C-
Bond; DCB (Debt-Conversion-Bond); New Money Bond; and EI (Eligible Interest Bond). 
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typical monetary authority, which represented a major institutional advance (Cerqueira 2003, 
p.77).  
The restructuring of Brazil’s external debt, a process that dragged on from 1982 to 1994, 
typifies the problems associated with having debt denominated in foreign currency. During this 
period, the external problem took over the domestic agenda in a way that is familiar for states 
which issue non-international currencies. Essentially, a structural problem exists for Brazil and 
other EMDs who must adjust their economic policies to obtain enough hard currency to pay 
their international obligations – a situation that is unknown for countries that issue international 
currencies.  
The debt crisis serves as an interesting case from which to consider the balance of power in the 
IMS because being a major debtor actually granted Brazil some power.42 Notably, international 
private banks had a great interest in regularising Brazil’s debt and this interest ended up 
counterbalancing the IMF’s influence. In any case, the IMF’s influence on Brazilian economic 
policy-making was low. Significantly, the agreement with the Fund in 1982 did not alter the 
path of the economic policies, since the government had started IMF-style policies already in 
October 1980.  
 
2.4   FIGHTING FOR ITS CURRENCY: BRAZIL’S BATTLE AGAINST 
INFLATION  
Like the country’s external debt, inflation was for a long time a central concern of Brazil’s 
economic policy. A major landmark in dealing with inflation took place after the ascent of the 
military regime in 1964 and the subsequent implementation of a series of economic reforms. 
                                                
42 As John Maynard Keynes already said, “if you owe your bank a hundred pounds, you have a problem. But if 
you owe a million, it has”. 
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Among these reforms was the establishment of the Central Bank of Brazil, as the executor of 
monetary policy, and the National Monetary Council (CMN, Conselho Monetário Nacional), 
as the responsible agent for the normative and regulative functions of the financial system.43 
In addition, there was substantial improvement in the financing of the government’s deficit 
with the establishment of the first public debt standard instrument, the Adjustable Bonds of the 
National Treasury (ORTN, Obrigações Reajustáveis do Tesouro Nacional). Before 1964 the 
government was virtually unable to finance itself through the issuance of debt bonds, so that 
the deficit was recurrently financed by the issue of paper money (Resende 1990, p.218). At the 
core of these measures was the government’s determination to contain inflation, which had 
reached 94 per cent in 1964.  
For the newly formed military regime, however, the goal of containing inflation could not 
undermine economic growth (Hermann 2011b, pp.52–53; Resende 1982, p.777). Recovering 
growth rates was the key to “legitimating” the authoritarian regime (especially among 
enterprises and upper-classes) and, consequently, other objectives of economic policy were 
subordinated to that end. Thus, the measures to contain inflation could not threaten the 
economic recovery. The government’s plan did not aim to eliminate inflation, but rather to 
attenuate its acceleration. 
Since the government expected a two-digit inflation rate in the medium term, mechanisms were 
established in 1964 to protect the real return of assets during the transition period to low 
inflation (Hermann 2011b, p.58). The primary mechanism to cope with high inflation was 
                                                
43 Despite the foundation of the Central Bank as the monetary authority, the Bank of Brazil remained performing 
monetary-policy related duties, since it had in practice the power to create currency. According to the Central 
Bank of Brazil, “the Central Bank became the currency issuing bank, but acted according to the needs of the Bank 
of Brazil. It was also the bank of banks, but was not the sole holder of the financial institutions' deposits because 
the institutions placed their voluntary reserves in the Bank of Brazil. Besides, the Central Bank was the 
government's financial agent, in charge of managing the federal public debt, but was not the cashier to the National 
Treasury, since this was a function of the Bank of Brazil” (Central Bank of Brazil n.d.).  
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monetary correction whereby the nominal value of assets was indexed to changes in the 
purchasing power of the national currency. Given the persistence of high levels of inflation, 
however, the initially temporary measure of monetary correction ended up extending until 1995 
and spreading to the various instruments of the economy, such as rent, salaries and the public 
debt.  
The progressive indexation of all contracts and transactions worked reasonably well to deal 
with an average annual inflation rate of 21 per cent from 1968 to 1973, when the oil shock 
which began in October of that year quadrupled the price of petroleum. The effect of the oil 
shock was a general increase in world inflation in 1974, but in the case of Brazil this increase 
in inflation was perpetuated because of its indexation mechanisms (Figure 4). Despite the 
government’s monetary and fiscal tightening, inflation continued to accelerate in the following 
years and with the second oil price shock in 1979 Brazilian inflation catapulted from 56.5 per 
cent that year to 107 per cent in 1981. 
FIGURE 4: WORLD AND BRAZIL INFLATION, GDP DEFLATOR, 1972-1985 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. Elaborated by the author.  
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Two years before resorting to the IMF, the government began in October 1980 to implement 
very contractionary monetary and fiscal policies. Thus, the agreement with the Fund in late 
1982 did not really change the path of economic policies. The problem was that Brazil 
constantly failed to meet the targets set by the IMF, which were set in nominal terms. 
Consequently, even if the government made a real fiscal deficit reduction, it failed to meet the 
nominal target. In the words of a former finance minister: 
It was nominal, so it was impossible, impossible; and the impossibility was in the terms 
of the agreement. Because Brazil was in an inflationary process, which was not fully 
understood then, but there was a notion that the inertia was causing inflation, and that the 
inflation level changed at every shock, that inflation was always increasing … That is 
why we had to, every trimester, renegotiate targets, and in some cases ask for waiver.44  
 
In the 24 months following the 1982 agreement, the Brazilian government submitted seven 
letters of intent to the IMF to renegotiate terms, which served to increase the negative 
perception of the IMF in Brazilian society. As the Brazilian government could not achieve the 
targets set by the agreement, there was a feeling of a constant monitoring of the economy by 
the Fund at the time of its worst recession. As a former foreign affairs minister remembered: 
“even the liftmen in the public buildings knew who Ana Maria Jul was,”45 who was the person 
responsible to the IMF to verify if the government was complying with its agreement. In the 
same light, a former finance minister summarised: “the IMF was seen as the number one public 
enemy”.46  
This anti-IMF feeling in Brazilian society was fuelled by an incorrect assumption about the 
level of the Fund’s intervention in domestic decisions. As the former Finance Minister and 
                                                
44 Non-attributable interview with a former finance minister.  
45 Non-attributable interview with a former foreign affairs minister. 
46 Non-attributable interview with a former finance minister. 
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Planning Delfim Netto said: “I wrote seven letters in collusion with the IMF: I pretended I was 
going to concede and they pretended they were going to accept, which actually shows an 
understanding of the difficulties. I mean, they could ask for [certain things], but they knew I 
was not going to do”.47 According to several interviewees, the IMF was many times used as a 
scapegoat to justify the implementation of contractionist policies. In the words of one former 
Central Bank director:  
Having worked [at the Fund] and then having worked as authority in Brazil, I think that 
the Fund served many times as an excuse for the authorities to do what they need to do; 
but they do not want to have the responsibility… the IMF provides a service to take the 
blame of making an adjustment that is generally unpopular.48  
 
While politically convenient in the short term, this strategy was ultimately counterproductive, 
as a former policy maker observed: 
Politically it is quite tempting you say “I am doing this not because I want to, but because 
the IMF is demanding”. This may work politically in the short term to safeguard the 
government from a populist viewpoint … but it has a negative effect since the capacity 
to implement an adjustment program diminishes, because the reaction of the population 
is different. One thing is the government say to the country: “look, we need to make this 
adjustment”. Another thing [is to say]: “look, I have to enforce this here because the IMF 
is demanding”. Then the population resists to this external, alien element, which impairs 
the adjustment.49  
 
In January 1985 the seventh letter was not approved because the government had failed, again, 
to meet the targets stipulated in the sixth letter, established for the last trimester of 1984. 
Negotiations were then interrupted until the first civilian government after 21 years of the 
military regime assumed office in March 1985. 
                                                
47 Interview with Antônio Delfim Netto.  
48 Non-attributable interview with a former Central Bank director.  
49 Non-attributable interview. 
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The new democratic government continued to use the IMF’s negative perception as a piece in 
the domestic political game. The new government took office under a very unstable equilibrium 
after the unexpected death of the candidate directly elected by the Congress, Tancredo Neves, 
and the rise of the vice president, José Sarney, who had been a supporter of the military regime. 
Facing economic crisis and rising inflation, Sarney used the anti-IMF rhetoric to gather popular 
support. As a former finance minister related: “the Central Bank suspended the cars for the 
IMF staff; there were things like ‘you do not rule here anymore’”.50 
In addition, the ascension of Brazil’s democratic regime marked a change in the government’s 
approach towards inflation. On the one hand, the ineffectiveness of the IMF-style policies to 
reduce inflation helped strengthen the view that Brazilian inflation was not the result of 
overheating demand but rather of monetary correction mechanisms that perpetuated inflation 
over time. In other words, inflation had become inertial because most contracts had indexation 
clauses that restored their real value after fixed intervals of time. Regarding the nature of the 
Brazilian inflation, a former finance minister said: “the idea that inertia was the preponderant 
cause of Brazilian inflation was not accepted in the IMF, nor [in Brazil] as well. This idea only 
matured really in 1985, more or less”.51 On the other hand, as noted by a former finance 
minister, inflation also became a political matter under the democratic regime: 
[High] inflation began to threaten the survival of governments in a democratic regime; 
gradually, the Brazilian society was becoming intolerant towards inflation. Thus, solving 
the problem of inflation was not only an economic problem, it was a political problem, a 
social problem. … Everyone accepted that inflation was a terrible tax for the poor. The 
problem was what to do...52  
There were two concurrent proposals to deal with Brazil’s inertial inflation. One was the 
proposal of Chico Lopes, which involved basically freezing prices, and the other was the 
                                                
50 Non-attributable interview with a former finance minister.  
51 Non-attributable interview with a former finance minister. 
52 Non-attributable interview with a former finance minister.  
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proposal of Persio Arida and André Lara Resende, known as Larida proposal, which was later 
used as the basis for the Real Plan. 
In February 1986 the government launched the Cruzado Plan, based on the proposal of Chico 
Lopes. According to a former finance minister, Lopes’ proposal “had enormous advantages 
over the other: first, everyone knew how to execute it”.53 Immediately after its implementation, 
the Cruzado Plan successfully lowered inflation, giving the population a real gain in purchasing 
power. The consequent increase in domestic demand coupled with an overvalued exchange 
rate (which was part of the Plan) led already in 1986 to a trade deficit. Since 1984, trade 
surpluses had helped enable Brazil to maintain a comfortable level of international reserves, 
but after the Cruzado Plan Brazil experienced an exhaustion of its international reserves (Figure 
5). 
FIGURE 5: INTERNATIONAL RESERVES, US$ BILLION, 1983-1987 
 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. Elaborated by the author.  
                                                
53 Non-attributable interview with a former finance minister. 
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Arguably Brazil could have circumvented the situation with a loan from the IMF, but since the 
Brazilian government was not willing to resort to the IMF’s assistance, it decided instead to 
declare a moratorium on payments. The initial success of the Cruzado Plan had increased the 
government’s popular support, but then its popularity decreased again as inflation returned. 
Resorting to the IMF was not politically viable, as it would have further decreased the 
government’s popularity. Instead the government decided to use the anti-IMF feeling in its 
favour. As a former finance minister said, there was an idea inside the government that: 
The moratorium would mobilize society in support of Sarney, who had reached 80 per 
cent of popularity with the Cruzado Plan and was down again. So it was a way of Dilson 
Funaro, the Finance Minister, to apologize in a way… And there were a lot of people in 
the government saying, “let’s run over them, we will beat these guys up and we are going 
to gain popularity”.54  
 
After the initial success of the Cruzado Plan, inflation rose to an even higher level. During the 
following years, four other unsuccessful attempts to address Brazil’s economic situation 
ensued: the Bresser Plan in June 1987; the Summer Plan in January 1989; the Collor Plan 1 in 
April 1990; and the Collor Plan 2 in February 1992 (Figure 6). These plans became known as 
“heterodox shocks” because they challenged the orthodox logic of the IMF. Although each of 
these plans had their own specificities, they shared among their main characteristics de-
indexation, with sudden withdrawal or amendment of existing rules of indexation, and the price 
freeze, which constituted a genuine shock in the economy. As noted by a former finance 
minister, these heterodox shocks became increasingly ineffective: “the programs following the 
Cruzado, they had their reasons, but they were less and less able to produce effects, because 
                                                
54 Non-attributable interview with a former finance minister.  
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the failure of the Cruzado Plan generated defensive strategies. I mean, it was enough to smell 
a price freeze for companies to begin to adjust”.55 
FIGURE 6: INFLATION AND HETERODOX PLANS, MONTHLY RATES, 1980-1994 
 
Source: IPEADATA. Elaborated by the author.  
After the failure of the Collor Plan 2, the domestic political situation changed again when 
President Fernando Collor was impeached for corruption and his vice president, Itamar Franco, 
took office in late 1992. From October 1992 to May 1993 Brazil had three Ministers of Finance, 
until President Itamar appointed his Foreign Affairs Minister, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, as 
the new minister. Cardoso put together a team of economists56 to formulate another plan to 
control inflation. This was the Real Plan. 
                                                
55 Non-attributable interview with a former finance minister.  
56 The team was formed by Persio Arida, André Lara Resende, Gustavo Franco, Pedro Malan, Edmar Bacha and 
Winston Fritsch, plus Clóvis Carvalho who was not an economist and worked as the manager of the meetings.  
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The elaboration of the Real Plan overlapped with the negotiations for the Brady Plan and 
ultimately impaired the implementation of the Brady Plan through its normal IMF-assisted 
path, as explained in the previous section. As a close participant at that time said: 
The final rite of the Brady Plan mixed with the Real Plan. According to the Brady Plan’s 
rite, the IMF compromised to do a stand-by agreement with Brazil, where it would lend 
us the money to buy the US Treasury bonds that served as collateral for the agreement 
… But suddenly the national agenda overlaps with that because then we were making a 
stabilization plan, so the conversation with the IMF adds with the conversation about the 
Real. We went to talk with them, and they said: “look, we read the news and know you 
are preparing something; well, then let’s talk about the thing”. And then of course the 
conversation about finalizing the Brady Plan became a conversation with the IMF about 
the Real Plan.57 
 
Up until that point, the IMF had backed all the other frustrated stabilisation plans and thus it 
was very sceptical about the Real Plan (IEO 2003, p.121). According to one participant who 
helped devise the Real Plan: 
The IMF wanted extraordinary things; they wanted a primary surplus, which was 
impossible to achieve. We had just approved a constitutional reform to eliminate 20 per 
cent of expenditures; that for the IMF was still not enough. It was not enough primarily 
because they did not believe, because that plan looked like magic. … And the political 
situation was extremely fragile: Itamar was a nationalist, traditional populist. The IMF 
was very afraid… how long was Fernando Henrique going to last? … I do not know if 
they did not understand or if they had orders, I think they had a determination not to 
support the government, not to support this adventure. They had supported too much; 
this thing here was not going to work. No one thought it would work.58 
 
In any case, essentially there was not much disagreement between the Fund and the Brazilian 
monetary authorities at that time about what had to be done in terms of economies policies. As 
a member of the team that designed the Real Plan said: 
                                                
57 Non-attributable interview with a former Central Bank governor. 
58 Non-attributable interview.  
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There has never been much disagreement about what to do. We knew that we had to 
make the fiscal adjustment, all that. The reason why we did not do [the agreement] at that 
time I think it was a combination of resentment of the IMF, a past of bitterness… and 
from our side we realized that we did not need it, and that actually it was good not to do 
it. Although if we had done, there would not have been any harm. But it was better not 
to do it. We were not obligated [to the conditionalities], and the Real was not associated 
to the Washington Consensus, IMF, etc. so from the point of view of the internal 
marketing of the program was better.59 
 
Even if there were disagreements, the IMF’s conditionalities were mostly restricted to general 
targets so that it was up to the Brazilian government the decision of where to make expenditure 
cuts. As noted by a Central Bank official:  
The IMF did not order to cut health resources … The IMF said: “you have to have a 
surplus of ‘x’”. Then the government deliberated about how it was going to meet the 
surplus: “I will cut the money from contractors or I will cut health? … I will cut from 
health, it is easier.” Everyone complained? “It was the IMF that told me I had to cut!”60 
This adds to the point that the actual level of interference of the IMF in domestic politics was 
exaggerated. In a similar statement, a participant in the elaboration of the Real Plan said: 
The IMF could not care less; they wanted the bottom line. What should be cut was the 
government’s problem. Actually it was little intervention, they should have intervened 
more to say, “I want you to cut current expenses”. The IMF never had this attitude, let’s 
say, pro-growth. An adjustment with growth implied cutting current expenditures, which 
is much harder to do because these expenditures, in general, besides having very strong 
internal interest groups behind, also have very strong constitutional moorings. … So the 
problem was that, I think, the IMF had little concern with the content of the cuts, and the 
countries, forced to cut, cut where they could, and these cuts in Brazil were very harmful. 
The Brazilian government invested 5 to 7 per cent of GDP, and began to invest 1 per cent 
of GDP due to the cuts made along this process of adjustment. And this was the main 
problem.61 
 
                                                
59 Non-attributable interview with a former Central Bank governor. 
60 Non-attributable interview with an official at the Central Bank. 
61 Non-attributable interview. 
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Ironically, the IMF did not support the plan that permanently curbed the level of Brazilian 
inflation. Unlike the previous heterodox plans, the Real Plan had no price freezing and all steps 
were announced to the public in advance, engendering wide popular support. The Real Plan 
was essentially a three-stage procedure. The first phase began in June 1993 with the Immediate 
Action Programme and centred on the settlement of public accounts. The second phase started 
in March 1994 with the introduction of the Unit of Real Value (URV, Unidade Real de Valor), 
a unit of account which temporarily coexisted with the domestic currency, the cruzeiro real. 
During this phase, prices were converted to the new unit of account which was in turn tied to 
the US dollar on a one-to-one basis and daily readjusted to the domestic currency. Thus, the 
cruzeiro real was still used as a medium of exchange, but not as a unit of account. In the third 
phase, which began in July 1994, the URV was replaced by the new currency, the real, which 
was disassociated from the previous inflationary inertia. 
Since 1994, inflation has not been a problem for Brazilians in the same way that it had been 
before the launch of the Real Plan. As argued here, by the mid-1980s inflation was not merely 
an economic problem, but also a political and social one, with consequences that principally 
affected the lower sections of society. Moreover, the fight against inflation involved a 
considerable dose of nationalism, not only because of the symbolic weight of recovering the 
national currency but also because of the dramatic and contentious path that preceded the 
eventual triumph of the Real Plan. As shown here, the successful strategy had to first reject 
external solutions and go on to the develop a novel formula, based on the particularities of the 
Brazilian economy. Moreover, the Real Plan was executed with no support from the IMF, a 
fact that has unsurprisingly contributed to the idea that Brazil’s battle with inflation was a 
national victory. On this matter, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who led the stabilisation plan 
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and was dubbed the “father” of the Real, said: “we accomplished the Real Plan not because of 
the international support, but because of the local support here”.62  
The success of the Real Plan served to guarantee Cardoso’s election as President of Brazil in 
October 1994. When the presidential campaign began in May 1994, the PT’s candidate Lula 
was the favourite in the polls with 42 per cent against Cardoso’s 16 per cent, according to a 
Datafolha survey (1994, 2). By August, a month after the new currency had been launched, a 
new survey indicated 36 per cent of the voting population favoured Cardoso and only 29 per 
cent favoured Lula. By October the gap in voting percentage had increased further, with 
Cardoso securing 48 per cent and Lula only 22 per cent (Datafolha 1994, 2). 
Cardoso’s election clearly reflected how important an issue the inflation problem had been and, 
as time would show, would continue to be, for the Brazilian people. His election also marked 
the beginning of a new phase for Brazil, one in which the Brazilian government was for the 
first time no longer tied to the external debt and inflation problems.  
 
2.5   CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed the ways in which Brazilian economic policy-making was historically 
constrained by external conditions, examining in detail the period from 1944 to 1994. 
Throughout these years, there was a permanent subordination of domestic objectives to 
external problems, a feature which served to characterise Brazil’s position as an unprivileged 
country in the IMS with little or no degree of autonomy, to use Cohen’s monetary power 
definition. Indeed, the capacity of Brazilian monetary authorities to choose economic policies 
or to have any amount of autonomy was fundamentally affected by external conditions. Thus 
                                                
62 Interview with Fernando Henrique Cardoso.  
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the strategies pursued in 1974 (of opting for a growth strategy while the rest of the world was 
adjusting to the new oil prices) and in 1994 (of buying the guarantees for the Brady Plan 
without the IMF) were only feasible because the international conditions were favourable.  
At a macro level, Brazil was permanently constrained by its asymmetric relationship with the 
US – asymmetric here not necessarily indicating a relation of conflict but rather a relation 
among unequal states. Brazil was less powerful relative to the US to the extent that it depended 
on the US infinitely more than the US relied on it. This dependence in turn translated into 
Brazil’s necessity to fit into the BWS. 
Brazil’s subordination ultimately rested on currency-related constraints. For reasons that are 
beyond the scope of this research, since its origins Brazil had a weak or, one could say, 
incomplete domestic financial system, and it is from this reality that Brazil’s problems with 
external debt and inflation arose. On top of having to deal with the constraints of not issuing 
an international currency, moreover, Brazil had problems which are characteristic of the basis 
of Cohen’s currency pyramid, when the domestic currency suffers competition from other 
currencies at the domestic level. Brazil was never dollarised and, unlike other Latin American 
countries, the Brazilian currency preserved its functions of money, not least because of the 
mechanisms of indexation. In any case, the high levels of inflation created unwelcome 
disturbances in the economy. 
To that extent, 1994 was a milestone in Brazil’s economic history. First, the Real Plan 
consolidated Brazil’s monetary monopoly or exclusivity. Second, the Brady Plan added to 
Brazil’s monetary power by eliminating a major external constraint to which domestic 
objectives had been subordinated since 1982. By becoming less constrained by inflationary 
and external debt problems, Brazil had a gain of autonomy to manage its economic policies 
from 1994 onwards and, thus, had more power. Therefore, its gain of power laid in reducing 
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its dependence, rather than increasing its influence over others. While this was a major change, 
Brazil persisted as a subordinated country in the IMS to the extent that it continued to face the 
problems associated with issuing a non-international currency. 
In addition, Brazil’s experience from 1944 to 1994 identifies channels other than an 
international currency that can be used as a source of influence in the IMS. Even though the 
arrow of power pointed in only one direction, Brazil sometimes managed to reduce the relative 
power of the status quo through the use of diplomacy. This was clear, for example, when Brazil 
persuaded private banks and the Paris Club to continue their negotiations even after the IMF 
suspended its agreement with Brazil in 1984.  
Diplomacy, which in the case of monetary relations is closely associated with trust, was also a 
fundamental element for the success of the Real and Brady Plans. As a high member of the 
government during the elaboration those Plans revealed:  
What matters is to have trust. Of course when the currency is under control confidence 
increases, but if the currency is under control and the negotiators do not trust each other, 
it does not work. We did not have anything organized, yet we were moving in the right 
direction, and people trusted.63  
Such credibility is engendered basically by domestic coherence. As a very influential Brazilian 
politician said: “The basic issue is internal. When you lose the internal credibility, it reflects 
outside. You have to win first here, try to maintain the credibility here; the rest is a response to 
what is happening here”.64 
Above all is domestic politics. The Brazilian experience showed that whenever necessary 
politicians would sacrifice their international reputation to stay afloat in the domestic political 
game. Even an unprivileged economy in the IMS like Brazil in the 1980s, the government’s 
                                                
63 Non-attributable interview. 
64 Non-attributable interview.  
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decision-making will be subordinated to domestic politics. The main example of this tendency 
was Brazil’s moratorium in February 1987 in order to avoid resorting to the IMF’s assistance. 
In the words of a former finance minister: 
[There] was the interruption to the access to the international capital market. Practically 
everything stopped. And Brazil’s image was very damaged. It took time to rebuild. 
Because Brazil ignored at that time [the costs of this decision], for political reasons, even 
ideological I would say, ideological in the sense of a prejudice against banks.65 
 
The evidence that even a state in a weak position puts domestic politics over external goals 
adds to the debate about the responsibilities of the US as the issuer of the key international 
currency. In particular, it seems unreasonable to expect that a powerful state like the US would 
ever consider to subordinate its domestic problems to external ones. The difference is that the 
US monetary authorities have more autonomy and that American economic policies have a 
worldwide impact, but the logic behind the decision-making is very similar in the sense of 
prioritising domestic politics.   
In the case of Brazil, the IMF was an important piece of the domestic political game, not least 
because of the population’s negative opinion of the Fund. Consequently, while breaking with 
the Fund tended to increase a government’s popularity, resorting to the Fund in times of need 
had a negative impact as it could be seen as a surrender to external interests. This association 
distorted the reasoning behind what was supposed to be a technical decision, based on the 
economic need of external support, and transformed it into a piece of the domestic political 
game, sometimes with negative economic consequences, as the moratorium episode in 1987 
exemplified. In contrast to popular perception, however, the evidence presented here suggests 
that Brazil actually had relative autonomy from the IMF. 
                                                
65 Non-attributable interview with a former finance minister. 
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CHAPTER 3. CRISES AND CONSOLIDATION (1995 – 2005)  
 
 
3.1   INTRODUCTION 
With the integration of global financial markets in the 1990s, the world economy went through 
a profound transformation (Summers 2000; Isard 2005). Following the lead of several high-
income countries which gradually liberalised their financial markets during the 1980s, a 
number of developing country states implemented rapid financial liberalisation in the late 
1980s and early 1990s (Isard 2005, pp.54–65; Eichengreen 2008, pp.178–183). This process 
of financial liberalisation triggered a new cycle of capital flows to developing countries, which 
had dropped considerably after the 1982 Mexican moratorium. As shown in Figure 7, official 
and private capital flows to developing countries rose sharply in the 1990s. 
FIGURE 7: TOTAL OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE FLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, US$ BILLION, 
1980-1982 
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Financial liberalisation and deregulation, however, increased the vulnerability of emerging 
economies and ultimately provoked a series of currency crises from the mid-1990s until the 
early 2000s (Kose et al. 2006). Part of the problem that led to the crises was that although some 
resources came into the form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), there was a huge inflow of 
short-term capital which had been attracted by fairly liberalised capital accounts and relatively 
higher interest rates. At the same time, most developing economy-states had adopted fixed or 
pegged exchange rates to the US dollar either as part of their export-led growth strategies, as 
was the case in East Asia, or to help to control inflation, as was common among Latin American 
economies, including Brazil. As a result, if investors foresaw the possibility of devaluation 
and/or feared that the government would lack sufficient foreign reserves, they quickly 
withdrew their capital from the threatened economy, which in general resulted in a self-
fulfilling prophecy that obligated governments to devalue their currencies. Particularly in Latin 
America, another part of the problem was that the massive inflow of international capital 
allowed governments to postpone dealing with structural problems, such as high-income gaps, 
low productivity, low international competitiveness and weak public institutions (Naím 1995, 
p.46).  
The first of the mid-1990 to early 2000s currency crises broke out in Mexico in December 
1994. Earlier that year, the US Federal Reserve had augmented interest rates and thus decreased 
international portfolio investors’ demand for emerging markets’ stocks and bonds (Naím 1995, 
p.51). The expectation of higher yields in the US combined with the uneasiness surrounding 
Mexico’s political scandals and assassinations that year led to a huge capital flight from 
Mexico, the then second largest beneficiary of investments to emerging markets, just after 
China (Naím 1995, p.51). Like most other developing countries at that time, Mexico was 
committed to a fixed exchange rate. While Mexico’s monetary authorities at first resisted 
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devaluing the peso, the furious selling of Mexico’s currency left no choice but for the Mexican 
Central Bank to allow the peso to float in December 1994. 
The East Asian crisis that followed the Mexican peso crisis surprised most observers not least 
because it occurred in economies with apparently good macroeconomic fundamentals and that 
had hitherto experienced high rates of growth (Noble & Ravenhill 2000, p.1; Isard 2005, 
p.122). The crisis erupted in Thailand in July 1997, when the Bank of Thailand ran out of 
foreign reserves. Observing a decline in Thailand’s exports, investors began to doubt whether 
the government would be able to maintain the fixed exchange rate between the Thai baht and 
the US dollar. Capital flew out as domestic and foreign investors feared a decline in the dollar 
value of their investments and the possibility that there would be insufficient foreign reserves 
to meet all claims. Thailand was forced to let the baht float and to resort to the IMF, whose 
rescue package imposed several conditionalities on Thailand’s financial system, and eventually 
triggered a stock market collapse (Noble & Ravenhill 2000, pp.2–3). After Thailand’s 
breakdown, other economies with similar characteristics became targets of speculative attacks: 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and South Korea were all to suffer similar crises. 
Following the devastation of these economies, there was a further round of contagion through 
trade with negative effects on the whole globe. 
The global economic slowdown triggered by the Asian financial crisis resulted in a sluggish 
demand for crude oil, causing a sharp reduction in its price, which in turn decreased Russian 
foreign reserves. This external shock combined with other vulnerabilities of the Russian 
economy, such as a high fixed exchange rate between the ruble and foreign currencies and a 
persistent fiscal deficit, led to the 1998 Russian financial crisis. In August 1998, the Russian 
government devalued the ruble, defaulted on domestic debt and declared a moratorium on 
foreign debt.  
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After the Asian and the Russian crises, international investors became more risk-averse to 
emerging market exposure, which led to rising interest rates in these countries. The effects of 
such crises were soon felt in Brazil, where a US$ 41.5 billion IMF package in November 1998 
was not enough to prevent a financial crisis and the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate 
system in January 1999. 
The financial crises in emerging market economies in the second half of the 1990s exposed the 
instability of the international monetary and financial system and also the incapacity of the 
IMF to deal adequately with new challenges on a global scale. This scenario revived the debate 
about the necessity of reforming the prevalent monetary and financial system and developing 
a stronger structure for global capitalism (Garten 1999).  
From the developed countries’ point of view, the emerging markets’ crises in the 1990s 
revealed that those states were big enough to interfere in developed countries’ financial 
markets. In this context, the G7 finance ministers decided that it was time to include key 
emerging economies in global economic management efforts. In late 1999, the G20 forum of 
finance ministers and central bank governors was established, adding 12 new members – 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa, South Korea, and Turkey – to the original G7 members – Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States – plus the European Union. The idea 
behind the new forum was to strengthen the dialogue among developed- and emerging-
economy states within the framework of the Bretton Woods’ institutional system in order to 
promote international financial stability.  
From the emerging-markets states’ point of view, the crises in the 1990s made clear the 
inability of the IMF to respond to their needs. First, the volume of resources provided by the 
IMF proved insufficient to avoid capital flight and exchange rate instability. Second, the 
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conditionalities imposed by the Fund were considered extremely severe, such as policies of 
recessive macroeconomic adjustment and structural reforms.  
The IMF’s failures to deal with emerging markets’ financial crises in the 1990s opened up 
space for regional initiatives of monetary and financial cooperation and, at the same time, 
added pressure to reform the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs). In particular, the growing 
weight of East Asia in the global economy and its ability to cause worldwide damage to it 
called attention to the region’s underrepresentation in the IMF and other key institutions. This 
notion of a democracy deficit also reached the World Trade Organization (WTO). In the course 
of the Doha Round, which began in 2001, developing-country states resisted the US-EU 
agricultural proposal. In August 2003, during the Cancun Meeting, a document signed by 
twenty states offered an alternative framework on agriculture to the proposal of the US-EU. 
These twenty states became known as Group of 20, which allegedly negotiated on behalf of 
the developing world.  
Simultaneously, emerging-market states began to accumulate foreign reserves as a strategy to 
protect themselves against further currency attacks. As Martin Feldstein (1999, p.1) advised in 
early 1999, “liquidity is the key to self-protection”. In fact, countries with higher international 
liquidity, such as China and Taiwan, were less susceptible to speculative attacks against their 
currencies during the crises of the 1990s. The accumulation of foreign reserves by emerging-
market states began to outline a new dynamic in the international monetary and financial 
system, which Dooley et al. (2004) called Bretton Woods II.  
In this context, a unique symbiosis developed between the United States and China, where 
China became an increasingly important creditor of the US. The dynamic behind this 
relationship was that the United States had become the main importer of Chinese goods, 
transferring dollars to China. These dollars were acquired by the Bank of China to accumulate 
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reserves and avoid currency appreciation, which could hamper Chinese exports. China’s large 
currency reserves were then channelled into US Treasury bonds, financing a rising American 
budget deficit.  
These trends of the global economy became clearer after 2003 and inaugurated a new global 
economic dynamic that would last until the 2008 financial crisis. This transformation was 
largely rooted in China’s economic take off and its spill over into the major commodities 
markets, particularly oil, as well as into other emerging market economies, particularly the 
commodity producers (The Economist 2004; The Economist 2003; IMF 2004, chap.1 and 2; 
UNCTAD 2005, chap.3; Prates 2007, pp.335–341). Figure 8 below shows the increase in 
commodity prices since the early 2000s.  
FIGURE 8: COMMODITY PRICE INDEX, 2005=100, 1992-2008 
 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook. Elaborated by the author.  
Against the backdrop of these transformations to the global economy, this chapter analyses 
how Brazilian policy-makers dealt with the emerging markets’ financial crises and considers 






















































years of the Real Plan until the Russian crisis spilled over into the Brazilian economy, placing 
it in the eye of the financial hurricane. The second section discusses Brazil’s negotiations with 
the IMF to receive its November 1998 rescue package and how this package was insufficient 
to contain international pressure on the exchange rate, which was devalued in January 1999. 
The third section analyses the last crisis Brazil went through during this period, which was 
triggered by the ascension of the leftist candidate Lula in the October 2002 Presidential 
elections and then turns to the effects of the rise of China on the Brazilian economy. The fourth 
section looks at Brazil’s external influence over this period. The final section concludes the 
chapter.   
 
3.2   SMOOTH SAILING ON ROUGH SEAS (1995 TO 1998) 
The year of 1995 began with several economic uncertainties for Brazil. As argued in chapter 
2, the first years following the Real Plan and Cardoso’s election must be understood within a 
political and economic domestic context where maintaining price stability was of highest 
priority. When Cardoso’s government took power on 1 January 1995, half a year after the 
introduction of the new currency, many remained sceptic about the success of the Real Plan, 
not least because the five previous attempts at bringing down inflation had failed. Added to 
this suspicion was the fact that inflation did not drop in the first year of the plan and the 
Brazilian economy was clearly overheated. At the international level, the Mexican crisis came 
as a warning for Brazil of the likely negative effects of currency devaluation on inflation. In 
this context, the government’s highest priority was to secure the Real Plan’s success.  
One of the main pillars for keeping inflation down was the exchange rate policy inaugurated 
in July 1994 and which lasted until January 1999, when Brazil suffered a speculative attack 
against its currency along similar lines to that which happened to Mexico in 1994. In essence, 
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this policy consisted of maintaining an overvalued exchange rate, which worked as a nominal 
anchor to control inflation. In practice, however, there were some changes to the exchange rate 
policy management over this period. The system started with a float and, quite unexpectedly, 
the real appreciated, even surpassing the value of the dollar (Franco 2000, p.36). In September 
1994, the exchange rate reached the lowest admissible level fixated by the Central Bank, at 
R$0.83 to the dollar (Franco 2000, p.38). In December, after the Mexican crisis, the trend 
reversed and the exchange rate began to depreciate too quickly. Fearing the effects of a 
depreciation, the Central Bank established a ceiling for the exchange rate at R$0.86 to the dollar 
(Franco 2000, p.38). Gradually the system evolved to “crawling minibands” (Franco 2000, 
p.40), similar to the Chilean regime.66 In the words of one Central Bank governor:  
[The Central Bank] adopted a floating [exchange rate] policy of the real but within certain 
parameters, which meant in practice the operation of a fixed exchange rate regime rather 
than a floating [one], but there was a slide, the exchange rate was gradually depreciating. 
… [The system] was still very focused on the issue of anchoring the inflation, that is, 
using the external sector as element for reducing inflationary pressures.67 
 
Despite the periodic devaluation of the bands, which meant a nominal devaluation of the 
exchange rate, over time the real exchange rate was actually appreciating. As Figure 9 below 
shows, from the launch of the real in July 1994 until February 1995 both the nominal and the 
real exchange rates appreciated, to then depreciate until April that year. From then onwards, 
however, the nominal exchange rate slowly depreciated and the real exchange rate appreciated 
because of the differential between domestic and foreign inflation. 
                                                
66 The ceiling was made official in March 1995, but the Central Bank initiated intraband interventions only in 
June 1995. For a detailed explanation of this period, see Franco (2000, pp.37–40). 
67 Non-attributable interview with a former Central Bank governor. 
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FIGURE 9: NOMINAL AND REAL EXCHANGE RATES, 2010=100, 1994-1998 
 
Source: BIS. Elaborated by the author. 
While the strategy of sustaining an overvalued exchange rate was effective to deal with 
inflation, it created an external imbalance due to consecutive trade deficits and the difficulties 
of financing the overall current account deficit. Although the Central Bank recognised the 
problems created by the overvalued currency, it was deemed necessary to control inflation, as 
related by a former Central Bank governor: 
It was a process of stabilization, a process of consolidation of the [Real] plan. So we 
knew, we intuit, that at some point we had to move from fixed exchange rates to a floating 
exchange rate regime. And the floating exchange rate has some advantages, but at that 
moment the debate was quite complex due to the risks that a floating exchange rate could 
bring to the inflation at that initial moment.68 
 
On the one hand, the deficits in the trade balance were the result of a dramatic increase in 
imports that followed the Real Plan (associated with a greater purchasing power of the 
                                                
















































































































population and an overvalued exchange rate) combined with unimpressive exports results. On 
the other hand, the current account deficit was financed by capital inflows, mainly in the form 
of FDI, which increased from US$2.6 billions in 1994 to US$26.1 billions in 1998 (Franco 
2000, p.28). The resulting larger payments of interests, profits and dividends produced an 
increasing deficit in the services and income balance. Hence, the current account went from a 
surplus of 0.3 per cent of GDP between 1991-1993 to a deficit of 4.5 per cent of GDP in 1998 
(Franco 2000, p.28). 
The current account deficit had to be compensated with a surplus in the financial account, 
which was achieved mainly through the maintenance of prohibitive interest rates. In addition, 
the privatisation process that had begun under President Collor was broadened substantially 
under Cardoso, contributing to increased capital inflows and at the same time helping the 
government to deal with its fiscal problems, which was another main issue at that time. As 
explained by a Central Bank governor:  
We realized that due to the differential of domestic inflation to foreign inflation that over 
time our currency was appreciating in real terms, which of course would lead to a certain 
external imbalance. In the beginning [it was possible to] finance [the disequilibrium], 
due to large inflows of foreign capital, direct investment, etc. At that time there was a lot 
of foreign capital inflow due to privatizations. So there were no balance of payments’ 
problems at the beginning.69 
 
The other imbalance that this approach engendered was in the fiscal situation of the 
government, particularly due to the high interest rates applied to attract international capital 
inflows. The government used the credibility acquired through the Real Plan to finance its 
deficit by raising funds in the domestic and international markets by promising to make the 
necessary expenditure and revenue adjustments gradually. In addition, due to reasons that will 
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be discussed later in this section, the government also failed to implement badly needed fiscal 
reforms, such as the reduction in expenditures on personnel, the reform of the civil service 
pension system and of the social security system (Giambiagi 2011, p.172; Baer 2013, pp.131–
135). In any case, as long as international capital inflow levels were maintained, both the trade 
balance deficit and the fiscal disequilibrium were sustainable, although very expensive.  
Amidst this delicate domestic situation, where the fear that inflation would return justified the 
acceptance of the imbalances created by an overvalued exchange rate, the Mexican crisis broke 
out. In the immediate aftermath of the Mexican crisis, there was practically no visible impact 
of the tequila effect on the Brazilian currency, as noted by a Central Bank director at that time: 
“Brazil was more important within the asset class of emerging economies, and there was such 
a good thing happening with Brazil that the Mexican crisis impacted much more in other 
emerging than in [Brazil]”.70 In fact, as Figure 10 shows, it was not until March 1995 that the 
currency began to depreciate.   
FIGURE 10: EXCHANGE RATE R$ / US$, DAILY VALUES, 1994-1995 
 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. Elaborated by the author. 
                                                

































































































The speculative scenario that followed prompted the adoption of a ceiling for the exchange rate 
in March 1995 to prevent excessive depreciation which could endanger stabilisation. Other 
than this adjustment in the exchange rate regime, which was accompanied by an increase in 
interest rates, the tequila effect on the Brazilian economy was relatively small.  
Two years later the international economy was hit by the Asian crisis, and the Real became 
again a target of international speculators. Then the main concern for the Central Bank was 
still the negative effects that could be brought by a sudden devaluation of the exchange rate. 
As a Central Bank director at that time said: 
[The Asian crisis] had a double impact: one on the exchange flow, which was not so 
great, [and another] on financial flows, which if we have done nothing would have had a 
quite big devaluing [effect] in the currency, which at that time we did not want to. 
Inflation was falling below 5 per cent per annum exactly at that moment, so to allow a 
devaluation of 40, 50 per cent, I do not know how big it was going to be, it was crazy. 
… Then there was a pressure on our reserves, which is normal during crises, but the 
biggest pressure came from the derivatives.71 
 
As in the Mexican crisis, the primary impact of the Asian crisis was an increase of speculative 
pressure on the national currency, which caused the Central Bank to tighten monetary policy 
so as to discourage capital outflows. As a Central Bank governor said: “to beat down these 
speculative attacks, the Central Bank had to raise interest rates, it had to impose a really much 
stronger monetary policy”.72 As Figure 11 illustrates, every time there was an external shock 
the Central Bank had to respond with extremely high interest rates in order to defend its 
currency and to prevent the devaluation that could potentially bring inflation back, as had 
happened in Mexico. In annualised terms, Brazil’s interest rate increased from 19 per cent in 
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to 45 per cent in late October 1997 (which is the increase of 1.5 per cent to 3.2 per cent 
represented in Figure 11 in monthly terms).   
FIGURE 11: INTEREST RATE (SELIC), MONTHLY PER CENT, 1994-1998 
 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. Elaborated by the author. 
Fortunately, the Brazilian currency was once again able to survive the speculative attack. 
Amidst the Asian turmoil, Brazil issued in the US market a 30-year bond, the Global 2027, 
which was then the longest maturity ever issued for a Brazilian government bond (Pedras 2010, 
p.68). Moreover, Brazil also exchanged securities for the first time, which allowed US$2.2 
billion in Bradies to be repurchased (Pedras 2010, p.68). On top of these efforts, by April 1998 
the Central Bank had accumulated a record of U$74 billion in international reserves. 
Embodying Brazil’s performance, the then Central Bank governor, Gustavo Franco, was 
elected the central banker of the year by the British magazine Euromoney. As he said:  
What we did [during the Asian crisis] was an overwhelming victory against the 
speculative attack, and that may have given us a sense of self-sufficiency somewhat 
exaggerated. Well, from our side, the Central Bank was very secure about the 
management of these instruments of intervention in the exchange market. We also 
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increased interest rates, then we lowered, thus we had total freedom to practice this kind 
of action.73 
 
While Brazil withstood the Mexican and Asian crises, the government was unable to tackle its 
fiscal imbalance during those years. This was due to an interplay of economic and political 
factors. First, the fiscal situation was aggravated by the maintenance of high interest rates that, 
as explained earlier, were necessary to attract international capital flows and so sustain the 
exchange rate, which was a central element in controlling inflation. As this section showed, 
during this period there was little space to lower interest rates, since the real was continuously 
targeted by international speculators.  
Second, the delay in the fiscal reform was also the result of a deep division within the Brazilian 
Congress, which refused to accept reforms that could restrict the fiscal autonomy of the states 
and municipalities or that could negatively affect conditions of employment in the public sector 
(Baer 2013, p.135). As the end of the government grew near, the Congress increased its 
advantage over Cardoso, who was investing a good deal of his political capital to secure a 
constitutional amendment authorising re-election already in the October 1998 elections. 
Indeed, the constitutional amendment, which depended on Congress’ approval, would allow 
Cardoso to run for re-election. In this context, the Congress used its leverage over the president 
to reduce the scope and pace of fiscal reform (Baer 2013, p.136). 
Third, because there was much less uncertainty regarding the success of the Real Plan in 
tackling inflation than in previous years, it became politically harder to justify an economic 
policy that resulted in high unemployment and low economic growth. In other words, the 
absolute and unquestionable commitment of the government to price stability that marked the 
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beginning of the Real Plan gradually faded away as the Brazilian economy emerged unscathed 
from the speculative attacks against its currency. At the same time, other concurrent priorities 
began to emerge, particularly when Cardoso envisioned the possibility of being re-elected. As 
a Central Bank governor at that time put forward: 
We went until there with a bad fiscal situation, and the [Asian] crisis came, we renewed 
the promises to fix the fiscal situation, showed the measures, used a cumulative 
credibility, operated very well in the markets, did everything right. The only thing that 
happened is that three months after the crisis … we in the economic area noticed that the 
fiscal figures were even worse than before … I think the President was very, exceedingly, 
tranquil with our ability to deal with crises, so he was not as diligent with the fiscal 
situation as he promised, and should have been. So when the Russian crisis came, just 
afterwards, then it caught us flat-footed, then it was cruel.74 
 
As the next section will show, in contrast to the Mexican and Asian crises, the Russian crisis, 
which broke out in August 1998, resulted in an almost complete termination of capital flows 
to emerging markets, particularly ones like Brazil with visible and chronic problems. The 
shortage of international capital was worsened by the international bailout of the Long Term 
Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fund management firm in September that year. This time 
the attack was much stronger and radically reduced the policy options available to the Brazilian 
government.  
 
3.3   FASTEN YOUR SEATBELTS: THE REAL CRISIS (1998-2001) 
After the Russian collapse, Brazil became the centre of speculative attacks. The attack in Brazil 
came mainly through the C-bonds, the most liquid bond issued by Brazil in international 
markets that is used as a measure for risk premium. The C-bond risk premium rose from 600 
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basis points in July to more than a thousand in August, reaching 1,403 on August 27 (Figure 
12). These bonds were negotiated internationally and therefore were beyond the reach of the 
Central Bank. As a Central Bank governor at that time said: “for us it soon became clear that 
the Russian crisis was much more serious, much deeper. It was going to affect us much more, 
it was going to require more effort, etc., and then we had a credibility deficit, something that 
we never had until then”.75 The credibility deficit occurred because the government had failed 
in implementing the so-called Pacote 51 in response to the Asian crisis, which was supposed 
to substantially decrease government spending and so reduce the fiscal deficit.  
FIGURE 12: C-BOND SPREAD, DAILY VALUES, 1997-1999 
 
Source: Ipeadata. Elaborated by the author. 
In this context, raising interest rates to discourage capital outflows became ineffective and 
increasingly unsustainable as interest rates levels came close to 50 per cent in annualised terms 
by September 1998. Thus, to avoid a currency devaluation, and the negative inflationary effects 
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it would engender, the Cardoso government turned once again to the IMF. As a Central Bank 
governor at that time stated: 
Fernando Henrique brought everyone together one day at the Palácio [do Planalto, the 
official workplace of the President of Brazil], a secret meeting, to say “we are going to 
make an agreement with the IMF, because it is a way to borrow a credibility that we 
dissipated, and at the same time it is going to obligate us to make the fiscal ‘homework’ 
that we did not do”.76  
 
With the October 1998 elections looming, Cardoso made a speech announcing his decision to 
negotiate with the IMF. According to a close observer: 
It was a difficult decision, because then Fernando Henrique had to change his mind and 
say “the campaign is going to be different: instead of campaigning for [growth], my 
campaign is going to be ‘I know how to deal with crises,’” which was what elected him 
at that time. So there were unthinkable things during the election period, like increasing 
interest rates and such. It was really a crisis. [There were] some days that we lost a billion 
and half of reserves, some days even more; a lot of nervousness in the market, but he 
showed a very tranquil face.77 
 
As indicated in Brazil’s Letter of Intent to the IMF in November 1998, the program with the 
Fund was of a “preventive nature” (IMF 1998, p.1) and was intended to restore the country’s 
credibility and to reduce the risk-aversion problem due to deep uncertainties in the financial 
international markets at that time. The IMF announced a US$41.5 billion rescue package for 
Brazil, which combined a stand-by credit of the Fund of about US$18 billion, US$4.5 billion 
from the World Bank and a similar amount from the Inter-American Development Bank, plus 
loans from 20 countries under the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) that amounted to 
US$14.5 billion, of which the US contributed the largest sum of US$5 billion. As explained by 
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a former Central Bank governor, the program required the cooperation of the international 
community, since the package approved largely exceeded Brazil’s access to IMF financing:  
The IMF is not a bank, it is an organization that when it needs to lend money through a 
stand-by agreement, it goes until 5 times the quota. I think Brazil’s quota was US$3 
billion so the IMF could automatically lend some US$15 billion … but we wanted to 
make a US$40 billion package, so to make the US$40 billion package the IMF used a 
supplementary facility that had been created during the Asian crisis … The agreement 
required many meetings, like one to one, and there was a great deal of goodwill. … In 
general, the agreement was a very nice experiment of organization, of international 
cooperation led by the IMF, everyone was happy with the program.78 
 
In fact, compared to the rescue packages that had been offered to the Asian countries, the 
Brazilian package had much better conditions. As a close observer noted: “the Fund never did 
here what it did in other countries [referring mainly to Asian countries], those absurd 
conditionalities… a country like Brazil does not have to accept these things, and we were not 
in such a desperate situation as well”.79 Another reason why the package was considered 
favourably from Brazil’s perspective was the convergence of ideas about what was necessary 
between Brazilian policy-makers and the IMF’s staff. As a Central Bank governor noted: 
I think it is good when you make an international agreement where the other party wants 
you to do something that is in your own interest, and that you would like to do anyway. 
So in this aspect, it was a very good agreement for us; we did not feel obligated to do 
anything we would not have done ourselves. And I remember very well all of us [the 
economic team] in the audience with the Senate saying this; every time that the national 
sovereignty discourse came, I said “I do not have any problems in doing an international 
agreement that obligates me to do something I was going to do anyway”.80  
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Finally, there was a soft power element that allowed Brazil to reach a favourable agreement, 
which was the good relationship between Cardoso and Clinton. As Cardoso said: 
I must also say that actually we reached the 1998 agreement because Clinton supported 
it. I have until today a very strong relationship with Clinton. … The order of command 
is so: the Fund has its independence, but the American Treasury has a very overbearing 
part there, very large, predominant. … I spoke with Clinton when they started to ask a 
lot, to raise interest rates and such. I said “Bill, I cannot do that, I have just been elected, 
it will look like I am fooling the people” … Clinton was understanding, and his finance 
ministers as well, … Obviously it was not unconditional, … but when you have political 
trust it is easier for you to get a more positive negotiation.81  
By mid-December 1998, the Brazilian Congress had approved about two thirds of the fiscal 
adjustment provided in the IMF’s program. Despite the economic stagnation, inflation had 
finally been beaten down, allowing the dismantling of the mechanisms created to deal with 
those astronomical inflation levels. As explained by a former Central Bank governor: “Brazil 
truly deindexed from 1997 to 1998, when inflation fell lower than 2 per cent; … it detoxified 
people’s minds. That was very important, we perceived on a daily basis people getting rid of 
the annoyance that was to deal with inflation”.82 
Nevertheless, the following months were marked by economic and political turbulence that 
impaired the hitherto fairly positive expectations about Brazil’s economy. Led by the state 
Governor of Minas Gerais Itamar Franco, the newly elected governors of opposition parties 
declared a moratorium on the service payments on the debt owed by the states, including Rio 
Grande do Sul and Rio de Janeiro. This was followed by the Congress’ rejection of the 
government’s pension reform proposals, increasing the distrust about the government’s 
commitment to fiscal adjustment. Meanwhile, the current account deficit kept mounting, 
intensifying the internal debate about the future path of the exchange rate policy. As argued in 
the previous section, there was a relative consensus amongst Brazilian policy-makers that the 
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currency was overvalued and that they should eventually adopt a floating system, but 
significant disagreement remained about how to make a smooth transition.  
In early January 1999, President Cardoso decided to support the proposal headed by Francisco 
(Chico) Lopes which intended to allow a speedier devaluation of the real by raising the 
currency ceiling faster than the currency floor. The new exchange rate policy was formally 
announced on January 13, and on that first day of the new band system the exchange rate 
already reached its ceiling, representing a devaluation of 9 per cent. The band system lasted for 
another 24 hours until it became unsustainable and the Central Bank, this time with absolutely 
no alternatives, allowed the real to float (Figure 13). 
FIGURE 13: EXCHANGE RATE R$ / US$, DAILY VALUES, 1998-1999 
 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. Elaborated by the author. 
The devaluation of the currency was immediately followed by a substantial increase in interest 
rates, because the new Central Bank governor, Armínio Fraga, feared that the Brazilian 
economy could follow the Mexican path. In his own words:  
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[In Mexico] there was an overshooting in the exchange rate and Mexican inflation 
skyrocketed, reaching almost 50 per cent in the intra-year or even more. We had a huge 
fear that in our case this was going to re-index [the economy]. I mean, it is a country with 
a very strong history of inflation and this is somewhat built into the behaviour of 
companies and of people, and in the end this was going to be the end of the Real Plan, so 
we did everything for that not to happen. … Opinion polls about inflation expectations 
suggested something between 20 and 50 per cent, and we knew that any two digits 
number was going to prejudice us a lot. So there was the formation of the inflation 
targeting system, with the floating exchange rate, and so on.83 
 
To that extent, the abrupt raise in interest rates must be placed within the context of an economy 
that had just very recently disentangled from persistent high inflation, and the fear expressed 
by monetary authorities of the return of high inflation was real given the Mexican experience. 
Also, the increase in interest rates was not the only response of the government towards the 
crisis. As noted by a former Central Bank governor: “since 1998, Brazil had been finally 
making the fiscal adjustment, and there was all this work of building trust, not only to help to 
cover the balance of payments needs, but also to change the risk perception associated with 
Brazil at that moment”.84 
Rebuilding international confidence was essential since the main inflationary element affecting 
the Brazilian economy was the exchange rate, which was in turn connected to the balance of 
payments, in particular to the capital account, where fluctuations happen much faster than in 
the current account. The first step was to re-design Brazil’s program with the IMF, adapting its 
terms to address the new reality of a floating exchange rate and inflation targets. Following the 
rapprochement with the Fund, the Brazilian economic team also invested in strengthening its 
ties with the rest of the international community. As the Central Bank governor then related: 
Even before I was approved [by the Senate] for the Central Bank, I went to Washington 
along with Amaury Bier, who was the executive secretary in the Ministry of Finance, 
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and we spoke with the IMF, with the American Treasury, to rebuild the basis of trust … 
We restructured the agreement, we got the American support, … and then it took off. 
Then we travelled the world to speak with the banks, to show our balance of payments, 
that we did not need too much rolling from them, that it was a problem that could be 
solved. … It was an effort of coordinating expectations … so we did this comprehensive 
work with three groups traveling to Asia, Europe, and the United States, making several 
presentations for banks, investors, saying “look, this is our problem, this is what we are 
doing, this are the reforms we are proposing and executing, and it has everything to 
succeed”. And it worked; it was almost as by magic. [After] that raise in the interest rates, 
which was the biggest, the last one, the interest curve spectacularly inverted, and then we 
knew that the thing was going well.85 
 
These efforts on the part of the Brazilian government did indeed prevent the return of inflation, 
and from early 1999 the Brazilian economy began resuming its growth. The government 
succeeded in improving the fiscal situation, which began with the partial approval of the social 
security reform in December 1998, and later with the approval of the Fiscal Responsibility Law 
(LRF, Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal) in May 2000, which represented a budget constraint to 
all levels of government. The LRF together with the floating exchange rate policy and the 
inflation-targeting regime formed what became later known as the macroeconomic tripod. 
In addition to the adoption of the macroeconomic tripod and the reconciliation with the 
international community, another element that helped Brazil to overcome the 1999 crisis was 
the reforms made to the Brazilian financial system during the so-called first phase of the Real 
Plan. In the words of a Central Bank governor at that time: 
When Brazil came out of the 1999 crisis, it was left in a much better situation than other 
countries because there was no financial crisis. In fact, we took advantage during [the 
period preceding the 1999 crisis] to modify the financial regulation and strengthened the 
financial system, taking out its weakest points so that there was no strong spill over from 
the exchange rate crisis to a financial crisis.86  
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Indeed, the Brazilian economy underwent a deep reorganisation of its banking and financial 
system at that time, including a reorganisation of federal public finances, mainly of states and 
of public banks. In particular, there were three concurrent programs: PROES, which was 
essentially a program of privatisations of state banks, but also included the resolution of the 
states’ domestic debts; PROEF, which was a program of recapitalisation of federal banks, and 
also the privatisation of some, such as the Banco Meridional; and the PROER, which included 
the consolidation of some big banks, such as the Bamerindus, as well as the restructuring of 
prudential rules and the creation of the Credit Guarantee Fund (FGC, Fundo Garantidor de 
Crédito). Together these reforms amassed to transform Brazil into a more robust economy, as 
a respected researcher at the government observed: 
After the Real Plan it was necessary to restructure the Brazilian banking and financial 
system: the PROER and PROES. Since then Brazil has a set of rules for operation of the 
banking system that goes beyond the Basel agreement. … This is very important because 
it gave an image of seriousness and of potential control of the monetary authority in terms 
of standardization and supervision that only a few countries have.87 
 
The resumption of growth was again interrupted by a combination of crises in 2001. Beginning 
with the events of September 11 that year, the Brazilian economy was affected by the general 
increase in global risk aversion and doubts over the pace of global growth. In December that 
year, the Argentinean government declared default on its foreign debt. Such a turbulent 
external environment was then coupled with a serious domestic energy crisis and the 
government was forced to ration the energy supply both to the general population and to 
companies.88 As noted by a former Central Bank governor at that time, the Brazilian economy 
resisted the turbulence relatively well:  
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This [Argentinean] crisis disturbed us, but it did not come alone: the drama was that it 
came together with the energy crisis, September 11, global recession, global crisis, it was 
a very bad period. And it caught us, but at that moment we were better prepared, things 
were going well, inflation expectations had been converging … then [inflation] 
expectations took off a bit because there was an impact in the exchange rate, and also 
because of the energy crisis. But it was a mini-crisis.89 
 
The greatest test, however, came during the Presidential elections in 2002 in light of the 
possible ascension of the leftist candidate Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Lula had been running as 
the Workers’ Party (PT, Partido dos Trabalhadores) candidate ever since the first democratic 
elections for president after the end of the military regime in 1989 and was consistently the 
second most voted candidate in every election since then. Hitherto his electoral campaigns had 
been marked by the defence of a socialist economy, by criticising the Real Plan and by the 
motto “get out IMF”. As the next section will show, Lula’s ascension in the polls triggered a 
general crisis of confidence as many people feared that his election could discontinue 
Cardoso’s economic policies.  
 
3.4   TAILWINDS FROM CHINA AND ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT (2002-
2005) 
In 2002 Brazil’s economic position remained fragile. The public debt was considerable and 
increasing, and the current account deficit remained substantial even four years after the 
adoption of the floating exchange rate. At the time, much of the foreign and domestic debt was 
indexed to the dollar so that the depreciation of the currency had an immediate impact on the 
public debt (Figure 14).  
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FIGURE 14: PUBLIC SECTOR NET EXTERNAL DEBT AND EXCHANGE RATE R$/US$, MONTHLY 
VALUES, DECEMBER 2001-DECEMBER 2002   
 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. Elaborated by the author. 
Under such suboptimal economic circumstances, the PT’s candidate Lula began to ascend in 
the polls for the upcoming October 2002 presidential elections, augmenting uncertainty over 
an already delicate equilibrium, as explained by a former Central Bank director: 
Then, the big question people had at that time was this, “look, will step into power a 
president who in the past criticized the debt, who criticized the fiscal policy to maintain 
the solvency of the debt, and who advocated increasing spending”. Right or wrong, this 
was the perception people had from Lula … so you start to do the maths, you see, “well, 
with the dollar at R$4, or nearly that, Brazil needs to generate a primary surplus of 4 per 
cent of GDP to prevent the debt to explode. As this will not happen, the debt will explode, 
there will be a default, and Brazil will break”. Simplifying, this is the logic. Now, the 
original weakness lay in the fact that [the Brazilian government] could not allow the 
exchange rate to depreciate much because the government had a weak external position.90 
 
It was a typical case of a self-fulfilling prophecy, where the fear of Brazil’s default triggered 
capital outflows, reinforcing the real’s weakness, which in turn augmented the public debt that 
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increased the fear of default. Economic agents dreaded that a leftist candidate would 
discontinue Cardoso’s economic policies and instead assume higher public spending and 
inflation, a decision which could lead to another Brazilian default. The financial market’s 
anxiety regarding Lula was embodied, for instance, in the “Lulameter,” a mathematical model 
developed by Goldman Sachs in June 2002 to quantify the probability of a Lula victory through 
the behaviour of prices in currency markets (Goldman Sachs 2002, pp.10–12).  
As the 2002 election approached, Lula kept rising in the polls and the exchange rate 
increasingly depreciated, augmenting the risk of a default. As a Central Bank governor at that 
time said: 
If Lula won and followed the PT program, Brazil would explode, so there was this well-
founded fear about what was there in the party program. And then what happened, as 
time passed, the fear was gaining ground, was growing, and we began to feel pressure on 
the exchange rate … in July it was already clear to us that this was a totally explosive 
situation and that something had to be done, and that the most important response was 
not in our hands, because people used to say to us, “all right, we know that you are 
competent, but you will not be here, so I do not want to be stuck in here, in this very 
uncertain environment, in fact more than uncertain, dangerous”. The expectation was 
very realistic and it was correct.91 
 
In contrast to previous crisis episodes, the central bank’s and the government’s hands were this 
time tied in dealing with the source of pressure on the exchange rate as it was outside its or the 
government’s control. In that situation, the Central Bank, together with the Ministry of Finance, 
led a political response to the 2002 crisis. They began by opening a dialogue with the 
presidential candidates, particularly Lula, to make them aware of Brazil’s fragile economic 
situation. Next, the Cardoso government signed a new stand-by agreement with the IMF in 
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September in an attempt to borrow the IMF’s credibility, and hence hold the currency’s value. 
In the words of a former Central Bank governor: 
So the exchange rate was depreciating, we did what we could, raising interest rates and 
so, but [we felt] a bit helpless in the face of a problem that needed to be fixed in its origin. 
So our response, our strategy to manage this crisis was totally different from the others, 
and it was political. We started talking with the candidates to bring them to reality, which 
was nothing good. So that is how it evolved, with a lot of backstage conversations, and 
at one point it was decided to make a new agreement with the IMF, which we designed 
in such a way that 80 per cent of the money was going to be disbursed to the new 
government, so it was a carrot for those who came [to power].92 
 
The strategy to contain the crisis was embraced by all of the presidential candidates, including 
PT’s Lula. Throughout the 2002 campaign, Lula had already changed his tone in comparison 
to his previous campaigns, adopting a less radical image with regard to economic policy. Then 
in June 2002 the PT launched a document named “Letter to the Brazilian people” (carta ao 
povo brasileiro), which stated that an eventual Lula government would honour all Brazilian 
debts and financial obligations in an attempt to decrease market uncertainties. The Letter had 
limited impact, however, on reversing negatives expectations and the real kept depreciating. 
According to a former Central Bank governor, it was only in September, after the approval of 
the IMF agreement and when the PT started its television campaign, adopting a conciliatory 
tone, that prospects turned around: 
I talked with them to show, “look, this is what is happening, it is a problem of 
expectations,” and especially for the PT I said, “it is in your hands, if you show some 
common sense things will calm down”. In June the Letter to the Brazilian People had 
been released, but it did not have much impact if you look at the market, but it was already 
the beginning of change. And then when Lula, who was already leading more in 
September, began to talk, then it started to calm down.93 
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Indeed, after reaching its peak crisis in September-October, the exchange rate remained stable 
and then gradually began to recover its value (Figure 15). Despite this recovery, the situation 
was very tense, as described by a former Central Bank governor: 
At that time, we used to say to people, “Lula is not a revolutionary, he is a union leader; 
a pragmatic man … he will not explode”. But people did not believe: “you are saying 
this because you are there, you want to survive”. It was a very dramatic situation, because 
the Brazilian government could not roll over the internal debt beyond November that 
year. Brazil had not only lost access to the international market, which had obviously 
lost, but also lost access to the domestic market: Brazilians did not want to roll over the 
debt with maturity later than the end of the year. So it was dramatic. But fortunately, with 
the answer Lula himself gave, things began to calm down. I mean, it was very clear at 
that time that the crisis was caused by them, and settled predominantly by them, with our 
help.94   
 
FIGURE 15: EXCHANGE RATE R$/US$, DAILY VALUES, 2002  
 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. Elaborated by the author. 
One of the factors that contributed to calming down the markets regarding Lula’s economic 
policy was the nomination of his economic team. As a former Central Bank governor said: 
                                                
94 Non-attributable interview with a former Central Bank governor.  
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“when Palocci [Antonio Palocci, Finance Minister from July 2003 to March 2006] appeared 
was the landmark, because Palocci was a man mostly unknown and it was clear that he had a 
very good sense, that he really would not sponsor any adventure”95 (see also Spektor 2014). 
Then, after being elected, Lula named as central bank governor the former President of 
FleetBoston’s Corporate and Global Bank, Henrique Meirelles, alongside several economists 
linked to the Getúlio Vargas Foundation in Rio de Janeiro – a well-known conservative centre 
– to key positions in the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank. As noted by Armínio Fraga: 
They were very wise in the transition. In the Central Bank only I left, [all directors] 
stayed. Then later they were gradually replaced. … Meirelles was someone who also 
brought feet on the ground, had international experience, did a great job, surrounded 
himself very well.96 
 
Indeed, the first years of the Lula government were marked by the maintenance of Cardoso’s 
macroeconomic policy framework, the macroeconomic tripod. Lula went in fact further than 
keeping Cardoso’s policies; he reinforced them. His new economic team announced inflation 
targets of 8.5 and 5.5 per cent for 2003 and 2004, respectively, suggesting a narrower monetary 
policy. The new government raised interest rates from 25 per cent to 26.5 per cent in the first 
quarter of 2003 and increased the target for the primary surplus from 3.75 per cent of GDP to 
4.25 per cent in 2003, which was to be maintained between 2004-2006. To achieve such targets, 
Lula announced a cut in public spending, delaying his promise for increasing social 
expenditures.  
The Lula government, however, faced a different external predicament than that of Cardoso’s. 
The economic rise of China combined with a higher international liquidity in the early 2000s 
                                                
95 Non-attributable interview with a former Central Bank governor.   
96 Interview with Armínio Fraga.  
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lessened Brazil’s traditional external vulnerabilities and marked the beginning of a less 
unstable international environment which lasted until the eruption of the 2008 crisis. 
Remarkably from 2003 onwards, Brazil reversed its historical deficit in the current account and 
began to accumulate surpluses (Figure 16).  
FIGURE 16: BRAZILIAN CURRENT ACCOUNT, 1995-2005 
 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. Elaborated by the author. 
The current account surpluses were principally a reflection of an increase in the value of exports 
(Figure 17), which, for its turn, could be traced back to the rise of China and its demand for 
commodities. Exports had been rising since the 1999 devaluation, from US$48 billion to 
US$60 billion in 2002. In 2003, Brazilian exports jumped to US$73.1 billion and reached 
US$118.3 billion in 2005. Despite the simultaneous increase in the value of imports, from 
US$48.3 billion in 2003 to 73.5 billion in 2005, the trade balance surplus swelled from 
US$24.8 billion to US$44.7 billion. In 2003 the trade balance was for the first time large 
enough to compensate the current account deficit, which closed that year with a surplus of 
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FIGURE 17: BRAZILIAN EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, 1995-2005 
 
Source: Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC). Elaborated by the author. 
China’s rise and the resumption of capital flows into Brazil also allowed the Central Bank to 
gradually restore Brazilian foreign reserves. As a former Central Bank director noticed: “the 
fact is that the emergence of China, China’s entry into the international trade flow, benefited 
[Brazil] greatly in terms of positive terms of trade, etc. It gave Brazil the opportunity to conduct 
similar policies [of those in Asia] of reserve accumulation”.97 Brazil’s motivation for reserve 
accumulation was not as grounded in anti-IMF action as it had been for Asian countries, not 
least because Brazil’s experience with the Fund had been much less traumatic as argued earlier 
in this chapter. In the words a former Central Bank director: 
What happened to several countries that faced crises was that they adopted the policies 
of the IMF; they ended up coming out from the crises, but swearing they would never 
return to the IMF. … Countries, particularly in Asia, decided they did not want to return 
to the IMF, and decided to practice aggressive policies of international reserve 
accumulation in order to, on the one hand, maintain their undervalued currencies to 
stimulate industry and, on the other hand, get rid of the risk of having to resort to the 
IMF. At the same time, regional reserve accumulation agreements were also developed; 
the Chiang Mai agreement is part of this idea. In the Brazilian case, there was no such 
                                                







































anti-IMF action, so concatenated, so coordinated. I think it was never, from the political 
point of view, an issue as relevant here in Brazil.98 
 
For Brazil, the idea of accumulating reserves was instead more grounded in the idea of building 
a more robust economy. As noted by a Central Bank director at that time, Brazilian policy-
makers, in contrast to their East Asian counterparts, “had no desire to hold the exchange rate, 
to prevent it to appreciate. … [Instead] there was a perception that it was necessary to 
accumulate reserves and that reserve accumulation was going to have an important role in 
reducing the country’s risk, as in fact has happened”.99 To that extent, at the time the motivation 
to accumulate international reserves was mainly to create the image of a sounder economy, as 
a former Central Bank director at that time remarked: 
When I entered in the Central Bank, there was already a discussion about rebuilding 
reserves. There was a perception that the level of Brazil’s international reserves was 
inadequate. In total I think [Brazil] had about 40 [billions of dollars], but from these 40 
about 25 [billions of dollars] was money from the IMF. In theory, the money was there, 
but it was not our money. It served to give an impression of solidity. Perhaps if the 
situation was bad [Brazil] could withdraw, but in theory it was not money to withdraw. 
So we felt that there was a need. Already in 2003 the National Treasury initiated a process 
of buying dollars.100 
Under these more propitious conditions, where Brazil had no risk in the balance of payments 
and there was a good volume of reserves, the technical area of the Central Bank presented in 
2005 a proposal to anticipate the payment to the Fund, which was due in 2007. 101  The 
proposition of paying the IMF two years ahead of schedule was financially reasoned, since 
Brazil was accessing the international market already in similar conditions to the ones 
stipulated by the Fund agreement. Moreover, the early payment to the Fund would be seen as 
                                                
98 Non-attributable interview with a former Central Bank director. 
99 Non-attributable interview with a former Central Bank director.  
100 Non-attributable interview with a former Central Bank director.  
101 Non-attributable interview with an official at the Central Bank. 
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a step forward in Brazil’s strategy to signal its growing economic resilience. Such signal only 
made sense because it was financially grounded, as explained by a high-ranked official at the 
Central Bank: 
In the end, with the falling costs to access the international market, [Brazil] was already 
raising resources at even more favourable conditions than the ones with the Fund … But 
the decision was not strictly financial. It is obvious that if [Brazil] still was raising [funds] 
at a much higher level than what [Brazil] was paying to the Fund, then the signal would 
look more like a bravado rather than a rational decision. So it only makes sense at the 
moment when these rates meet; it does not need to be cheaper: if you are raising near to 
the Fund’s rate then it starts to make sense. You say, “look, our situation has improved 
so much that we have access to the international market, and we have conditions to pay 
our debt with the Fund,” and it was more in that direction, to send a signal about the 
strength of Brazil’s economic conditions than a signal against the Fund.102 
 
Clearly paying the IMF ahead of schedule had assumed a political meaning and had become a 
symbolic act. In the words of a close observer:  
[Paying the Fund] has a political impact, of course it has. You stop being a debtor of the 
IMF. And when you are no longer a debtor of the IMF, you do not have to submit to 
evaluation programs, which is when the IMF may tell you to do something, or you have 
the famous intention letters, which marked the Brazilian economy from the 1980s to the 
1990s. So we submit only to the Article IV, which is the annual assessment that [the 
Fund] carries out in the economies. … So it is different, when you are in a program of 
the Fund, the Fund comes to tell you what to do, what you should do, so you change your 
relation with the Fund [when you paid the debt].103 
Put differently, while the payment to the Fund had political significance, it only worked 
because it was economically grounded. As observed by a high-ranked official at the Central 
Bank: “it was clear that if there was a significant cost differential between what Brazil was 
raising and what it was paying for the Fund, the signal would not have that strength”.104  
                                                
102 Non-attributable interview with a high-ranked official at the Central Bank. 
103 Non-attributable interview with an official at the Central Bank. 
104 Non-attributable interview with a high-ranked official at the Central Bank. 
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In sum, the external predicament encountered by the Lula government was much more 
favourable than the one experienced by Cardoso. In the context of China’s rise, Brazil’s 
external constraints were reduced, allowing for the reversal of its current account deficits in 
2003 and the accumulation of international reserves. This in turn enabled the government to 
anticipate its payment to the IMF in 2005, two years ahead of schedule. In the words of a high-
ranked official at the Central Bank: 
In 2003, [there is] already a scenario in which this structural component around China 
begins to prevail, affecting commodity prices, and improving the conditions for emerging 
[economies] in general. Then you start making the adjustment, creating the conditions to 
resume growth in 2004, 2005 in a stronger way. At the moment when [Brazil] starts to 
grow in a more consistent way, the real stabilizes and begins appreciating, [Brazil starts] 
to be able to accumulate reserves, the access to the market [improves] … So then Brazil 
begins to have conditions to build its own defences and then the issue of the prepayment 
to the Fund entered on the agenda, as an additional element; not to avoid the Fund’s 
interference, because there was none, [Brazil] was already in a situation where the 
program was over, and it was only paying [not drawing]. It was more in the sense to issue 
a positive sign and say, “look, our situation is so good that we are settling our debt with 
the Fund”.105 
 
Rather than fulfilling the fears that had led to the 2002 crisis, the ascension of Lula as president 
in 2003 marked a continuity of the policies inaugurated by Cardoso in 1999. Presumably, the 
endurance of the macroeconomic tripod displeased some of Lula’s supporters, who had 
expected a change with a left-wing candidate in power. As the next section will discuss, the 
Lula government compensated for its continuity in macroeconomic policy by pursuing a more 
leftist foreign policy. 
 
 
                                                
105 Non-attributable interview with a high-ranked official at the Central Bank. 
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3.5   A RISING POWER: BRAZIL’S EXTERNAL INFLUENCE (1995 – 2005) 
The late 1990s and early 2000s marked the time in which emerging market economies had 
begun to stand out as increasingly relevant players in the global economy. In 1996, Chase, Hill 
and Kennedy (1996, p.3) called the attention to the pivotal states, i.e. states that “could not 
only determinate the fate of its region but also affect international stability”. These were Brazil, 
Mexico, Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, Turkey, India, Pakistan and Indonesia. Around the same 
time, Jeffrey Garten (1996) elaborated his work on big emerging markets, or BEMs, where he 
identified ten emerging players in the world economy: Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, South 
Africa, Poland, Turkey, India, South Korea, the Chinese Economic Area (which includes China 
and Taiwan) and Indonesia (together with its close trading neighbours such as Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Singapore). In November 2001, Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill (2001) 
created the acronym BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) to refer to some of the larger 
emerging market economies and that consistently put forward good economic prospects when 
compared to the G7 economies. Two years later, another Goldman Sachs’ report forecast that 
Brazil would be among the world’s five largest economies by 2050 (Wilson & Purushothaman 
2003).  
As one of the largest emerging economies, Brazil benefited from this general international 
perception that emerging markets were increasingly important and deserved inclusion in 
international financial forums. In 1996 the Central Bank of Brazil was among the eight central 
banks to be included in the first membership enlargement of the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS). Later in 1999, Brazil was also among the countries invited to integrate the 
G20 forum, which emerged as an informal group of finance ministers and central bank 
governors of 19 countries and the European Union at the suggestion of the G7 finance ministers 
after the Asian crisis. As observed by a former Central Bank governor:  
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Brazil has been, in this whole process, a strong, a very present interlocutor. For example, 
in my time, I remember we participated informally in the Basel committee in the 
beginning. At some point, we were invited – along with other emerging countries, China, 
India, etc. – to enter the BIS. So Brazil became a shareholder of the BIS … and from 
there followed an integration process, a greater participation of Brazil, both in terms of 
supervision and in terms of discussing monetary issues in general. And this also serves 
for the IMF and such, so we improved.106 
 
With the inauguration of a less turbulent period in the international economy after 2003 – a 
period which coincided with the beginning of the Lula government – Brazil had more 
autonomy to pursue foreign policy objectives. For many scholars, Lula’s ascension in 2003 
marked an increase in Brazil’s external influence (Hurrell 2010; Sotero 2010; Dauvergne & 
Farias 2012; Vizentini 2005). Hurrell (2010, p.60), for example, stated that Brazil’s foreign 
policy during the Lula governments was marked by “a new international self-confidence; a 
determination to forge a bolder and more innovative foreign policy; and a clear sense that 
Brazil’s time has come,” and that “building on President Lula’s extraordinary personal 
popularity, the country’s continued economic stability, and its increased international activism 
and assertiveness Brazil has undoubtedly acquired a new global prominence”. Sotero (2010, 
p.72), meanwhile, acknowledged that “at the root of [Brazil’s] rise is 15 years of continuity of 
sound macroeconomic policies and, in particular, the 1999 decision of float its currency, the 
real, which exposed Brazilian companies to the global market forces at a momentum when they 
were prepared to engage an expanding world economy”. While he gave some credit to 
Cardoso’s tenure – “President Cardoso set Brazil in a new direction in regional affairs, in order 
to assert the country’s autonomy while pushing for integration with its immediate neighbours” 
(Sotero 2010, p.75) – he made clear that the transformation occurred with Lula (Sotero 2010, 
p.75). By the same token, Dauvergne and Farias (2012, p.907) also recognised the importance 
                                                
106 Non-attributable interview with a former Central Bank governor. 
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of the Cardoso government when they said that “President Lula’s placing of development at 
the centre of both domestic and foreign policies should not, however, be seen as a rupture with 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s presidency (1995-2002), particularly when compared to his last 
years”. But like Sotero (2010) they also focused the change on Lula: “Lula took a different 
approach, however, highlighting how asymmetric international structures were impeding 
development, as well as positioning Brazil firmly as a developing – and emerging – economy” 
(Dauvergne & Farias 2012, p.907). 
Conceivably, one of the reasons why Brazil increased its external influence over the years 
between 2003 and 2010 was because Lula made foreign policy one of the main pillars of his 
government. Since foreign policy was important to him, he insisted on giving speeches in 
international forums himself, and only occasionally sent his foreign affairs minister to talk on 
his behalf – a decision which contributed to Brazil’s increased visibility. Drawing on his 
previous experience of several years as a union leader and taking advantage of his friendly 
personality and charisma, Lula proved to be a great speaker and a skilful negotiator. A good 
example of Lula’s versatility and ability to engage different interests was in January 2003 
when, just after being elected, he attended and spoke at both the World Social Forum in Porto 
Alegre and the World Economic Forum in Davos. 
Nonetheless, the changed international environment was crucial, particularly in respect from 
2003 onwards to China’s engagement with the global economy and the subsequent reduction 
of external constraints for Brazil. Moreover, the continuity of the macroeconomic policy by 
the Lula government contributed to improved Brazil’s external image, as noted by a former 
Central Bank governor: 
Then with Lula, I would say that there was continuity, and this was the great novelty. 
Because until Lula came, it was always thought: “[Brazil] is going well with Fernando 
Henrique, but one day PT will win and will break the country”. So if you are making a 
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strategic analysis of whether to [invest] in Brazil in the long term, 50 years, 100 years, 
you say “I have some scenarios here where I am going to lose everything”. And then 
when Lula arrives and demonstrates good sense, as he did, put together a good team, that, 
from the uncertainty point of view, [represented] a huge gain for Brazil.107 
 
In this respect, another close observer noted: “the Real Plan was very important [for Brazil’s 
external influence], but as important was the continuity of economic policy, at least in the first 
term of Lula, which gave a considerable aura of seriousness and of respectability”.108 This is 
in line with the view of Brainard and Martinez-Diaz (2009a, p.2) who have argued that “Brazil 
status among the world’s rising economic powers emanates from an auspicious conjuncture of 
external forces and internal strengths”. According to these scholars, along with historically 
high commodity prices, Brazil has also benefitted from its “sustained commitment to sound 
macroeconomic policies” (Brainard & Martinez-Diaz 2009a, pp.2–3). In the same line, 
Trinkunas (2014, p.11) said “it was only after the successful policies of the Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso administration (1995-2002) laid the foundations for economic and political 
consolidation at home that Brazil was able to resume its rise”. Thus, Roett (2011, p.107) is 
wrong to say that “despite the best of intentions, the Cardoso administration limped to an end 
in 2002. It would take the new government of Lula and the PT to initiate a new round of reforms 
after 2002 that would finally transform Brazil into a modern nation”. When Lula took power 
in 2003, he benefited from a favourable external scenario and from the stabilisation achieved 
by Cardoso in the previous period.  
Despite the role Cardoso’s macroeconomic policies had played in the stabilisation of the 
Brazilian economy, the continuation of these policies displeased a good deal of PT supporters 
who had expected a change with the election of Lula’s leftist regime. In a context where Lula 
                                                
107 Non-attributable interview with a former Central Bank governor.  
108 Non-attributable interview. 
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was less constrained by the external environment, his government chose to pump up Brazil’s 
foreign policy to compensate for the continuity in the economic area. As noticed by a high 
ranked official at Itamaraty: 
Because Lula basically followed the same economic policy as Cardoso, a place where 
they actually gave to the left of the party was foreign policy. So then came a discourse 
directed to the regional sphere and to the support of these schemes in Venezuela and 
others.109 
 
While Lula’s foreign policy was not a complete rupture with Cardoso’s foreign policy, there 
was nonetheless a reorientation and change of discourse, which became all the more visible 
during Lula’s second term as president. As noted by a former Central Bank director: “there 
were some changes of priority, which became clear afterwards, resurrecting a bit that Third 
World issue, Brazil connects with things like the Bolivarian league, and such”.110 Specifically, 
Lula’s foreign policy did not disregard Brazil’s relations with the US and the other major 
powers, but it put South America and other Southern states as Brazil’s top priorities. 
This orientation was not a complete rupture from the past for the Cardoso government had also 
chosen South America as a foreign policy priority. In Cardoso’s first presidential term the focus 
was placed more on the relatively new sub-regional bloc Mercosul (a customs union between 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay established in 1991), but during his second term, the 
regional concept was expanded to include relations with the rest of the region as well (Malamud 
2011, p.6). According to Vizentini (2005, p.386), widening the integration process to include 
all South America was a way to overcome Mercosul’s crisis, a crisis that had been triggered by 
the devaluation of the Brazilian currency in 1999 and which affected the economic balance 
                                                
109 Non-attributable interview with a high ranked diplomat.  
110 Non-attributable interview with a former Central Bank director. 
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between Brazil and Argentina. For Argentina the way out of the crisis was to increase its ties 
with the US and to agree to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), a platform that had 
been under negotiation since 1994. In this context, Cardoso called the 1st South American 
meeting in 2000, which marked the beginning of change in terms of foreign policy. Brazil’s 
position of privileging Mercosul and the other South American countries at the expense of the 
FTAA was in line with what Brazil pursued in a more emphatic way during the Lula 
government in terms of rejecting the American umbrella for regional matters.  
A main feature that differentiated Lula’s government from Cardoso’s was the absence of 
greater external constraints not only for Brazil but also for the other South American countries, 
which facilitated regional integration (Fiori 2011, p.9; Carvalho et al. 2009, p.124). 
Furthermore, at the time when Lula ascended as President of Brazil, several left-wing 
presidents took power in other South American states (Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Néstor 
Kirchner in Argentina, Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay, Evo Morales in Bolivia) so that there was 
a political convergence in the region that contributed to a better dialogue. In Castañeda’s (2006, 
p.29) words “starting with Hugo Chávez’s victory in Venezuela … a wave of leaders, parties, 
and movements generically labelled ‘leftist’ have swept into power in one Latin American 
country after another”. This alteration in the political leanings created a political convergence 
in South America that favoured regional integration and developmentalist projects. 
Thus, the beginning of the Lula government coincided with a resumption of regional 
integration in South America in which Brazil played a major role as one of the main 
contributors to the regional initiatives. For instance, Brazil contributed 70 per cent of the total 
amount annually designated to Mercosul Structural Convergence Fund (FOCEM, Fundo para 
Convergência Estrutural do Mercosul) (by comparison Argentina gives 27 per cent, Uruguay 
gives 2 per cent, and Paraguay gives 1 per cent). In the Financial Fund to the Development of 
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the Rio de la Plata Basin (FONPLATA, Fundo Financeiro para o Desenvolvimento da Bacia 
do Prata), Brazil, together with Argentina, held one-third of the quotas, with the remaining 
third equally divided between Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay. In the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB), which is not owned by developing countries,111 Brazil held, along 
with Argentina, the second largest number of shares (10.75 per cent) following the US (30 per 
cent). In addition, in 2003 BNDES officially included regional integration as one of its goals, 
expanding its operations in South America (BNDES 2004, p.1).112  
The rise in oil prices that began in 2003 contributed to the ascension of another major player 
in South America’s regional integration: Venezuela. Under Hugo Chávez’s presidency, 
Venezuela’s interest in regional integration had a clear anti-American tone. In 2004, for 
example, together with Cuba, Venezuela launched the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of 
Our America (ALBA, Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América)113 as an 
alternative to the US’ proposal for the FTAA. Under ALBA, Chávez began to conduct several 
initiatives with Latin American countries, most of them involving oil, such as Petrocaribe, to 
subsidise oil exports to the Caribbean countries, and Petrosur, a regional confederation of state-
owned oil companies. As a high ranked diplomat observed: 
A country that develops a program like PetroCaribe, which is obviously a mechanism 
that demonstrates leadership and allows the exercise of influence, because you sell oil 
below market price and with that you make other countries dependent on your interests, 
obviously had a leading political aspiration. The creation of ALBA is also a political 
demonstration of leadership … [the problem] is that the Venezuelan model is viable in 
Venezuela and in some other countries; in others there is no condition to succeed.114  
                                                
111 The expression “bank owned by developing countries” (bancos de propiedad de países en desarrollo) is used 
by Ocampo (2006, p.15) to refer to multilateral development banks that do not have the capital of industrialised 
countries. 
112 One limitation for the expansion of its regional activities however is that BNDES can only fund Brazilian 
companies or branches of multinational companies established in Brazil. 
113 At the moment, the following countries have joined ALBA: Bolivia (2006), Nicaragua (2007), Dominica 
(2008), St. Vincent and the Grenadines (2009), Ecuador (2009), Antigua and Barbuda (2009), Saint Lucia (2013). 
114 Non-attributable interview with a high-ranked diplomat.  
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Venezuela also began to act as an alternative creditor, loaning US$2.5 billion to Argentina and 
enabling that country to pay off its debt with the IMF in December 2005. In addition, Venezuela 
provided financial support to Bolivia and Cuba in the following years (Carvalho et al. 2009, 
p.125). Moreover, Chávez pursued a diplomatic battle with the United States by deepening 
Venezuela’s bilateral relations with countries such as Cuba, Russia, Syria and Iran. 
In this context of a leftist shift in South America, of lower external constraints, and of likely 
compensating for the continuity in the macroeconomic area, Brazil’s foreign policy bended to 
support some of Hugo Chávez’s initiatives. As described by a high-ranked official at the 
Central Bank: 
Brazil has never aligned with a Bolivarian line, as Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, nor has 
never been so close to that line as Argentina, … [but] this behaviour [of Venezuela and 
Argentina] ended up making that the initiatives of articulation in the regional sphere 
gained a bias somehow antagonist to multilateral institutions.115 
 
Brazil and Venezuela rapprochement started in 2004 when the two main regional integration 
projects, Mercosul and the Andean Community (CAN, Comunidad Andina) (formed by 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela), met to announce their intention to unite 
their integration efforts into a single project, then-named South American Community of 
Nations (CASA, Comunidade Sul-Americana de Nações). In 2006 Venezuela left CAN to 
apply for a membership of Mercosul. According to a high-member of the government, 
Venezuela’s decision signalled Brazil’s hegemony in the region: “why [Venezuela] wanted to 
enter in Mercosul? Because Brazil is in Mercosul … Mercosul is a project to Venezuela more 
                                                
115 Non-attributable interview with a high ranked official at the Central Bank. 
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strategic than economic-commercial; … is to be sheltered under Brazil’s umbrella”. 116 
Nevertheless, as the next years unfolded, this perspective was to be challenged.  
In sum, from 1995 to 2005 Brazil benefitted from an ongoing transformation in the global 
economy, where EMDs became increasingly important players in the IMS and were gradually 
included in international financial forums such as the BIS and the G20. The global environment 
that emerged in 2003 with China’s economic rise further increased Brazil’s external influence. 
Facing lower external constraints, the Lula government had more freedom to pursue its foreign 
policy objectives, which did not represent a rupture with the Cardoso government but rather a 
change in Brazil’s priorities. On the one hand, this change was a way to counterbalance Lula’s 
decision to continue Cardoso’s macroeconomic policies; on the other hand, it was also part of 
a regional political context that favoured initiatives of regional integration and rejected the US 
leadership.  
 
3.6   CONCLUSION 
The decade after the implementation of the Real Plan tested Brazil’s newly acquired price 
stability, when a series of currency crises broke out in emergent market economies and spilled 
speculative pressures over other emerging markets’ currencies. As this chapter has shown, the 
Brazilian economy suffered every time there was a financial turbulence due to the fragile state 
of its external position. In the words of a former Central Bank director: “Brazil was a country 
that had a high deficit in the current account, had limited international reserves, so it was a 
country that was always vulnerable to contagions. So whenever there was international 
nervousness Brazil was affected in some way”.117 Most significantly, the Brazilian currency 
                                                
116 Non-attributable interview. 
117 Non-attributable interview with a former Central Bank director. 
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became a target of speculative attacks in the aftermath of the Russian crisis, forcing devaluation 
and the adoption of a floating exchange rate regime.  
Despite all the international and domestic turbulences that occurred during the period analysed 
in this chapter, the Real Plan survived and succeeded: by 2005 Brazil was recognised as a less 
vulnerable economy, as one of the fastest growing emerging markets and as an increasingly 
important global player. The ghost of inflation was finally behind Brazil and its external debt 
was no longer a strong source of vulnerability. As well as settling its debt with the IMF, the 
Brazilian government also reduced its exposure to external debt. Equally important, from 2003 
onwards Brazil began to accumulate current account surpluses, reducing its balance of 
payments’ vulnerability. In addition, the trade surpluses and positive net inflows of foreign 
direct investments at this time allowed the beginning of a reserve accumulation process, which 
contributed to the image of Brazil as a robust economy. 
This unprecedented resilient condition of the Brazilian economy was, at least to a certain 
extent, part of a broader global context where emerging market economies were in general 
becoming stronger and more important economic actors. While it is striking that Brazil’s 
external influence increased from 2003 onwards, this change needs to be placed within the 
global dynamics prevailing at that time. At this chapter discussed, Brazilian policy-makers 
were since 1994 working towards a more resilient economy. Yet it seems to be the change in 
the global scenario, rather than this shift in domestic politics, that allowed the Brazilian 
economy to take off and the Brazilian government’s economic reputation to improve. As this 
chapter has argued, there was no significant disruption in the macroeconomic policies pursued 
by Cardoso and Lula, so Brazil’s rise should be conceived more as a result of an external 
change. This idea fits with the conception of Brazil being a subordinated economy in the IMS, 
and therefore being much more a business cycle “taker” than “maker”. 
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This chapter has also attempted to further demystify Brazil’s relation with the IMF. First, it is 
wrong to suggest that the IMF imposed policies on Brazilian policy-makers, at least with regard 
to the experience of 1998. As a former Central Bank governor said, “having dealt with the IMF, 
I know they are conservatives, but I casually worked in a government that, since the first day 
we had to deal with the IMF, we had the same thinking about public finances, about balance 
of payments, about taxation”.118 Second, Brazil did not repay the IMF to get rid of the Fund’s 
influence, but rather to send a signal to international markets and other states about its 
economic resilience.  
The rise of China and the subsequent escalation of commodity prices would favour Brazil’s 
economic performance even more clearly after 2005. Most of this international dynamic went 
on until 2010, being temporarily interrupted by the 2008 global financial crisis. As the next 
chapter will show, having built solid economic fundamentals since 1994, Brazil further 
increased its external influence from 2006 to 2010.  
  
                                                
118 Non-attributable interview with a former Central Bank governor. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE FUTURE ARRIVES: BRAZIL AS THE 
LAND OF THE PRESENT (2006-2010) 
 
Brazil – fortunately one of the last countries to be hit by the crisis 
– is now one of the first to emerge from it. 
There is no magic in what we did. We simply kept our financial 
system from being contaminated by the virus of speculation. We 
cut back our external vulnerability as we turned from debtors 
into international creditors. Along with other countries, we 
decided to contribute resources for the IMF to loan money to 
poor countries, free of unacceptable conditionalities imposed in 
the past. 
Above all, however, both before and after the crisis broke out we 
implemented anti-cyclical policies. We intensified our social 
policies, particularly income-transfer programs. We raised 
wages above inflation rates. We used fiscal measures to stimulate 
consumption and keep the economy moving. 
We have now emerged from the brief recession. Our economy has 
regained its impetus and shows promise for 2010. Foreign trade 
is recovering vitality, the labour market is doing amazingly well 
and macro-economic equilibrium has been preserved, at no cost 
to the victories of our people’s movements. 
What Brazil and others have shown is that, at times of crisis, we 
must still carry out bold social and development programs. 
Yet I hold no illusions that we might solve our problems alone, 
within our own borders. Because the global economy is 
interdependent, we are obliged to intervene across national 
borders and must therefore re-found the world economic order. 
(President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazilian Statement at the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, 2009) 
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4.1   INTRODUCTION 
This chapter covers the years from 2006 to 2010, a period of turbulence and uncertainty in the 
global economy which was characterised by the economic rise of new players that challenged 
the existing order dominated by the United States and other developed economies (Ikenberry 
2008; Wade 2011; Subramanian 2011). The increase in the relative economic size of emerging 
market and developing countries (EMDs), or “the South,” gained notoriety in 2008, as the share 
of emerging market and developing economies’ GDP (measured at purchasing-power-parity, 
PPP) exceeded that of advanced economies as shown in Figure 18.  
FIGURE 18: ADVANCED AND EMERGING MARKET AND DEVELOPING ECONOMIES’ GDP BASED ON 
PPP, SHARE OF WORLD TOTAL, 2000-2010 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2015. Elaborated by the author. 
The 2008 crisis magnified the rise of multipolarity as EMDs proved to be more resilient than 
the developed world in addressing the economic instability that stemmed from the crisis (Kose 
& Prasad 2010). Given that most EMDs are commodity-exporting countries, much of EMDs’ 
greater resilience to the crisis can be explained by the external environment resulting from 
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below, commodity prices increased substantially during the 2006-2008 period. The upward 
trend was interrupted during the 2008 crisis, but already began to show signs of recovery in 
mid-2009. Consequently, while the 2008 meltdown obviously represented a tremendous 
external shock for EMDs, they could still rely on relatively high commodity prices to lessen 
the external constraints brought upon them by the crisis and resume growth faster than their 
developed peers.  
FIGURE 19: ALL COMMODITY AND CRUDE OIL PRICE INDEX, 2005=100, 2003-2010 
 
Source: IMF Primary Commodity Prices. Elaborated by the author. 
As one of the biggest commodity-exporting countries, Brazil profited massively from the 
beneficial cycle in terms of trade triggered by China’s rise, for it served to increase the 
country’s global influence. China’s huge demand for commodities lessened Brazil’s traditional 
external constraints in the balance of payments and made it possible for Brazil to accumulate 
substantial international reserves. After the crisis, the rapid recovery of commodity prices was 
central in enabling Brazil to rebound from the crisis. As Figure 20 shows, the price of metals 
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FIGURE 20: METALS PRICE INDEX, 2005=100, 2003-2010 
 
Source: IMF Primary Commodity Prices. Elaborated by the author. 
The period covered by this chapter also marks China’s displacement of the United States as 
Brazil’s main trade partner, a change that occurred in 2009. That year, the trade flow between 
Brazil and China was US$36.9 billion, against US$35.6 billion with the United States. Between 
2000 and 2010, Brazilian exports to China increased almost thirty-fold (Figure 21). Even when 
Brazilian exports to the US and the rest of the world dropped in 2008-2009 due to the crisis, 






















































































FIGURE 21: BRAZILIAN EXPORTS TO CHINA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE REST OF THE WORLD, 
2000-2010 
 
Source: MDIC/AliceWeb. Elaborated by the author. 
This international scenario that favoured commodity-exporting countries like Brazil 
overlapped with an alleged alteration of Brazil’s economic policies. Part of the academic 
literature and some policy-makers sustain that there was a change in macroeconomic policies 
from 2006 onwards, a change that has been identified as responsible for Brazil’s relatively 
better performance during and in the immediate aftermath of the crisis (until 2010) (Barbosa 
& Souza 2010; Morais & Saad-Filho 2011). This change was mostly associated with fiscal and 
monetary stimulus measures, into cash-transfer programs and an increase in public investment, 
usually associated with developmentalist policies.  
Brazil’s economic performance was used to the political advantage of a group within the 
government who propagated an oversimplification of the economic debate: “the fundamental 
strategic option to bet on growth, rather than radicalizing the uncertain proposal of 
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on immediate results”119 (Barbosa & Souza 2010, p.31). By focusing on the government’s role 
to explain Brazil’s performance, this perspective considerably underplayed the place of 
external constraints imposed by the IMS to countries like Brazil.  
The aim of this chapter is to put in perspective the argument which attributes Brazil’s economic 
performance from 2006 to 2010 to an alteration in the government’s policies. It highlights, 
instead, the role played by the international conditions of rising commodity prices and high 
international liquidity. In addition, this chapter contends that there was in fact little evidence 
of a significant policy alteration in 2006. While the Lula government after 2006 increased 
public spending, the former priorities of achieving a primary surplus and inflation control 
remained constant, even during the 2008 crisis. In this context, this chapter argues that the 
external environment was fundamental to Brazil’s relative economic success. 
The reasons for Brazil’s sound performance aside, an important consequence of the country’s 
relative economic success was a greater external influence. Being largely unconstrained in its 
economic policy-making, the Brazilian government enjoyed the freedom and plentiful 
resources to pursue its foreign policy objectives, which mainly revolved around intensifying 
its relations with South American and African countries. After 2008, and in the context of the 
general increase of EMD’s role in global financial governance, Brazil further expanded its 
international influence, benefiting from the elevation of the G20 in September 2009 as well as 
from the IMF’s and World Bank’s reform packages.  
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section presents the empirical data that 
challenges the alleged change in Brazil’s macroeconomic policies in 2006. The second section 
discusses the international repercussions of good domestic results from 2006 to 2008, 
                                                
119  Author’s translation from the original in Portuguese: “a opção estratégica fundamental em apostar no 
crescimento, ao invés de radicalizar a incerta proposta do ajuste fiscal contracionista, baseada nos cânones 
neoliberais, terminou sendo validada com base em resultados imediatos”. 
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particularly in relation to reducing inequality and poverty, and how Brazilian diplomacy used 
those results to promote its image and influence worldwide. The third section shows how 
Brazilian policy makers dealt with the constraints imposed by the 2008 crisis. The fourth 
section explores the implications of the crisis in relation to the role played by developing 
countries in general and Brazil in particular in the IMS. The fifth section concludes the chapter.  
 
4.2   BRAZIL’S RISE: DOMESTIC CHANGE OR COMMODITY BOOM? 
(2006-2008) 
By 2006, the Brazilian economy had considerably reduced its external vulnerability as the 
international scenario inaugurated in 2003 allowed the government to gradually reduce the 
external constraints for Brazilian economic policy-making. From 2003 onwards Brazil began 
to accumulate unprecedented surpluses in the current account and an increasing amount of 
international reserves. As Brazil’s access to the international capital markets gradually 
improved, the government anticipated the payment to the IMF in December 2005 (refer to 
chapter 3). 
The payment to the IMF practically overlapped with an important change within the 
government’s economic team, with the replacement of Finance Minister Antonio Palocci by 
Guido Mantega in March 2006. The significance of this alternation lies in the fact that Palocci 
and Mantega are associated with opposing views: respectively, a pro-market approach and a 
more interventionist, or “developmentalist,” approach (Barbosa & Souza 2010). Palocci’s 
replacement prompted the departure of other members of the economic team aligned with the 
pro-market approach, such as Murilo Portugal, the then Deputy Finance Minister, and Joaquim 
Levy, the then Treasury Secretary. As a result, it seems accurate to say that there was an 
inflection within the economic team towards the “developmentalist” ideas.  
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The years following the end of the IMF agreement and the change within the government until 
the eruption of the global crisis in September 2008, were marked by a sequence of 
unprecedented achievements including economic growth, rising investment rates and 
economic stability. In 2006, Brazil became for the first time a liquid capital exporter as its 
foreign reserves surpassed its foreign debt. In addition, in 2006 Brazil’s outward FDI flows 
outgrew its inward FDI, 120  making Brazil the second largest outward investor among 
developing countries that year, after only Hong Kong (FDC-CPII 2007). Further, Petrobras 
announced the discovery of new oil reserves under the pre-salt layer. Likely in consequence of 
this discovery, Brazil achieved a surplus in its oil derivatives and commercial balance, an 
excess which the government claimed marked Brazil’s energy-self-sufficiency.121  
In 2007 Brazil’s economic growth jumped to 6 per cent, from 4 per cent in 2006, reaching 5 
per cent in 2008 in spite of the global crisis. In January 2007 the government launched the 
Growth Acceleration Program (PAC, Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento), a major 
agenda of economic policymaking and investment projects with the aim to accelerate economic 
growth in Brazil. The PAC involved investments of some R$500 billion between 2007 and 
2010 in the areas of transport, energy, sanitation and hydric resources. As a result, total 
investment increased from 16.4 per cent of GDP in 2006 to 16.9 in 2009, peaking at 19.1 per 
cent in 2008, according to data of the Ministry of Finance (Ministério da Fazenda 2010, p.21). 
In the same period, public investment increased from 3 per cent to 4.3 per cent (Figure 22).  
                                                
120 Brazilian outward FDI figures must be analysed with caution, as it is hard to differentiate authentic FDI from 
purely financial investment under the guise of FDI (Lima & Barros 2013, p.653; Campanario et al. 2013, p.658). 
In 2007, more than two thirds of total FDI went to tax havens (Lima & Barros 2013, p.653). 
121 In Sennes and Narciso’s (2009, pp.33–34) words: “The actual case is that though Brazil produces an oil volume 
similar to what it needs for its internal consumption, its production (mainly of heavy oil) has a quality that is not 
entirely compatible with the country’s refineries, as they are made to refine light oil. Brazil exports part of the 
heavy oil it produces and completes the refinery mix with imported light oil and its derivatives”. 
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FIGURE 22: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT, % OF GDP, 2002-2009 
 
Source: Ministério da Fazenda (2010, 21). Elaborated by the author. 
All this happened within a context of economic stability and the maintenance of the 
macroeconomic tripod previously discussed in chapter 3. On the one hand, the primary surplus 
averaged 2.3 per cent of GDP in 2006-2008, slightly lower than the average of 2.5 per cent in 
2003-2005. On the other hand, the Central Bank continued to reduce interest rates while 
keeping inflation even below the target of 4.5 per cent. The Selic rate fell from 19.5 in late 
September 2005 to 11.25 in September 2007. In 2006 and 2007 the inflation rate was, 
respectively, 3.14 and 4.46, according to central bank data.  
Not surprisingly, this outstanding performance of the Brazilian economy was used by the 
government for its own political advantage. The official discourse suggested that, first, having 
the agreement with the IMF had constrained the government’s autonomy to increase 
investment and, second, that paying the IMF was a political decision. As the then-secretary of 
economic policy of the Ministry of Finance, Nelson Barbosa, and his assessor, José Antonio 














decision in the debate on the directions of economic policy of the Lula government”122 
(Barbosa & Souza 2010, p.8).  
Second, official discourse attributed Brazil’s great economic results to the rise of the 
“developmentalist” ideas within the government. In the words of Barbosa and Souza (2010, 
p.14), “as the Lula government opted more clearly for a developmentalist economic policy, 
there was a substantial acceleration in economic growth”. 123  This option towards 
developmentalist policies was described as an “inflection” rather than a change of paradigm in 
the macroeconomic framework, since the macroeconomic tripod remained unaltered (Morais 
& Saad-Filho 2011, p.520). The diagnosis that an inflection, or the adoption of an “hybrid 
paradigm,” towards developmentalism unlocked economic growth was endorsed by part of the 
academic literature (Morais & Saad-Filho 2011, pp.516, 521).  
Taking into account the politicisation of Brazil’s relations with the IMF and the association of 
the pro-market approach with the US dominance that were discussed in chapters 2 and 3, the 
government’s claim had a substantial political appeal. As one very influential Brazilian 
economist and former policy-maker said, after Brazil no longer needed the IMF’s resources, 
“[the government] took a political advantage … because there were some ill-informed people 
[in Brazil] that thought this was a heroic deed”.124 Securing popular support was fundamental 
for the Lula government as his first term in office grew to a close and he planned to run for re-
election in the October 2006 elections. While Lula had great popular approval, his government 
had just been hit by a big corruption scandal in mid-2005, an episode that is known in Brazil 
                                                
122  Author’s translation from the original in Portuguese: “O pagamento ao FMI refletiu um momento de 
acirramento e de decisão no debate sobre os rumos da política econômica do governo Lula”. 
123Author’s translation from the original in Portuguese: “À medida que o governo Lula optou mais claramente 
por uma política econômica desenvolvimentista, ocorreu uma aceleração substancial no crescimento econômico 
do país”.  
124 Non-attributable interview.  
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as the mensalão scandal. In fact, it was this corruption scandal that had prompted the dismissal 
of Palocci from the Ministry of Finance. Thus, the change in the economic team was not really 
influenced by external events, such as the payment to the IMF; rather, it was rooted in domestic 
political circumstances.  
Moreover, as argued in previous chapters, the level of intervention of the IMF was generally 
overstated by the government, so that the end of the agreement in 2005 did not represent an 
actual increase in the government’s autonomy. The capacity of the government to increase 
public investment after 2006 can be explained, instead, as a result of a long-term 
macroeconomic process, where external constraints were gradually reduced due to an ongoing 
change in the global economy and to several domestic policies that strengthened the Brazilian 
economy. In the words of a former high-ranked policy-maker: 
It is true that all the process of fiscal contention that resulted from that agreement [with 
the IMF], of the crisis and of the debt deal, hurt a lot investments; the investment rate fell 
a lot. And from 2004/2005, coinciding with the end of the agreement there was again an 
increase in the investment rate. But much less because Brazil won freedom and more 
because Brazil, first, was able to re-enter in the international capital market, to borrow 
again, and [second], because of the commodity boom, which created an attention to 
Brazil at that time. I do not see to what extent having or not the IMF here has implicated, 
you know, it was more the circumstances of the international economy than anything 
else.125 
 
Furthermore, the interpretation of cause and consequence, where an inflection towards 
developmentalist policies generated greater economic growth, is at least debatable simply on 
the premise that the world in general and EMDs in particular were growing at high rates at the 
time. In 2006, Brazil’s GDP was of 4 per cent, higher than 3.1 per cent in 2005, but lower than 
the world average of 5.5 per cent, EMDs of 8.1 and even Latin America of 5.6 per cent (Figure 
                                                
125 Non-attributable interview.  
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23). In 2007 and 2008, Brazil’s GDP surpassed the world and Latin America’s growth rates, 
but still lagged behind EMDs’ average GDP of 8.6 and 5.8 per cent, respectively. Brazil’s 
performance was even less impressive when taking into account the average growth of GDP in 
emerging and developing Asia: 10.1 per cent in 2006, 11.1 per cent in 2007 and 7.2 per cent in 
2008. 
FIGURE 23: GDP GROWTH (PER CENT), GROUP COUNTRIES AND BRAZIL, 2000-2008  
 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2015. Elaborated by the author. 
Besides, in 2006 there was no rupture with the core of the “neoliberal” macroeconomic 
framework, represented by the tripod. The continuation of the pro-market approach was 
embodied in the Central Bank governor, Henrique Meirelles, who remained in office during 
Lula’s two tenures. Meirelles was politically very strong within the government, since he had 
been elected Federal Deputy by the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB, Partido da 
Social Democracia Brasileira) with a substantial vote count in the October 2002 elections, but 
never took office as he was appointed as Central Bank governor. Interviews with former 
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government and did not subordinate himself to the Finance Minister, particularly after the 
replacement of Palocci by Mantega. As a former Central Bank director said: “Guido continued 
with the policy … maybe he had the will, but he did not have the political conditions for 
changing [macroeconomic policy]”.126 
In this light, the monetary and exchange rate policies are illustrative of the absence of a great 
modification in the government’s priorities. The downward trend in the interest rates that began 
in September 2005 and lasted until April 2008 must be seen in a context where the inflation 
rate was meeting the target (Table 1).  
TABLE 1: INFLATION AND INFLATION TARGET, 2006-2010 
Year Target (%) 
Tolerance 
Intervals (p.p.) 
Upper and Lower 
Limits (%) 
Actual inflation 
(IPCA, % p. a.) 
2006 4.5 2 2.5 - 6.5 3.14 
2007 4.5 2 2.5 - 6.5 4.46 
2008 4.5 2 2.5 - 6.5 5.90 
2009 4.5 2 2.5 - 6.5 4.31 
2010 4.5 2 2.5 - 6.5 5.91 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. Elaborated by the author. 
Aside from the fact that the interest rate began to decrease before the alleged changed within 
the government, the Central Bank had already gone through another cycle of lowering interest 
rates earlier in Lula’s first term (Figure 24). Brazil’s interest rates were among the highest in 
the world and there is little disagreement among scholars and policy-makers that they should 
have been lower. The main difference in view between “neoliberals” and “developmentalists” 
with regard to monetary policy is the level of inflation rate that can be tolerated, the former 
defending a lower rate than the latter.  
 
                                                
126 Non-attributable interview with a former Central Bank director.  
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FIGURE 24: INTEREST RATES (SELIC), 2003-2008 
 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Boletim, Seção mercado financeiro e de capitais (BCB Boletim/M. Finan.). 
Elaborated by the author. 
In addition, contrary to its Asian peers, the Brazilian government did not adhere to an export-
led growth development strategy, letting the exchange rate appreciate in response to strong 
dollar inflows (Figure 25). While the Central Bank intervened in the foreign exchange market, 
it did not prevent the overall trend of an appreciation of the real. This excessive exchange rate 
appreciation was strongly criticised by advocates of the developmentalists’ policies, all of 
whom claimed it was harming Brazilian exports, particularly those of manufactured goods 
(Morais & Saad-Filho 2011, p.523). One former finance minister referred to the overvalued 
currency as exchange rate populism, as it increased real wages and controlled inflation: “Lula 
let the exchange rate appreciate in an absolutely scandalous way; for him it was marvellous, [it 
was pure] populism, everyone was happy, but for the country…”127 If anything the currency 
appreciation leaned more towards a pro-market approach than a developmentalist one. 
                                                

















































FIGURE 25: EXCHANGE RATE R$/US$, 2000-2010  
  
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Boletim, Seção Balanço de Pagamentos (BCB Boletim/BP). Elaborated by the 
author. 
In sum, the period 2006-2008 represented a remarkable phase for the Brazilian economy, one 
characterised by macroeconomic stability and an improvement of social indicators. There was 
a significant alteration to the government’s economic team, yet this change did not alter the 
core of the macroeconomic framework in place since 1999. While economic growth increased, 
it was nevertheless lower than Brazil’s EMDs peers. To that extent, it seems reasonable to 
argue that the external environment inaugurated in 2003 had a great influence on Brazil’s 
performance during 2006-2008. Before analysing the impacts of the global crisis on the 
Brazilian economy, the next section shows how the good performance of the Brazilian 
economy, particularly its success in tackling inequality, was key for promoting Brazil’s 




4.3   THE SUPERPOWER REHEARSAL (2006-2008) 
As discussed in chapter 3, foreign policy was an essential pillar of the Lula government. The 
priority given to foreign policy was reflected in the augmented budget of the Ministry of 
External Relations, Itamaraty, which increased from R$1 billion in 2003 to R$1.7 billion in 
2008. Moreover, between 2003 and 2007, Brazil opened 15 embassies in African countries,128 
reflecting the pivotal role the continent played in Brazil’s political and diplomatic agenda. 
From 2003 to 2008, President Lula travelled annually to Africa,129 announcing cooperation 
programmes with African countries and forgiving the public debts countries like Cape Verde, 
Gabon and Mozambique had with Brazil. 
Likewise, Brazilian resources directed towards international cooperation more than doubled 
from 2005 to 2009, from US$158.1 million to US$362.2 million (Figure 26), according to data 
gathered by the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA, Instituto de Pesquisa 
Econômica Aplicada) and the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC, Agência Brasileira de 
Cooperação) (Cintra 2010, p.19).130 During this time, the share of resources destined for 
humanitarian assistance soared from 0.3 per cent of the total to 12 per cent, and those directed 
to technical cooperation also rose from 7.2 per cent to 13.5 per cent (Cintra 2010, p.19). In 
absolute terms, Brazil augmented its contribution to international organisations and regional 
banks from US$123.1 million in 2005 to US$ 247.5 in 2009 (Cintra 2010, p.19). The resources 
                                                
128 Those were Sao Tome and Principe (2003); Ethiopia (2004); Benin (2005); Cameroon (2005); Equatorial 
Guinea (2005); Sudan (2005); Tanzania (2005); Togo (2005); Botswana (2006); Guinea (2006); Zambia (2006); 
Burkina Faso (2007); Democratic Republic of the Congo (2007); Mali (2007); and Mauritania (2007).  
129 In November 2003, Lula visited San Tome and Principe, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa; 
in June 2004, San Tome and Principe, Gabon, Cape Verde; in April 2005, Cameroon, Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea 
Bissau, and Senegal; in February 2006, Algeria, Benin, Botswana, and South Africa; in 2007, Burkina Faso, 
Congo Brazzaville, Angola and South Africa; in 2008, Mozambique. 
130 This was the first survey done by the Brazilian government to know how much Brazil spent on international 
cooperation, denoting how being a donor was new to Brazil.  
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expended for international cooperation were mainly allotted to areas which Brazil deemed as 
priority regions, i.e. South America and Africa. 
FIGURE 26: BRAZILIAN COOPERATION FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, US$ MILLION, 2005-
2009 
 
Source: ABC (2010, 21). 
Behind the expanded budget for foreign policy during the Lula government were the 
international dynamics that emerged from China’s economic rise, which allowed Brazil to 
become less vulnerable to external shocks and to accumulate international reserves. As a high-
ranked diplomat observed: “there was a clear link between foreign policy and the commodity 
boom”.131 Symptomatic of this correspondence was Brazil’s debt repayment to the IMF in late 
2005, which yielded Brazil a very positive political outcome among its peers. As a high 
member of the government said:  
No longer depending on the IMF is an important political sign about the reduction of [a 
country’s] external vulnerability. And this has important diplomatic effects, you become 
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an actor, as it happened [with Brazil], you overcome the stage of dependence of these 
bodies and move to the next step which is to propose the reform of these organisms.132 
 
While the level of intervention of the Fund in Brazil’s economic policies was low before 2005, 
Brazil occupied the debtor dependent position in international forums. To that extent, the main 
difference for Brazil after settling its debt with the Fund seems not to be the level of autonomy 
Brazil had to define economic policies but the potential it had to enhance its place in the 
international debate. As a Brazilian representative to the World Bank related: “when you are 
in debt or dependent on the institution, it is much more difficult to act as a shareholder … the 
feeling of independence and the perception of independence [by others] creates a much more 
favourable environment to make you a partner in the project”.133  
For example, during the IMF meeting in Singapore in 2006, Brazil refused the proposal of 
quota and voice reform presented, because its scope was too limited when compared to that 
which Brazil desired.134 This kind of attitude is unlikely to come from a country that is utterly 
dependent on the Fund resources. As a high-ranked official at the Central Bank reported: “the 
then managing director [Rodrigo] Rato … personally called dozen of finance ministers, dozens 
of developing countries to try to ensure the necessary amount of votes to pass the reform in the 
format he was presenting”.135 According to him, there was an incipient reaction led by Brazil, 
which did not actually threaten the reform from being approved, “but the process was a bit 
shattered, shaking that structure of the Fund, of preserving a command extremely focused on 
developed countries, European countries, etc.”.136 While there was no political momentum to 
                                                
132 Non-attributable interview. 
133 Non-attributable interview with a Brazilian representative at the World Bank.  
134 Non-attributable interview with a high-ranked official at the Central Bank. 
135 Non-attributable interview with a high-ranked official at the Central Bank. 
136 Non-attributable interview with a high-ranked official at the Central Bank. 
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alter the prevailing global monetary and financial architecture until the 2008 crisis, the change 
in Brazil’s assertiveness after paying off the IMF debt is nonetheless meaningful. 
Brazil’s economic performance engendered a transformation not only in its self-confidence but 
also in its international reception. For instance, Brazil’s cooperation in social polices was soon 
sought by both developing and developed countries,137 as many were increasingly interested in 
emulating Brazil’s experience in their own cooperation programmes and in establishing 
triangular cooperation with Brazil.138 It seems that the principal point which differentiated 
Brazil’s economic rise from that of the other developing economies was having something to 
offer to the developed world: “the social side of Lula’s policies [increased] Brazil’s 
international soft power, because it created an appeal to [the Brazilian] model,”139 said a former 
Foreign Minister.  
Indeed, Brazil’s economy did not mirror that of China or India, which astonished the world 
with their outstanding economic growth rates; rather, it was an economy whose growth 
appeared based on a commitment to addressing inequality issues.140  As Brazilian policy-
makers prioritised the reduction of inequality and poverty, “Brazil began to communicate to 
                                                
137 The main Brazilian partners for triangular cooperation were Japan, United States, Germany, France, Canada, 
Argentina and Spain (Cintra 2010, p.34). 
138 Non-attributable interview with a high-ranked diplomat.  
139 Non-attributable interview with a former foreign affairs minister.   
140 Poverty fell by 51.9 per cent during the Lula government (Neri 2011, p.13),  meaning that Brazil accomplished 
the first Millennium Development Goal to reduce by half the proportion of the population living in extreme 
poverty almost ten years in advance (Barros et al. 2010, pp.134–135). In comparison, during Cardoso’s 
government, poverty fell by 31.9 per cent (Neri 2011, p.13). Between 2001 and 2009, while Brazil’s average per 
capita income rose by 23.5 per cent, per capita income from the poorest 10 per cent rose by 69.08 per cent (the 
richest 10 per cent rose by 12.8 per cent) (Neri 2011, p.14). Significantly, figures show an inequality reduction in 
gender (women’s income rose by 38 per cent), race (black and pardos’ income increased by 43.1 per cent and 
48.5 per cent respectively, against white’s income increase of 20.1 per cent) and region (per capita income in the 
poorer Northeast rose by 41.8 per cent against 15.8 per cent in richer Southeast) (Neri 2011, p.15). Brazil’s success 
in reducing income inequality is largely attributed to the result of social policies, notably the conditional cash 
transfer programme Bolsa Família, which was scaled up by three times during the Lula government to include 11 
million households (Neri 2011; Barros et al. 2010). In 2013, Bolsa Família won the 1st Award for Outstanding 
Achievement in Social Security, granted by the International Social Security Association.  
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the world that there was a qualitative change in Brazil’s development project,”141 one Brazilian 
representative at the World Bank said. Another member of the government stated along similar 
lines that Brazil showed “there [was] no insuperable inconsistency between having sound 
macroeconomic control and, within that context, doing very concrete measures of social 
inclusion”.142 As a Brazilian representative at the World Bank declared: “Brazil went on from 
being a ‘problem country’ to being seen as a ‘solution country’”.143 The fact that Brazil carried 
out these solutions under a democratic regime only served to further enhance its credentials 
within the international community. 
At the World Bank, for example, Brazil’s rapid economic growth and commitment to social 
inclusion lent weight and prominence to its influence within that institution. As a former 
Brazilian representative there commented: “I felt there was a curiosity and at the same time a 
deference in relation to Brazil … in determining the standards to where other economies should 
go”.144 The recognition of Brazilian leadership in this area became clear in 2013 when the 
World Bank announced the creation of a knowledge hub of poverty and inequality in Brazil. 
When launching this initiative, the World Bank President Jim Yong Kim said: “Brazil has 
demonstrated that solid economic policies coupled with social responsibility are not only 
possible but desirable. And that growing while at the same time reducing inequality is an 
attainable goal” (Kim 2013). 
Also mirroring such change was the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD) Council Resolution in May 2007, which proposed an enhanced 
engagement with Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and South Africa (OECD 2007). Although 
                                                
141 Non-attributable interview with a former Brazilian representative to the World Bank.  
142 Non-attributable interview.  
143 Non-attributable interview with a former Brazilian representative to the World Bank. 
144 Non-attributable interview. 
 153 
there was not a formal invitation for Brazil to integrate into OECD, the interest of the developed 
world in building ties with Brazil and other large emerging market countries was novel. 
Despite the positives resulting from the fact that Brazil was no longer a debtor country, 
Brazilian diplomacy began to face some dilemmas. As one Brazilian diplomat confessed: “it 
was much easier to do foreign policy before; Brazil’s external situation was much more 
complicated, but the speech was much easier … Nowadays Brazil can no longer have the tiny 
country speech; Brazil no longer fits in this”.145 Indeed, Brazil has always enjoyed acting as 
the bridge between the developing and the developed countries; it always had the option of 
being the first of the developing countries or the last of the developed. Thus, Brazil was very 
reluctant to join the OECD not least because it “would be very difficult [to the Brazilian 
diplomacy] to be a member of the OECD and at the same time be active in the G77,”146 as a 
high-ranked diplomat said.147  
Moreover, Brazil’s hesitancy in making the transition from “third world” discourse to enter 
into the “rich-country club” was also grounded in domestic political reasons. As a high-ranked 
diplomat noticed, “in a PSDB government, we would have been [in the OECD] for a long 
time”.148 Along similar lines, a former high-ranked policy-maker said: “what Brazil cannot 
define is the strategy about what to do; and then I think the problem is basically the 
government’s ideology, from the PT, which continues with this third-worldism”.149 Since the 
beginning of the Lula government in 2003, foreign policy had been used to counterweight the 
government’s continuity of macroeconomic policies (chapter 3), meaning that an alliance with 
the United States and other developed countries was off the table. Instead, Brazil invested in 
                                                
145 Non-attributable interview with a high-ranked Brazilian diplomat. 
146 Non-attributable interview with a high-ranked Brazilian diplomat. 
147 The Group of 77 is the largest intergovernmental organisation of developing countries in the United Nations. 
148 Non-attributable interview with a high-ranked Brazilian diplomat. 
149 Non-attributable interview. 
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strengthening political ties with the developing world, particularly with its South American 
neighbours. 
Brazil’s engagement with the rest of South America brought to light one of its diplomatic 
dilemmas, namely regarding Brazil’s leadership role in South America integration. Indeed, the 
government hesitated in taking the lead in the integration process, as a high-ranked diplomat 
said: 
If Brazil wants to be a leader and exercise that leadership; it has to take more risks … 
There is a fear in some branches of the government that leadership might be interpreted 
as imperialism. The other side, the [neighbour] countries, they expect Brazil to exercise 
that leadership, expect Brazil to be more benign, to have a more strategic view … without 
having a hegemonic political ambition.150 
His frustration was somewhat confirmed by an interview with a high-ranked policy-maker of 
the Lula and Dilma’s governments:  
In the region we have to be careful: leadership you do not need to announce; leadership 
comes from recognition. If you keep “banging the drums” [batendo o bumbo] … you 
create resistance. Our economic, political weight is so disproportional in the region that 
you do not need to say that Brazil is the leader, this is evident.151  
 
The view that being the biggest economy in South America is a sufficient condition for regional 
leadership is far from a unanimous position. To begin with, Brazil is the largest economy in 
South America but is not the richest. In terms of GDP per capita and human development, 
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay rank consistently higher than Brazil, with Mexico and 
Venezuela sporadically exceeding it as well, depending on oil prices. Hence, there is 
considerable resistance in Brazilian society to accept the remittance of financial support from 
Brazil to regional mechanisms (Malamud 2011, p.5). In the words of a high-ranked diplomat: 
                                                
150 Non-attributable interview with a high-ranked diplomat  
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The Brazilian society, the Congress, still does not understand the importance of Brazil’s 
role in the region and to the regional mechanisms; the expectation of the neighbouring 
countries to receive support from the Brazilian government. There is always a 
questioning, “these recourses should be used to build schools, ports in Brazil”. … There 
is a lack of knowledge at the technical level, but above all a reservation, a resistance to 
Brazil make financial contributions [for other countries]. Why? Because people still do 
not see this as something positive and, going deeper in this issue, they do not understand 
that a Brazilian leadership entails responsibilities and also involves financial 
contributions.152 
 
Furthermore, while Brazil is the largest economy in South America and is amongst the world’s 
largest economies, it lacks commercial relevance. In comparison to other large emerging 
markets, such as India and China, the size of Brazil’s exports and imports is very small (Table 
2). Brazil’s share in global merchandise exports is 1.29 per cent, against 1.66 per cent of India 
and 11.74 per cent of China. The figures for global merchandise imports are similar, where 
Brazil accounts for 1.33 per cent against 2.47 per cent of India and 10.32 of China. More 
importantly, Brazil is not present in the international value chains, since commodities represent 
most of its global trade, with an upward trend (Cunha 2011; Cunha et al. 2012). Manufactures 
represent only 35.1 per cent of Brazil’s exports, while in India they account for 59.4 per cent 
and in China 94.0 per cent of total exports. In sum, Brazil is a relatively closed economy, with 
a very low trade to GDP ratio of 25.5 when compared to the figures of China and India, 51.9 





                                                
152 Non-attributable interview with a high-ranked diplomat. 
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TABLE 2: MERCHANDISE AND COMMERCIAL SERVICES TRADE  
  Brazil India China 
Merchandise 
Trade 
Share in world total exports 1.29 1.66 11.74 
   Agricultural products 37.4 15.0 3.2 
   Fuels and mining products 24.2 25.5 2.7 
   Manufactures 35.1 59.4 94.0 
Share in world total imports 1.33 2.47 10.32 
   Agricultural products 5.9 5.2 8.5 
   Fuels and mining products 21.7 45.4 27.9 
   Manufactures 72.3 38.8 58.2 
Commercial 
Services Trade 
Share in world total exports 0.81 3.25 4.41 
Share in world total imports 1.90 2.84 7.52 
Source: WTO, 2014. Trade Profiles, data from 2013. Elaborated by the author. 
Being a closed economy is problematic for a country that has ambitions to become an 
influential player in monetary affairs. On this matter, a former Central Bank governor 
commented: “there is no point in trying to be important in the monetary world if you are not in 
the commercial world”.153 Brazil’s commercial insulation has impaired, for instance, Brazil’s 
quota in the IMF, since the quota formula takes countries’ trade openness into account. As 
noted by a former Central Bank director: 
Brazil has a chronic problem in the quota negotiation with the IMF; that is, historically, 
the country’s share in world trade has been important to determine the quota; the 
country’s degree of openness is decisive. Brazil is a country relatively closed to trade. So 
suddenly [Brazil] is a country with an economy considerably larger than the Mexican 
economy, but that might end up with a smaller share than Mexico because we are more 
closed. In theory, that means our economy is less exposed to the external sector and 
therefore needs less support.154 
Considering the case of Brazil’s relations with its South American neighbours, a former Central 
Bank director said:  
It is not a matter of size; we are a very closed economy. … if you want to be a reserve 
currency you need to have size and to offer your currency to other countries: either 
lending to other countries, which is [not possible] for Brazil, or having commercial deficit 
with these countries, and Brazil is small in the international trade … so how could anyone 
have reais?  
                                                
153 Non-attributable interview with a former Central Bank governor. 
154 Non-attributable interview with a former Central Bank director. 
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From 2006 to 2008, Brazil held commercial surpluses with all South American countries except 
Bolivia (Table 3). As well observed by a high-ranked diplomat, “how do we want to promote 
regional integration this way? How do you develop complementary economic relations if we 
only export and do not import?”155  
TABLE 3: BRAZIL TRADE BALANCE WITH SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES, US$ FOB, 2006-2008  
  2006 2007 2008 
Argentina  3.686.329.292 4.012.699.656 4.347.179.409 
Bolivia  -746.626.199 -750.433.169 -1.722.312.812 
Chile  1.047.281.964 802.312.533 840.112.012 
Colombia  1.891.980.055 1.911.875.979 1.465.838.938 
Ecuador  847.104.599 631.444.346 835.383.982 
Paraguay  937.739.517 1.214.070.864 1.830.044.102 
Peru  721.392.616 644.849.098 1.342.617.950 
Uruguay  394.372.825 502.053.613 625.972.799 
Venezuela  2.973.871.037 4.378.015.391 4.611.415.280 
Source: MDIC/Aliceweb. Elaborated by the author. 
Significantly, Brazil’s position stood in a stark contrast to that of China’s, which held deficits 
with most countries in the region. As noted by one official at the Central Bank: 
What is the difference between Brazil and China? China can have swap agreements with 
any Latin American country it wants to. Why? Because China holds deficits with all 
Latin American countries, so what happens: if the country does not pay you, you do not 
pay. China is hedged on that. And Latin America and the Caribbean are the regions where 
the Brazilian economy holds the biggest surpluses, in terms of export of goods with 
technology and value added. And it is nowadays the only place to where Brazil is able to 
export manufactures and services.156 
The contrasting positions of Brazil and China in South America were recognised by the 
government, as a high-ranked policy-maker said:  
We need to create conditions to incorporate the neighbours … in this commercial matter, 
[Brazil] might need to make some political options; create mechanisms to import from 
neighbours will make our attractiveness to them [higher], counterbalancing the 
magnetism they have from China and other countries. And this you do not only with 
economic theory, you do with politics.157 
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Failing to build commercial ties with the region, the Brazilian government’s actions 
concentrated instead on creating a superstructure of agreements. The most important one was 
probably the Constitutive Treaty of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUL, União 
de Nações Sul-Americanas), signed in May 2008, which completed the integration started in 
2004 between the Andean Community and the Mercosul nations. Amongst the greatest 
ambitions of UNASUL was the constitution of a monetary fund and lending institution, the 
Bank of the South – an idea that had been launched by Hugo Chávez in his electoral campaign 
in 1998. Venezuela gained support of Argentina and a first memorandum of understanding was 
signed in February 2007, when Bolivia and Ecuador also became members. Brazil and other 
UNASUL members, however, remained reluctant to join the Bank of the South (Carvalho et 
al. 2009, p.115). In May 2007 Brazil agreed to join the project; however, according to Carvalho 
et al. (2009, p.115) Brazil convinced the other members to resume the negotiations from the 
beginning, which meant revising Chávez’s original project. The agreement to establish the 
Bank of the South was finally signed in September 2009 by the governments of Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela – missing therefore the other five 
members of UNASUL (Chile, Colombia, Guyana, Peru and Suriname) – and has not yet started 
its operations.  
During the negotiations, Brazil and Venezuela held conflicting positions on several important 
matters for the Bank (Carvalho et al. 2009, p.116). The Brazilian position prevailed in some 
important aspects such as the establishment of the Bank of the South as a development bank to 
finance infrastructure projects, which contrasted with Venezuela’s desire for a lender of last 
resort to replace the IMF. Brazil also managed to limit the bank’s activities to South America, 
preventing any possibility that Venezuela could eventually use the bank to support its extra-
regional allies, such as Cuba and Nicaragua. However, the headquarters were established in 
Caracas, and not in Montevideo as Brazil had preferred. Venezuela also won a victory with 
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regards to the Bank’s voting system, which was established according to the principle of one 
country, one vote. At the heart of the disagreements was the more radical position of Venezuela 
against the Washington-based institutions, as noticed by a Central Bank official who 
participated in the debate:  
Because behind the Bank of the South there is a speech of Venezuela, of Ecuador, of 
rejecting the IADB. … There was a meeting in which Brazil proposed to reinforce the 
actions of [South American countries] in the IADB, articulate more, and the answer was: 
“no, these Washington institutions are dominated by imperialism, we do not want them, 
we want to replace them”. … Before creating a new [bank], why not make the Fonplata 
operate?158 
 
Besides the UNASUL and the Bank of the South, there were a series of other regional 
mechanisms inaugurated around the same time, such as the Mercosul Structural Convergence 
Fund (FOCEM, Fundo para Convergência Estrutural do Mercosul), which initiated its 
operations in January 2007, and the Local Currency Payment System (SML, Sistema de 
Pagamentos em Moeda Local) between Brazil and Argentina, in operation since October 2008. 
The proliferation of these arrangements, however, did not match the economic capacity of the 
region. There was simply “too much smoke and not enough fire,” as a high-ranked official at 
the Central Bank said (see also Malamud 2011, p.8). According to him, South American 
regional initiatives could only become more successful if they ran in parallel with the work of 
the IMF, the World Bank and the IADB, rather than if they tried to substitute them:  
This is not a matter of ideological nature; it is an extremely pragmatic issue: you have no 
power here to try to build an alternative to dispute with what is already established and 
operating in the region … There is no way [South America] can create a mechanism of 
international reserves that is effectively able to protect the countries from an external 
shock, for a very simple reason: the most part of the region’s reserves belongs to only 
one country, and this country needs these reserves … So the initiatives here at the 
regional level have to be adjusted somewhat to this reality, perhaps we can have a less 
                                                
158 Non-attributable interview with an official at the Central Bank. 
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grandiloquent project, more down-to-earth, more effective from the point of view of 
promoting economic integration. But for that you have to get down from the podium…159 
In a critical view, a high-ranked official at the World Bank compared the South American 
integration experience with the Asian one: 
The Asian let the economic relations increase … and then they created the superstructure; 
whereas in the case of South America, we create great diplomatic treaties without having 
at the base the interested economic clusters to support [integration]. This is a very 
mistaken view … to think that the world is formed by great treaties, [as if] first you make 
a treaty and then come the merchants, [it is the opposite].160 
 
Thus, despite being the largest economy in South America, Brazil failed to transform its 
structural resources into effective regional leadership (Malamud 2011). Economically, the 
commercial ties with its neighbours were weak. Instead, South American countries – Brazil 
included – were becoming increasingly dependent on trade with China. Politically, Lula’s 
foreign policy orientation made it more difficult to moderate Venezuela’s influence in regional 
arrangements, which progressively assumed a political nature. As a respected researcher at the 
government in this topic said: 
One of the great problems of Brazilian diplomacy is this lack of leadership perspective. 
Brazil does not have a project, [Brazil does not know] to what we negotiate, there is no 
direction, there is no project, and I think this is the great problem of integration here in 
South America, it depends on Brazil and Brazil does not have this perspective, it does 
not have well defined why it wants closer ties with its neighbours… destiny, geography, 
etc. but it does not go much further than that.161 
 
In sum, as a result of Brazil’s sounder economy, the Brazilian government could increase the 
amount of resources destined for foreign policy, which were targeted mainly at cooperating 
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with South American and African countries. Moreover, the social initiatives of Lula’s 
economic policy further augmented Brazil’s international soft power as it created a 
development model that caught the attention of the developed world. However, while the 
Brazilian economy was no longer financially dependent on developed countries, the 
government had difficulty in behaving as an independent state, one that was prepared to assume 
the costs of leadership. Before Brazil could solve these dilemmas, the 2008 financial crisis 
broke out and interrupted the scenario that had favoured a greater regional integration. 
  
 
4.4   THE LAND OF THE FUTURE’S DEBUT (2008-2010) 
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 changed the hitherto favourable 
conditions enjoyed by the Brazilian economy, conditions that had been only marginally 
affected by the subprime crisis triggered in the United States in June 2007. One the one hand, 
the real appreciating trend reversed in July 2008 when it reached its lowest mark of 
R$1.59/US$1. In August, the exchange rate went down to R$1.61/US$1.00, depreciating even 
further by that September to R$1.79/US$1.00. Behind the depreciation of the real, was the 
“flight for safety” triggered by the international crisis, which caused an appreciation of the 
dollar against most currencies (Cohen 2009b, p.26; Eichengreen 2009, p.55; Akyüz 2012, 
p.15). In fact, despite being originated in the US financial system, the 2008 crisis did not harm 
international investors’ perception of the US as the safest destiny for their assets.  
On the other hand, the strengthening of the dollar led to a drop in commodities prices (Figure 
27), which peaked in July 2008 only to fall rapidly until the end of that year. This drop in 
commodities prices had a negative impact on Brazil’s terms of trade, which when combined 
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with the shortage in international liquidity also contributed to the depreciation of the real 
(Mesquita & Torós 2010, p.7).  
FIGURE 27: EXCHANGE RATE, COMMODITY AND OIL PRICES, 2006-2010 
 
Source: IPEA and Central Bank of Brazil. Elaborated by the author.  
The effect on the exchange rate was further amplified by the exposure of several Brazilian 
exporting companies to foreign exchange derivatives (Mesquita & Torós 2010, p.7). As the 
real began to appreciate in 2003, the revenues of the exporting companies were hampered. 
Some companies compensated their lower income in the financial market, betting high on the 
real’s appreciation. When the exchange rate depreciated, some large Brazilian companies like 
Aracruz, Grupo Votorantim and Sadia, were presented with substantial losses. These losses 
contributed to the erosion of the favourable scenario of high international liquidity and 
favourable terms of trade, which had prevailed since 2003.  
The 2008 crisis differed from all previous external crises Brazil had faced in two main ways. 
First, the crisis was triggered outside Brazil. In 2008, the shortage of dollar liquidity was not 
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the United States that reverberated around the world. Second, Brazil was in a much more 
privileged position than in previous crises to deal with the effects of the crisis thanks to the 
reforms the Brazilian governments had gradually put in place since 1994, notably in terms of 
banking and financial regulation, management of the federal public debt and reserve 
accumulation. In the words of one influential Brazilian economist: 
Unlike what happened in the past, which was a situation where, either because Brazil had 
a fragile domestic situation that was [prone to contagion] or because investors were 
specifically attacking Brazil, what used to happen was that there was a capital outflow; 
the currency devalued, triggering an inflation problem; and at the same time a fiscal 
problem, because there was no capital inflow … and then you had a balance of payments 
crisis often together with a fiscal crisis, where you had to make those major adjustment 
with the help of the IMF. This was the classical way of crisis here. In 2008, this was not 
what happened.162 
 
When the 2008 crisis broke out, the Brazilian financial system turned out to be less 
contaminated by junk assets than other economies. Since the mid-1990s, Brazil had pursued 
tighter financial regulation, somewhat against the prevailing mainstream ideas of financial 
liberalisation and deregulation. As an official at the Central Bank said: 
The clear example is in the 1990s, in the early 2000s, the trend among the world’s central 
banks was to remove the supervision of the financial system. … We suffered a lot of 
pressure here in the Central Bank. It is not a pressure from an institution, but the pressure 
from the prevailing ideology, and we resisted a lot. And the fact that in the 2008 crisis 
the countries that had supervision, regulation within their financial systems managed to 
respond more quickly to the crisis [helped to] create a new benchmark.163 
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According to Brazilian policy-makers, they knew that Brazil’s economic reality – one very 
prone to financial disturbances – required greater surveillance than the benchmark proposed 
by developed countries. As noted by a high-ranked official at the Central Bank: 
If on the one hand Brazil took some steps towards [the mainstream] in the 1999 crisis, 
on the other hand we always maintained a certain autonomy, even during the government 
of Fernando Henrique, never fully embracing the consensus agenda at the international 
level. In the Lula government this was even more evident and obviously in the 2008 crisis 
this deregulation element of the financial sector was very strong, and in Brazil we always 
had the concern to maintain an effective regulation and supervision… certain elements 
of our economic structure, which were seen as idiosyncratic or jabuticabas164, were then 
seen in a more benign way.165 
 
For example, the notion of the bank stress test, which came to the fore during the 2008 crisis, 
had for a long time been part of Brazil’s risk management policies. As noted by a former 
Central Bank governor: “[Other countries] did not have in their risk horizon the market stress; 
in Brazil we lived under constant stress, so the Brazilian risk management incorporated the 
stress, not in the methodologically well-organized way as it is today, but the concept 
existed”.166 In this regard, he said: 
It was a process in which Brazil in fact got ahead. I would say that the idea of a stronger 
regulation was connected somewhat with the greater understanding we [Brazilian policy-
makers] had of the Brazilian problems. That is, we knew we needed to adopt here a 
stricter regulation than in other countries. We knew that volatility here was higher, that 
risks here were higher. So that led Brazilian banks to develop certain ways of risk 
management, or more sophisticated risk management techniques that we saw in other 
countries, because there you did not have a lot of volatility.167 
 
                                                
164 Jabuticaba is a Brazilian tree, whose name is commonly used as a pejorative expression to refer to something 
unique to Brazil.  
165 Non-attributable interview with a high-ranked official at the Central Bank. 
166 Non-attributable interview with a former Central Bank governor. 
167 Non-attributable interview with a former Central Bank governor. 
 165 
Another jabuticaba in the pre-crisis period was the level of reserve requirements determined 
by the Central Bank, which were considered too high compared to international standards. In 
the words of a high-ranked official at the Central Bank:  
Our level of reserve requirements [was seen by the mainstream] as an impediment to the 
development of our financial markets… but at the time of the crisis [the level of reserve 
requirements] created a leeway for the Central Bank intervention that was very important 
to prevent bank failures. Obviously, it was also a lock for the degree of leverage [in 
comparison to] other economies… Thus, on the one hand, our economy was less 
undermined and, on the other hand, at the moment that [the economy] needed a liquidity 
injection, you could do this without using public resources; it was resources that were 
here in the Central Bank and that with one signature you changed the regulation, giving 
an injection able to target certain segments that were in most need at the time.168 
 
The Brazilian economy also went against the mainstream in relation to public banks. The 
context of the 2008 crisis challenged the view about the usefulness of public banks, since they 
were a key element in the quick rebound of countries like Brazil, as a respected researcher at 
the government noticed: 
The fact that in the 1990s and in the 2000s, the relevance of having public banks in Brazil 
– the Banco do Brasil, Caixa Econômica, particularly BNDES – was very much 
questioned… with the crisis, this topic sweeps under the carpet: Brazil, like other Latin 
American and other emerging economies, used its public banks … to provide credit; it 
changed the credit market in Brazil, the volume of credit went from something like 25 
per cent to 50 per cent of GDP in a few years... and Brazil was one of the economies that 
went through the crisis without major traumas.169 
A former Central Bank governor likewise recognised the importance of Brazilian public banks 
in the Central Bank’s response towards the crisis: 
I think there was wisdom to avoid many problems; the Central Bank acted as well as 
BNDES, Banco do Brasil and Caixa Econômica did together. You can even make an 
analogy with the Fed; [in Brazil] we made a kind of quantative easing as the Fed did, but 
acting from different institutions. BNDES bailed out institutions which, if they 
bankrupted, would strongly affect the banking system in a moment of vulnerability. 
There was a bank run… and the Central Bank involved Banco do Brasil and Caixa 
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Econômica to increase the credit market, which greatly helped the situation of the race 
against medium-sized banks. We used our equivalent of the FDIC [Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation], the FGC to improve the liquidity situation… Most importantly, 
the Central Bank and the BNDES acted to make some important acquisitions happen, 
which prevented some important banks to fail. … Therefore, the Central Bank and other 
banks acted very firmly to avoid the emergence of a crisis atmosphere and coped very 
well with the situation.170 
 
Another main reform in the years preceding the 2008 crisis concerned the composition of the 
federal public debt. Traditionally, the federal public debt was predominantly indexed to the 
interest and exchange rates. In 2004, these figures were 48 per cent and 32 per cent, respectively 
(Figure 28). Then, in the event of an external shock, the exchange rate devalued and the Central 
Bank responded by increasing interest rates, which triggered a twofold increase in the net 
public sector debt as proportion of GDP. In turn, the higher debt as a proportion of GDP was 
perceived as an increase in the country’s risk, which consequently increased the risk premium, 
reinforcing the real’s downward slide. In sum, the debt structure in place in the early 2000s 
amplified the magnitude of the external shock. 
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FIGURE 28: FEDERAL PUBLIC DEBT COMPOSITION, 2004-2010 
 
Source: National Treasury. Elaborated by the author. 
Gradually, the government deliberately changed the composition of the federal public debt, 
reducing the share of debt indexed to interest and exchange rates and raising the share of debt 
indexed to inflation or prefixed rates. In September 2008, the federal public debt indexed to 
inflation and prefixed rates accounted for almost two-thirds of country’s total debt, whereas 
the debt indexed to the exchange rate accounted for only 8 per cent. In this regard, a very 
influential politician and former minister reflected:  
When a country’s debt is not in its own currency, it has a different constraint of others; 
it was the Brazilian case until [not long ago]. Today the Brazilian debt denominated in 
dollars … is practically irrelevant. [Brazil] overcame this problem, this curse of having 
debt denominated in foreign currency. The liquidity problem, the default problem, all 
this is over… I think the Brazilian situation has changed completely; it is a much more 
solid situation. This does not mean that Brazil has resolved its problems, but I think that 
the external problem is no longer the key determinant of Brazilian economic policy.171 
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Consequently, when the exchange rate depreciated in 2008, the opposite from previous crises 
happened: “the net debt fell instead of rising, then the government could make a counter-
cyclical policy,”172 as a former Central Bank director explained (Figure 29).  
FIGURE 29: TOTAL NET PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT, % GDP, 2006-2010 
 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Boletim, Seção Finanças Públicas (BCB Boletim/F. Públ.) Elaborated by the 
author. 
In addition, the stockpiles of foreign reserves the Central Bank had been accumulating since 
the pre-crisis period served to strengthen Brazil’s resilience when the crisis broke out. As 
discussed in chapter 3, China’s economic rise created the opportunity for Brazil to initiate a 
policy of reserve accumulation similar to those pursued by Asian countries. Overall, the 
strategy of reserve accumulation was driven by the Central Bank’s desire to signal to the world 
Brazil’s resilient economy. The first signal of this strength came with Brazil’s debt repayment 
to the IMF in 2005. In retrospect, a former Central Bank director explained Brazil’s policy of 
reserve accumulation as follows: 
                                                
































































It was initially a policy of shoring up reserves, then we paid with those dollars the IMF 
loan, and then it was a reserve accumulation policy. … So I think the reserve 
[accumulation policy] was not so much an act of repudiation of the IMF, but an initiative 
to perpetuate the positive, but temporary, shock of China.173 
 
After paying the IMF, the aim was to build a robust cushion of international reserves as a self-
insurance policy. Again, the desire to accumulate reserves was linked to showing off Brazil’s 
resilience. According to a Central Bank director, Brazil’s shortage of reserves appeared to be 
holding Brazil from achieving an investment grade credit rating: 
So by 2004, 2005, 2006, we saw the rating agencies for instance demanding that Brazil 
implemented comprehensive reforms, even some that were very appropriate, but that we 
did not see the political environment to do. And we looked and saw countries like Russia, 
with institutions much more complicated than ours, but that were investment grade. 
Why? Because Russia had reserves and we had not. So we basically decided to buy the 
investment grade.174 
 
The strategy worked as, amidst the financial meltdown, Standard & Poor’s upgraded Brazil’s 
long-term foreign currency sovereign debt to investment grade in April 2008. In early May 
2008 The Economist (2008) described Standard & Poor’s upgrade as a “strong vote of 
confidence and a milestone in Brazil’s economic history, after years of mistrust following the 
1987 debt default”. In May 2008, Brazil received an upgrade from a second rating agency, 
Fitch Rating, and in September 2009 from Moody’s Investors Service.  
While the Central Bank used some of its reserves during the crisis, it rapidly recovered those 
expended and soon exceeded its pre-crisis level of accumulation. When the crisis erupted in 
September 2008, the Central Bank had US$205 billion in international reserves. This amount 
decreased to US$187 billion in March 2009, when it began to recover, surpassing its pre-crisis 
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level already in August 2009. By December 2010, the Central Bank had US$285 billion 
accumulated in international reserves (Figure 30). 
FIGURE 30: INTERNATIONAL RESERVES, US$ BILLION, 2000-2010  
 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. Elaborated by the author. 
Albeit effective as a self-insurance policy during the crisis, the policy of reserve accumulation 
was very expensive. It was consequently a controversial policy since the reserves were built in 
a context of deficit in the current account and of nominal deficits in the public sector. In other 
words, Brazilian reserves were not the result of a sustained surplus in the economy, whether in 
its relations with the rest of the world or with the public sector itself; they depended on the 
capital inflow, an inflow that was larger than the Brazilian economy needed to finance its 
deficits. Consequently, to buy foreign reserves the government needed to issue domestic debt 
and pay the high domestic interest rates to maintain it. As a former Central Bank director said:  
I remember many times I had to go to the Senate, representing the Central Bank along 
with [Henrique] Meirelles [the Central Bank of Brazil’s governor from January 2003 to 
January 2011], and some senators were criticizing us for buying reserves. We always 
















































when the accident happens then you start to appreciate the insurance, and it was exactly 
what happened.175 
 
In any case, these policies amassed to build a resilient economy that could weather the external 
shock of 2008, providing the government enough room to manoeuvre to fight effectively the 
effects of the international crisis on Brazil. The immediate effect of the crisis was the 
interruption of international credit lines for Brazilian banks and companies with banks in the 
US. Consequently, one of the Central Bank’s first challenges was to maintain adequate levels 
of liquidity in dollars and reais (Mesquita & Torós 2010, p.18).  
In terms of liquidity in foreign currency, already in September 2008 the Central Bank began to 
use international reserves to established dollar auctions in the spot market and to provide 
temporary credit facilities to Brazilian exporters (Mesquita & Torós 2010, p.10; Barbosa 2010, 
p.4). In late October, the Central Bank also started swap operations, whereby the Central Bank 
bought domestic currency to alleviate the speculative pressures on the real (Mesquita & Torós 
2010, pp.11–12; Barbosa 2010, p.4). Soon after, in October 29, the Central Bank of Brazil 
announced a currency swap agreement with the Fed, which supported the provision of up to 
US$ 30 billion, with no conditionalities. According to a former Central Bank director, the swap 
line with the Fed was symbolic of Brazil’s progress on the global stage:  
I think there was a big change… the progress Brazil has made in ten years: in 1998, the 
world was not in crisis, and Brazil was borrowing money from the IMF; in 2008, the 
world was in a major crisis and Brazil was making currency swaps with the Fed without 
conditionalities. So I think Brazil has made progress indeed.176 
 
                                                
175 Non-attributable interview with a former Central Bank director.  
176 Non-attributable interview with a former Central Bank director.  
 172 
The Fed selected only three EMDs other than Brazil to conclude swap lines contracts: Mexico, 
South Korea and Singapore – economies that were considered not only “large and systemically 
important” but also “fundamentally sound and well managed” (Federal Reserve 2008). The 
currency swaps with the four EMDs were preceded by the announcement of similar agreements 
with ten177 central banks from developed countries since September 18. As a Central Bank 
director said:  
At that time, the Fed established several currency swap arrangements with other central 
banks. At a first moment it was only with central banks of developed countries, and then 
we began to note that although the epicentre of the crisis was far from Brazil, some of 
our banks, some of our institutions, began to suffer pressure because we were outside the 
umbrella of the swaps. And then, using the contacts we made in the meetings of the BIS, 
using the dialogue we had there, we quickly managed to talk to the New York Fed and 
they made a currency swap with Brazil, without conditionalities; it was money we could 
use with no need of having any pre-agreed policy with the Fed. … So it was not a loan, 
it was a swap: if they wanted to use reais they had, if we wanted to use dollars, we had 
US$ 30 billion.178 
 
On the surface, it looked like Brazil’s Central Bank had had significant influence in securing 
the swap agreement with the US. As noted by Steil (2014a, p.56), however, the Fed chose the 
countries for the swaps according to their importance to the US financial system. It is 
unrealistic to think that Brazil’s Central Bank could have obtained the agreement if it had not 
been in the US’ interest. In that year, the Fed rejected swap-line requests from Chile, the 
Dominican Republic, Indonesia and Peru (Steil 2014a, p.56). The swap lines established during 
the crisis with Brazil and the other EMDs expired two years after, when the US economy was 
less vulnerable to external financial volatility, and in 2012 the Fed denied a swap-line to India 
(Steil 2014a, p.56).  
                                                
177 These were the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Bank of Canada, Danmarks Nationalbank, the Bank of England, 
the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Norges Bank, the Sveriges 
Riksbank, and the Swiss National Bank. 
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For Brazil, the agreement was nevertheless essential. Its importance did not lie in having access 
to the US$ 30 billion (actually Brazil had almost seven times that value in international 
reserves) but rather in the agreement itself. As noted by a Central Bank director at that time: 
We actually looked at this currency swap as a signal. We did not need to use that money, 
we had reserves, we were not even selling many reserves, but we wanted to have this 
sign that we were part of the core of the international financial system, and we did. So in 
the end we did not use the money, we did not have any auctions, but the effect we wanted 
we achieved that was the signalling effect.179  
 
In terms of domestic liquidity, one of the main measures used by the Central Bank involved 
lowering the reserve requirements for domestic banks, which represented an injection of 
liquidity into the financial system without using fiscal resources. Two other main lines of action 
were improving rediscount operations and expanding operations with the Brazilian Credit 
Guarantee Fund (FGC, Fundo Garantidor de Crédito) (Mesquita & Torós 2010, p.13). 
The provision of liquidity in reais did not undermine the Central Bank’s priority of meeting its 
inflation target (Mesquita & Torós 2010, p.13). The Central Bank tightened monetary policy 
until the end of 2008 to prevent inflation accelerating (Figure 31), given that when the crisis 
erupted the Brazilian economy was booming and the subsequent impact of the depreciation in 
the exchange rate further pressured inflation. The Central Bank feared that a premature cut in 
interest rates could compromise its credibility on price stability and therefore waited until 
January 2009 to loosen its policy again when the prospects for the economy had improved 
(Mesquita & Torós 2010, p.13).  
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FIGURE 31: INTEREST RATES (SELIC), DECEMBER 2007-MARCH 2010, ANNUAL PER CENT  
 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Boletim, Seção mercado financeiro e de capitais (BCB Boletim/M. Financ.). 
Elaborated by the author. 
Ultimately, the Central Bank’s response to the crisis was not an unorthodox one. On the 
contrary, it was quite conservative, given that the Central Bank kept the stability of prices as 
its priority, waiting until January 2009 to begin decreasing interest rates. Even so, having fewer 
economic imbalances when the international crisis erupted allowed the Central Bank to 
eventually decrease interest rates, instead of raising them as had been the case in previous 
crises, but it only did so when it judged there to be no threat of accelerating inflation. As one 
Central Bank director at that time said, the difference in the Central Bank’s response in 2008 
from that of previous episodes was mainly the more resilient condition of the Brazilian 
economy that permitted the implementation of counter-cyclical measures: 
[The Central Bank] let the exchange rate depreciate to clear the excesses there were in 
the local market. We knew that, as the economic fundamentals were good, the exchange 
rate was going to appreciate afterwards. And then when this began to happen and the 
inflation expectations began to improve, we began to cut interest rates. So this was an 
































































I think that the big difference [was not the economic team, but] the policies that allowed 
us to arrive in 2008 in a better shape, more resistant.180 
 
This account further calls into question the government’s claim that the alteration of its 
economic team in 2006 engendered a substantial change in terms of economic policies. In fact, 
Mesquista and Torós (2010, p.9), both Central Bank directors at the outbreak of the crisis, 
stated that the management of the crisis avoided breaking with the macroeconomic tripod. To 
be sure, 2008 was the first time the Brazilian government had the necessary policy space to 
implement counter-cyclical measures, a policy space that emerged after several reforms in the 
period preceding the crisis (such as banking and financial regulation, management of the 
federal public debt profile and accumulation of international reserves) and that was also context 
dependent. Interviews suggest that, if the economic team had made any difference to the 
response towards the 2008 crisis, it came from the Central Bank governor, as one influential 
economist said: 
I think it made a huge difference the fact that the Central Bank governor was someone 
who had been the president of a large international bank [Meirelles served as the 
President of BankBoston from 1996 to 1999, and as the President of Global Banking and 
Financial Services for FleetBoston Financial Corporation from 1999 to 2000], who is 
someone who truly understands how this system works and what you have to do to unlock 
the interbank market in a situation like this.181 
 
Along with the decrease of the interest rates from January 2009 onwards, the government also 
increased the domestic credit supply. First, the government increased BNDES available credit, 
which allowed BNDES to provide special credit facilities for circulating capital, small and 
medium enterprises and exports (Barbosa 2010, p.5). Second, it extended interest-rate 
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subsidised credit to the two largest public commercial banks, Banco do Brasil and Caixa 
Econômica Federal. According to Barbosa (2010, p.6), these actions combined increased credit 
supply by the Brazilian public banks by 33 per cent between September 2008 and July 2009, 
while large private banks increased their credit supply by 9.1 per cent.  
On top of monetary and credit supply measures, in September 2008 the government initiated 
tax exemptions measures and in January 2009 it announced further stimulus measures, 
including an expansion of the PAC. In March 2009 the government launched a new habitation 
program, called Minha Casa, Minha Vida, in a further attempt to unlock investment. In this 
context of increased public spending, the primary surplus target was lowered from 3.3 per cent 
to 2.5 per cent of GDP (Ministério da Fazenda 2010). 
Finally, as the Brazilian currency began to appreciate due to a new wave of capital flows which 
started in the second-quarter of 2009, the Brazilian government introduced measures of capital 
account regulation (CAR) in October 2009, which included capital control and financial 
prudential regulation mechanisms (Prates & Paula 2017; Gallagher, Griffith-Jones, et al. 2012). 
Several academic studies show that while the introduction of those measures were insufficient 
to contain the appreciation of the Brazilian currency, they had an impact in shifting the 
composition of capital inflows toward long-term investment and modestly increased Brazilian 
policy autonomy (Baumann & Gallagher 2012; Prates & Paula 2017; Chamon & Garcia 2016; 
Klein 2012).  
The broad response of the Brazilian government towards the crisis was successful as, after a 
small recession of 0.2 per cent of GDP in 2009, the Brazilian economy resumed its growth in 
the second quarter of 2009, peaking at 7.5 per cent in 2010 – Brazil’s best performance since 
1986. Inflation remained under control (4.3 per cent in 2009 and 5.9 per cent in 2010) and the 
government achieved a primary fiscal budget of 4.1 per cent of GDP in 2008 and of 2.1 in 
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2009. Thus, indicators suggested that Brazil had successfully surmounted the negative effects 
of the international crisis and had resumed growth. 
As the height of the crisis passed, however, the government continued to pursue a heavily 
expansionary fiscal policy. As a former Central Bank director stated: 
But I think that the change really happened in 2010, in late 2009/early 2010, because you 
already had recovered from the crisis; if you were really countercyclical it was time to 
start bringing it back. … The government continued with a heavily expansionist policy 
in 2010 when the economy was already giving signs of overheating: inflation in 2010 
was already rising, and in 2011 reached 6.5 per cent. So you had an overheated economy, 
and despite the signs of an overheated economy [the government] continued with the 
loose fiscal policy. … Then you notice [an incipient change] in 2010, and the change is 
crystalized in 2011, then already with Dilma… It was not during the crisis, it was in the 
post crisis.182 
 
Indeed, evidence suggests that there was a clear change from 2011 onwards. As the government 
believed the Brazilian economy was performing well because of the inflection in its 
macroeconomic policies in 2006, it embraced “developmentalist” policies more forcefully after 
2011. However, from 2011 onwards Brazilian economic performance worsened. Concurrent 
to this change was that the propitious international conditions that had existed despite the crisis, 
began to disappear in 2011. This correspondence may suggest that, contrary to the domestic 
economic policy-focused explanation, the external environment had a more influential effect 
on Brazil’s sound performance during 2006-2010 than has been previously thought.  
 
4.5   BRAZIL IN THE SPOTLIGHT (2008-2010) 
Brazil’s response towards the 2008 crisis was extensively recognised and lauded around the 
world. In November 2009 The Economist (2009) observed that “Brazil suddenly seems to have 
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made an entrance onto the world stage,” and Brazil was identified as one of the last large 
economies to enter the crisis and one of the first to emerged from it. In particular, the Central 
Bank’s response towards the crisis, which minimised its effects on the Brazilian economy, 
promoted international interest in Brazil and, in the words of a close observer, “gave a boost to 
Brazil”.183 As described by a high-ranked official at the Central Bank: 
[Brazil’s performance during the crisis] created a huge interest in the Brazilian economy, 
books being launched about Brazil, ‘new superpower emerging’. … It was very clear, 
[there was] a big interest about the experience and about what Brazil had to say on what 
was happening and on how to deal with that situation.184 
 
Brazil’s performance coupled with the unique context of a crisis that mainly affected the 
developed world and favoured the ascension of other EMDs served to augment Brazil’s 
external influence. As one influential economist said: 
The emerging [countries] were the flavour of the month at that time; there was a euphoria 
around the BRICS, Brazil had just been upgraded to investment grade… People talked it 
was going to be the locomotive of global growth, which was a big mistake, but the fact 
is that there was this attraction.185 
 
The crisis found Brazil chairing the G20, which was upgraded to a leaders’ forum in November 
2008 and symbolised EMDs’ prominence in the aftermath of the crisis. In terms of external 
influence, the rise of the G20 and Brazil’s role in it has actually been regarded a more 
significant event than the Real Plan for Brazil, as a former high-ranked policy-maker and 
influential economist acknowledged: 
In terms of power, I think that what recently changed was not the Real Plan, it was the 
creation of the G20. I think that after the financial crisis and the creation of the G20 there 
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was the idea that the global governance system was going to take into consideration more 
than in the past the interests of developing countries.186 
Likewise, Celso Amorim reflected on the importance for Brazil to be part of the G20: 
The fact that Brazil is currently in the G20, this is not measurable. It is what I always say 
when I talk about the Security Council and the businessmen ask: “why Brazil wants to 
be part of the Security Council? This is nonsense and so on.” And then I tell them: “why 
the businessmen want to be member of the country club?” To get along with who has 
power; it is not there that you do business, but you get to know each other, get to know 
the people in the government. … I am exaggerating to make the picture, but if you are in 
the G20, if you influence a decision, it is much more likely that your interest will be taken 
into account.187 
 
In April 2009, when the G20 leaders agreed to triple the size of the available resources at the 
IMF under the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB), Brazil made the second largest 
contribution (8,740 million SDR) amongst the new participants (IMF 2011). India and Russia 
gave contributions of the same amount and China gave the largest one (31,217 million SDR). 
In the same month, Brazil became a member of the IMF’s Financial Transaction Plan, being 
included in the list of members sufficiently strong enough to finance IMF transactions (IMF 
2009). For Brazil, “this was a sui generis situation,” as the Brazilian representative in the IMF 
described: “Brazil, who was always a debtor, suddenly found itself in the creditor position. 
This affected a lot our position, for good”.188 According to him, the Brazilian government 
capitalised on its role as a creditor of the Fund: 
Lula used to say all the time, in Brazil and outside Brazil, “now we are creditors of the 
Fund, [it is] totally different from the past when we were not creditors and had to be 
subordinated to the Fund, when we were debtors”. It is a political message. And, in 
practice, here [in the IMF], the Brazilian seat became more influential.189  
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Being one of the biggest EMDs, Brazil was a natural candidate to be invited to join international 
forums concerned with increasing the representation of EMDs. As a Brazilian economist said: 
What is happening is that other countries have lost their relevance and this axis of 
relevance moved to countries that today have a stronger geopolitical weight, even though 
[their] economic advances have not kept the same pace of this new political prominence. 
I think this has to do with the slight change in the global axis from developed to emerging 
countries, and then it bends naturally to the major emerging countries; countries of 
continental proportions like Brazil cannot help but be a country that will join this 
domain.190  
 
After increasing its quota shares from 1.42 per cent to 1.78 per cent in the 2008 IMF Reform, 
Brazil merited the second largest increment in quota shares (0.53 percentage points), in the 
2010 Reform, only behind China’s increase of 2.4 percentage points. As a result of this major 
realignment of quotas shares, Brazil became the tenth largest IMF shareholder. In March 2009, 
Brazil was included among the new participants of the Basel Committee on Banking and 
Supervision (BCBS). In the following month, Brazil became member of the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB), the successor of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF). Concurrently, Brazil was 
also among the EMDs invited to the BIS’ informal meeting on the night before its plenary 
meetings.191 As described by a former Central Bank director: 
One of the unwritten rules is that the presidents and directors of the main central banks, 
which at that time was called G10, they get together on Saturday night. … This G10 was 
expanded to include Brazil, Mexico, China and South Africa. So this means that the 
Central Bank of Brazil entered in fact in the group of the main central banks in the world 
… and I believe we have continued in this group since then.192 
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Moreover, thanks to the particular Brazilian form of diplomacy, Brazil stood out among EMDs 
in general and from China in particular. As a former Central Bank director noted:  
For example, in these Basel committees, the idea is you make them a permanent dialogue 
forum; the idea is that people spend time together, talk during a whole day, several times 
per year, go out for dinner, exchange business card, stay friends, keep in touch, to create 
a community that at a time of crisis is useful. … That makes most countries maintain a 
certain stability in their representation on these committees. In the case of the Chinese, 
every two months changed; you never know who is the person, who is the contact. To 
China and to the PBoC [People’s Bank of China] lack experience; not financial capacity. 
If they want, they have the means to do, but they lack experience.193 
Brazilian diplomacy is traditionally very vocal, whereas “Chinese diplomats,” a high-ranked 
diplomat said, “always have been very rigid, always have spoken little English, and always 
have negotiated on the basis of written text”.194 In informal negotiations such as in the G20, 
China’s diplomatic behaviour hindered it, allowing Brazil, with its more vocal strategies to 
stand out. In the words of a high-ranked diplomat: 
One of the things that Brazil spoke about first was to enter in the Basel committee, we 
were the ones to put this one the table. And Brazil traditionally does this; we have had 
that for many years, since the first UNCTAD. Brazil is very vocal and speaks, and the 
others sometimes hide behind us. And this demand agenda was not China that opened 
space.195  
Thus, Brazilian diplomats skilfully used the country’s relatively good domestic response to the 
crisis to promote Brazil’s image and influence internationally.  
Furthermore, President Lula’s personal style and rhetoric helped put Brazil at the centre of 
global attention: “there was an economic reason, but also a personal [reason]: president Lula 
liked this business, Celso Amorim liked [as well]; they travelled and took a lot of initiatives,”196 
one high-ranked diplomat highlighted. In similar lines, a respected Brazilian researcher said: 
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“Lula and Amorim surfed well this wave [of the crisis]”.197 In September 2008, for example, 
Lula declared, “people ask me about the crisis and I answer, ‘go ask Bush’ … It is his crisis, 
not mine” (Fidler 2009). Statements such as these yielded President Lula the tag of “the most 
popular politician on earth” (BBC News 2009) as US President Barack Obama said during the 
G20 Summit in London in April 2009. At the end of 2009, Lula was named “Man of the Year” 
by the French newspaper Le Monde and the Financial Times ranked him among the 50 faces 
that shaped the 2000s. In January 2010, Lula received an unprecedented award of “Global 
Statesman” by the World Economic Forum, created to mark the 40th anniversary of the Forum 
in Davos, Switzerland.  
All these circumstances amassed to paint Brazil as a robust and influential player at the world 
stage. In the words of a former Brazilian Minister:   
I got tired of hearing: “Brazil is not an emerging country. Brazil has already emerged”. 
It is not true, because our social problems are still very large; we have many shortcomings 
to overcome. But undoubtedly [Brazil] achieved a different international stature. And 
these internal factors are essential. Nonetheless, the external action was also an important 
factor to this gain of stature, and I think that by its turn also had a positive reflex 
domestically, which facilitated capital inflows, several things combined. It is fluid.198 
 
While Brazil’s domestic economic performance and external political action were important to 
increase Brazil’s global influence, its success was largely context dependent. First, the break 
out of a major financial crisis in the developed world destabilised the economic and political 
balance of power in the IMS and made possible the ascension of EMDs. As noted by one 
influential Brazilian economist: 
This change of the axis, of how a crisis that affects all developed countries and … this 
perception of the fragility of the developed vis-à-vis the robustness of the emerging. Even 
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if this robustness is not so robust, this change in the perception really gave a political and 
geopolitical boost, a voice to these countries that would not have been possible in 
different circumstances.199 
Similarly, a former finance minister said: “What happened fundamentally was not a change in 
Brazil; it was a change in the rich countries, they suffered a very violent crisis”.200 The crisis 
opened the opportunity for a more serious debate about the necessity of reforming global 
economic governance in ways that would give EMDs more influence. In the words of a former 
Brazilian representative at the IMF: 
With the crisis, the voice of emerging countries, including Brazil, grew a lot. The crisis 
knocked the confidence in the traditional powers, where the crisis originated … because 
it became clear that many things they said and recommended did not have much ground, 
so this opened space to countries like Brazil to have more voice. And this happened here 
in the Fund, but also in the G20.201 
 
Second, there was an increased appeal to include China in global economic governance given 
its economic size. Once the channel was open to incorporate China, it was almost natural to 
include other rising economies. In the words of a former Central Bank governor: 
I think Brazil has improved. Brazil over the years, after the Real Plan, was gaining more 
prominence, visibility in international financial forums. It turns out [however] that this 
process was linked with the perception of developed countries that they needed to involve 
more the emerging [countries], particularly for a realistic reason of incorporating China. 
Bringing only China to the debate was not [possible], so this opened a window. The 
greater financial internationalization itself led to the realization that, if emerging 
countries are fragile, there might be very negative repercussions on the developed 
countries’ economies, on the developed countries’ banking systems.202  
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Thus, Brazil’s increased external influence in the aftermath of the global crisis must be seen as 
a combination of a very specific combination of domestic and international circumstances. As 
one Central Bank official summarised:  
Who believes in astrology would say it was an alignment of the planets: you aligned a 
crisis that affected mainly the Europeans; a moment in which Brazil had great liquidity; 
had paid [the IMF]; [and was] articulated with other countries; there was a very important 
managing director, who was Dominique Strauss-Kahn, who valued the emerging 
countries, unlike former directors … Dominique Strauss-Kahn gave a lot of strength to 
these reforms [advocated by EMDs], to a new balance of forces in the Fund to increase 
the power of the emerging – Brazil, China, India, Colombia, and so on. So all these 
factors came together, and it was decisive, and yes we changed [our position].203  
 
This context, however, gradually faded away and the prestige Brazil had in the immediate 
aftermath of the crisis was not destined to remain. As noted by one close observer, “Brazil had 
its peak of prestige, of influence in the international sphere, G20, IMF, etc. I would say, it was 
the period from 2008 to 2011, more or less”.204 
Significantly, it should be noted that Brazil’s rise in influence during the crisis was achieved 
independently of Brazil’s connection with its South American neighbours. Instead, Brazil’s 
rise was connected to the similar circumstances and successes of the other BRICS countries. 
The regular and informal diplomatic cooperation among Brazil, Russia, India and China that 
started in 2006, where their foreign ministers met annually at the margins of the United Nations 
General Assembly, evolved in 2009 to a meeting with the heads-of-state and government. Later 
in December 2010, South Africa officially became a member nation and the group was renamed 
BRICS, with the “S” standing for South Africa. Gradually, Brazil’s involvement with the 
BRICS replaced the priority given to South America before. 
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This change in foreign policy priorities only became clearer later on. Until 2010, Brazil was 
still relatively engaged in promoting regional integration mechanisms, such as the Bank of the 
South discussed earlier in this chapter. Likewise, Brazil continued to make an effort to act as a 
regional leader. In July 2009, for example, Brazil agreed to triple Paraguay’s income from the 
hydroelectric of Itaipu.205 
The change to the international scene from 2011 onwards reveals the effect external factors 
had on the image Brazil was able to portray abroad from 2008 to 2010. Put differently, Brazil’s 
international influence proved fragile when international conditions altered. To that extent, the 
prevailing balance of power in the IMS during the 2008-2010 period that conferred greater 
political influence on EMDs should be understood as only temporary. As the next chapter will 
argue, with the exception of China, the crisis did not alter the core of the IMS and EMDs 
ultimately remained subordinated players.  
 
4.6   CONCLUSION 
The fragment of the Brazilian statement at the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2009 
quoted at the beginning of this chapter illustrates the surge in Brazil’s worldwide influence in 
the second half of the 2000s, particularly after the global financial crisis of 2008. As this 
chapter has argued, the Brazilian economy improved its performance from 2006 until the 
eruption of the 2008 crisis, which coincided with the repayment of the IMF debt and a relevant 
alteration in the government’s economic team. While academics and policy-makers alike have 
maintained that Brazil’s sound macroeconomic results were the consequences of a redirection 
of economic policies since 2006, Brazil’s performance was likely more strongly influenced by 
                                                
205 Itaipu was built along Brazil and Paraguay’s shared border, and established that Brazil had preference to buy 
Paraguay’s excess capacity. 
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favourable international conditions of booming commodity prices. At the same time, the 
Central Bank’s response towards the 2008 crisis was an orthodox one. The difference in 2008 
was the unprecedented policy space the Brazilian government had to embrace counter-cyclical 
policies, which was result not of a change in its economic team but rather of a much stronger 
initial economic position. Brazil’s improved position to fight the 2008 crisis, for its turn, was 
a result of a long term process of reforms and an international context that served to gradually 
build a more resilient economy.  
The reasons for Brazil’s improved performance aside, the reduction of external constraints for 
macroeconomic policies ensured the Brazilian government more freedom to look for external 
allies and the chance to build its image as a rising power. Additionally, Brazil’s unique 
development model which combined economic growth with income distribution began to draw 
the world’s attention. Ultimately, the 2008 crisis created the momentum for an effective 
projection of this image. Had the crisis not happened, it is likely that the G20 would not have 
become the main international forum for monetary cooperation; Brazil would not have been 
invited to participate in selected groups within the BIS; and there would have been no pressure 
to accelerate the reform in the IMF and other financial organisations. While this hypothesis 
cannot be verified, the fact that after the worst of the crisis had passed, the G20 lost its relevance 
and calls for reform in the IMF reduced (as will be argued in the next chapter) suggests that 
this argument is in all probability correct.  
Both in terms of external influence and domestic economic results, it is clear that international 
conditions were essential to Brazil’s performance. In the words of a close observer, “the fact 
that you do your homework is certainly not a sufficient condition for you to climb positions of 
external acceptance; it helps, but is not a sufficient condition”.206 While there was a pressure 
                                                
206 Non-attributable interview. 
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from the economic side to include EMDs, it is remarkable that most changes were called for 
by developed countries, particularly the US. To be sure, the replacement of the G8 by the G20 
undoubtedly carried a lot of meaning; however, the fact that US President George W. Bush had 
pressed for this change suggests that ultimately developing-country states had little power to 
alter the architecture of the IMS, regardless of their growing economic weight and their relative 
resilience toward the crisis.  
In spite of the ongoing debate on the origins of the 2008 crisis being rooted in the US and the 
continued criticism of the US’s huge deficits, the US has remained the most influential power 
in the system. This is clear, for instance, from the swap arrangements the Fed made with other 
central banks. Then, instead of exercising its influence indirectly through the Bretton Woods 
Institutions, the US began directly to decide the beneficiaries of the dollar liquidity (Steil 
2014a).  
The argument that because emerging countries had more economic weight they should also 
have more political power must be put into perspective in light of the US’ continued influence 
in the IMS. The 2008 crisis confirmed that the IMS is in fact a rigid and hierarchical system. 
The only state that was actually increasing its monetary influence was China, under the guise 
of the BRICS. For other EMDs, the crisis represented a circumstance in which they appeared 
to have greater influence in the IMS; however, it did not precipitate any decisive structural 
change. Even though Brazil capitalised on some permanent soft power during the crisis, it did 
not change its position within the IMS. 
The international recognition Brazil received from 2006 to 2010 is nonetheless meaningful to 
understand what happened in the following years, for it somewhat legitimised the 
“developmentalist” bloc within the government, not least because of Brazil’s performance 
during the crisis. In other words, because the government believed that the better performance 
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was the result of its developmentalist policies, it continued and broadened these policies in the 
following years, as the next chapter will show. 
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CHAPTER 5. A NEW BRAZIL? (2011-2014) 
 
 
5.1   SLEEPING WITH THE ENEMY: THE PARADOX OF BRAZIL’S 
RELATIONS WITH CHINA 
The more rapid economic recovery of emerging market and developing countries (EMDs) 
relative to their developed peers immediately following the 2008 global financial crisis 
bolstered the idea of a revised and more balanced IMS, one in which EMDs would play a 
greater role (Eichengreen 2011a, p.8; Helleiner & Pagliari 2011; World Bank 2011; Maziad et 
al. 2011; Dailami & Masson 2009; Akyüz 2012). As international conditions began to change, 
however, this hypothesis was increasingly brought into question and the excitement about 
EMDs in general – and Brazil in particular – proved to be fleeting and fragile.  
Even so, some of Brazil’s soft power remained in place long after the short-lived euphoria had 
disappeared. To begin with, the period 2011-2014 witnessed several instances in which the 
continuation of Brazil’s soft power was evident, such as the election in September 2013 of the 
Brazilian diplomat Roberto Azevêdo as Director-General of the WTO and the election of Brazil 
as chair of the United Nations’ Peacebuilding Commission in January 2014. Brazil was also 
chosen to host the FIFA World Cup in July 2014 and the Olympics in August 2016, elections 
that some observers have suggested were a manifestation of a greater worldwide influence 
(Grix et al. 2015, p.474).  
In addition, Brazil continued to participate in the formal and informal global financial forums 
it had joined during the height of the crisis and the Central Bank continued to be recognised by 
its international peers for its competence in dealing with the financial crisis. As a Central Bank 
official stated, “the Central Bank has become a reference in fighting the crisis, and the demand 
 190 
for cooperation coming to the Central Bank increased drastically”.207 After the crisis, the surge 
in the demand for international cooperation resulted in the creation of a specific area within the 
Central Bank.208 The Central Bank began to promote ‘international weeks’ of bank inclusion, 
risk management and regulation, which are attended by other central banks interested in 
learning Brazil’s know-how. 209  Internationally, Brazil also gained a greater role in the 
international debate, as a renowned economist said: 
Today the Brazilian authorities have a key role in the international debate, for example, 
in the BIS … Brazil already participated in the 1990s, but nowadays even more. When 
there was, for example, soon after the crisis, all that revision of the regulatory systems in 
the world; how countries were going to remodel financial regulation; how the United 
States was going to do and how this was going to affect the world and so on; when that 
was still in the process of discussion, Brazil had a very big role and was even used in a 
way as a reference, considering that we went through several banking crises in the past 
and we knew more or less what worked and what did not work from the regulatory point 
of view. … This is a novelty of the last, I would say, five years [2009]; before that Brazil 
did not have this, it was not on the spotlight so much.210 
 
Lastly, Brazilian policy-makers have stated that they could discern a positive difference in their 
treatment worldwide. In the words of a high-ranked diplomat: 
It may be that from the monetary, economic point of view the changes have not been so 
deep yet, but I think they are in progress … and to those working with this on a daily 
basis, we notice a change in the treatment, I have no doubt, I have dealt with these matters 
for thirty years and I have never seen the American so humble, so humiliated, asking for 
help, that was what they did.211  
Also in international forums, a Brazilian representative in the World Bank said: 
Today the power structure in these forums is different from what it was until 2008; it is 
different, it still is. … Because we have more representation in these forums, people listen 
                                                
207 Non-attributable interview with a Central Bank official. 
208 Non-attributable interview with a Central Bank official. 
209 Non-attributable interview with a Central Bank official. 
210 Non-attributable interview.  
211 Non-attributable interview with a high-ranked diplomat.  
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to us more, the relationship is different, how much you are heard, how much your 
proposals gain space in these organisms, in these meetings, I think it has changed a lot.212  
The vast majority of interviewees related a change in their treatment worldwide and in the 
deference they received from their international peers, a change that “is not quantitative, it has 
to be described,”213 as a senior Brazilian diplomat summarised. As a former foreign minister 
exemplified: 
I can tell you a bit about the political consequences of this difference. When would, 15 
or 20 years ago, someone who was candidate for the post of managing director at the 
IMF pay a visit to Brazil for support of the Brazilian government? … I think the first 
visit of Lagarde outside Europe for support was to Brazil. First she needed the support 
of the Europeans, evident, and then she came to Brazil. Why? That is what I wonder, 
because it was not because of our quotas, since our voting capacity is limited; it was not 
because of our economic power in general in Brazil; it was certainly not due to currency 
[reasons] … of course the size of our economy always weighted, stability obviously 
helped, but also the capacity of Brazil’s influence.214  
This positive difference in Brazil’s treatment was also perceived in the rapport Brazil has 
maintained with international investors, one that has lasted even as Brazil began again to face 
strong economic turbulences. As one influential Brazilian economist said:  
I think investors and the whole world in a general way had a huge tolerance for these 
crazy things we did [referring to the period after 2010], because of the political capital 
Brazil won in the period subsequent to the crisis. … When you consider previous 
episodes and compare … no one was tolerant with Brazil … this margin of tolerance only 
comes after [Brazil] had this very positive visibility; it makes a huge difference.”215  
 
In sum, the general perception of Brazilian policy-makers and of some external observers is 
that Brazil was able to maintain a portion of the soft power it acquired in the aftermath of the 
crisis. In the words of a high ranked official at the Central Bank: 
                                                
212 Non-attributable interview.  
213 Non-attributable interview with a high-ranked diplomat.  
214 Non-attributable interview with a former foreign minister.  
215 Non-attributable interview. 
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I think Brazil capitalized well that moment in which there was a lot of attention focused 
on it to strengthen its weight in these discussion forums. This somehow has remained, 
even if Brazil is out of the spotlight position from the point of view of the markets’ 
specific interests. … Brazil moved a bit forward and not necessarily is moving everything 
backwards. So it has maintained some of that previous advance, even in a context that is 
no longer as favourable as before, and it has also used that for its agenda.216 
Such increased margin of tolerance was convenient as international prospects became less 
favourable to the Brazilian economy and exposed how, in essence, Brazil persisted as an 
unprivileged state in the IMS. 
Beneath this surface layer of soft power, Brazil’s position in the IMS has remained in place 
even in the face of certain international dynamics that masked ongoing weaknesses within the 
Brazilian economy and enabled Brazil’s superficial success following the 2008 crisis. These 
dynamics were mainly associated with the consequences of China’s economic rise for Brazil, 
notably in terms of foreign trade (Cunha et al. 2012; Cunha 2011; Jenkins 2012). On the one 
hand, Chinese demand for commodities bolstered Brazilian exports, reducing Brazil’s 
traditional external vulnerabilities and creating an environment for economic growth. On the 
other hand, however, China’s demand for commodities simultaneously weakened Brazil’s 
external position by undermining the composition of Brazilian exports. Increasingly in its 
bilateral relations with China, Brazil became a source of natural resources for China and a 
market for Chinese manufactures (Cunha 2011; Jenkins 2012; Gallagher & Porzecanski 2010, 
pp.64–69). Brazil’s specialisation in natural resources was further reinforced by Chinese 
competition in third markets, particularly in Latin America, Brazil’s main market for 
manufactures (Cunha et al. 2012; Lélis et al. 2012; Cunha 2011; Jenkins 2012).  
In this sense, China’s global expansion has had paradoxical effects on the Brazilian economy. 
Symbolic of this conflicting relationship was the division in the Brazilian business community 
                                                
216 Non-attributable interview with a high-ranked official at the Central Bank. 
 193 
between the Brazil-China Entrepreneur Committee (CEBC, Conselho Empresarial Brasil-
China), formed in 2004 to enhance the countries’ bilateral relations, and the Federation of 
Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP, Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São 
Paulo), along with other sectoral associations, which demanded greater government support to 
face Chinese competition (Jenkins 2012, p.23). 
From 2011 onwards, the negatives effects of China’s rise on the Brazilian economy became 
increasingly evident. This was mainly due to the reversal in the rise of commodity prices, which 
had hitherto created more macroeconomic autonomy for Brazilian policy-makers whilst 
diminishing the issue of the primarisation of exports. As Figure 32 below illustrates, 
commodity prices peaked in April 2011 and headed downwards until late 2014. A very similar 
but somewhat more volatile trajectory was followed by oil prices (Figure 32).  
FIGURE 32: ALL COMMODITY PRICE INDEX AND CRUDE OIL, 2005=100, 2008-2014 
 
Source: IMF Primary Commodity Prices. Elaborated by the author. 
The Brazilian economy was also affected by metal prices, which similarly to oil were 






















































































All Commodity Price Index Crude Oil (petroleum)
 194 
were impacted by the prices of agricultural raw materials and food and beverages, although 
these tended to be less volatile. In each of these cases, however, prices remained relatively high 
but turned downward from 2011 onwards, causing significant problems for Brazilian economic 
policy-making. 
FIGURE 33: METALS, AGRICULTURAL RAW MATERIALS, AND FOOD & BEVERAGE INDEX PRICES, 
2005=100, 2008-2014 
 
Source: IMF Primary Commodity Prices. Elaborated by the author. 
In short, the tapering of commodity prices exposed just how much the Brazilian economy was 
linked to China’s rise: “[China] is a big stomach of raw materials where [Brazil] has entered 
as the periphery of China. … Brazil has engaged exporting commodities. There is the 
advantage, all agribusiness engages with that, but there is also the impact in the productive 
structure,”217 as pointed out by a Brazilian researcher at the government. 
As China integrated into the global economy, it transformed the international dynamics for 
Brazil in three ways: 1) by elevating the price of commodities; 2) by contributing to the 
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appreciation of the Brazilian currency; 3) and by fostering competition of manufactured 
products, mostly in the international market. The combination of (1) and (2) created the context 
in which the Brazilian economy was less constrained by external factors, as described in the 
previous chapter. However, when (1) and (2) are pooled with (3), it is clear that China’s 
integration into the global economy undermined Brazilian exports from the mid-2000s 
onwards. While (1) and (2) were temporary effects, (3) was permanent. When (1) changed, the 
negative effects of China’s rise on Brazil’s economic performance surfaced. Brazilian and 
international economists, however, have long been discussing the risks posed by China’s 
ascension for Brazil and Latin America as well as the possibility of early deindustrialisation, 
“primarisation” of exports and Dutch disease218 (Palma 2005; Bresser-Pereira 2010; Cunha et 
al. 2012; Jenkins 2012).  
Commodity prices began to ascend in 2003 and continued to rise until 2011, despite the drop 
in 2008. Not by coincidence, the performance of the Brazilian exports and the Brazilian 
currency followed a very similar path, as Figures 34 and 35 illustrate. As commodity prices 
increased, Brazilian exports soared and Brazil accumulated trade surpluses so that international 
capital flowed into the country resulting in an appreciation of the domestic currency. While 
commodity prices were not the only factor behind the trade and capital trends, it is hard to deny 
their relevance given the connections between them.   
                                                
218 The term Dutch disease was coined by The Economist (1977) to refer to the decline of the manufacturing sector 
in the Netherlands following the discovery of a large natural gas field in 1959. Since then, this concept is 
commonly used in the economic field to describe a situation where a boom in commodity exports triggers an 
inflow of foreign currency, leading to an appreciation of the domestic currency and consequently harming exports 
of other goods, mainly manufactures.  
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FIGURE 34: BRAZILIAN EXPORTS AND METAL PRICE INDEX, 2000-2014  
 
Source: IMF Primary Commodity Prices (values for January each year) and MDIC/Aliceweb. Elaborated by the 
author. 
FIGURE 35: BRAZILIAN REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE AND COMMODITY PRICES, 2000-2014 
 
Source: BIS real effective exchange rate and IMF Primary Commodity Prices. Elaborated by the author. 
When considered in the context of the growing competition posed by Chinese manufactures, 
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negative outcome for the composition of Brazilian exports (Cunha et al. 2012; Jenkins 2012). 
From a broad perspective, the share of commodities in Brazilian exports grew rapidly from 
2000 to 2014 at the expense of manufactured goods (Figure 36). This process was particularly 
rapid from 2006 to 2011, when the share of commodities increased from 29 per cent to 48 per 
cent. In 2014 the share of commodities was 49 per cent, against 36 per cent for manufactured 
goods.   
FIGURE 36: COMPOSITION OF BRAZILIAN EXPORTS, 2000-2014 
 
Source: MDIC. Elaborated by the author. 
Interestingly enough, until 2006 Brazilian exports were actually headed by two groups of 
manufactured goods, vehicles and nuclear reactors, which accounted for US$23.3 billion that 
year (16.9 per cent). In 2007, while vehicles still accounted for the largest share of Brazil’s 
exports, nuclear reactors were overtaken by mineral fuels and ores. In 2008, vehicles and 
nuclear reactors fell to the third and fifth position, respectively, and export of mineral fuels and 
ores soon replaced them. More worryingly, since 2011 the exports of vehicles and nuclear 
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2014 (10 per cent) – a percentage far lower than their 2006 level. Figure 37 illustrates this 
transformation in the composition of Brazilian exports, taking 2014 as the reference year.  
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FIGURE 37: BRAZILIAN EXPORTS, TOP GROUP OF PRODUCTS, 2003-2014 
Figure 6. B







eb. Elaborated by the author. 
!
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Brazilian exports became increasingly concentrated in fewer products. Looking at the top 10 
products exported, for example, their share increased from 27.3 per cent in 2003 to 45.8 per 
cent in 2011 (and 43.2 in 2014). While in 2003 Brazil’s main export product represented 5.9 
per cent of total exports, in 2011 it represented 12.4 per cent (Table 4). 
TABLE 4: BRAZILIAN EXPORTS, TOP 10 PRODUCTS 2003 AND 2011  











Other soybeans, even 
crushed 
4.287 5.9 
Iron ores not agglomerated, 
and concentrates 
31.851 12.4  
2 Soybean waste, solid 2.601 3.6 Petroleum oils, crude 21.603  8.4  
3 
Iron ores not agglomerated, 
and concentrates 
2.282 3.1 Other soybeans, even crushed 16.312  6.4  
4 Petroleum oils, crude 2.121 2.9 Cane sugar, in crude 11.548  4.5  
5 
Autom. with motor 
explosion,1500<cm3<=300,
up to 6 pass 
2.077 2.8 
Iron ores agglomerated and 
concentrates 
9.965  3.9  
6 




Coffee not roasted or 
decaffeinated, in grain 
7.999  3.1  
7 Cane sugar, in crude 1.350 1.8 Soybean waste, solid 5.544  2.2  
8 
Coffee not roasted or 
decaffeinated, in grain 
1.302 1.8 
Chemical wood pulp of 
n/conif., soda/sulphate, 
semi/bleac 
4.605  1.8  
9 




and offal, frozen 
4.454  1.7  
10 
Fowls spec. gal. domest. 
cuts and offal, frozen 
1.092 1.5 Frozen bovine meat, boneless 3.506  1.4  
       
 Total   27.3   45.8 
Source: MDIC/AliceWeb. Elaborated by the author. 
Despite such worrying indicators, the government overlooked the concentration of its exports 
likely because Brazil continued to achieve exports records and these rising exports fuelled 
recovery from the crisis and simulated economic growth. Despite the fact that Brazilian exports 
rose and growth improved because commodity prices were high until 2011, the Brazilian 
government apparently believed that the recovery in economic growth fuelled by exports was 
driven mainly by the counter-cyclical policies it implemented (Barbosa & Souza 2010, p.22).  
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Thus, when economic growth began to slow in 2011, the government reinforced and widened 
the fiscal policies adopted in the wake of the 2008 crisis. As the international scenario had 
changed, however, when the government applied the same formula different results ensued. In 
the words of a former Central Bank director: “People today see the government repeating things 
it did in 2008-09 without success; so they wonder about the quality of the government’s 
diagnosis, if it is right or wrong”.219 The outcome was mounting economic problems that 
eventually broke out into a political crisis in mid-2013, further aggravating the economic 
situation.  
As result of its economic situation, Brazil’s external influence diminished during this period, 
although this change occurred at a slower pace and to a lesser extent than Brazil’s economic 
influence. After all, China’s rise also had paradoxical effects on Brazil in political terms. On 
the one hand, as China benefited from its partnership with other EMDs, particularly the BRICS, 
to increase its international influence, Brazil enjoyed the privileges of being its ally. On the 
other hand, as a result of China’s asymmetric economic power in relation to Brazil, it ended up 
capturing part of Brazil’s sphere of influence in the rest of South America. 
The aim of this chapter is to argue that the Brazilian government essentially had little power to 
reverse its domestic economic performance when external circumstances proved less 
favourable. To do this, the remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections. First, it 
addresses how Brazilian policy-makers reacted to the revival of higher constraints in the IMS 
after 2011. Second, it examines how Brazil’s external influence was affected by global 
developments as well as by Brazil’s economic condition. The third section concludes the 
chapter.  
                                                
219 Non-attributable interview with a former Central Bank director. 
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5.2   THE FINAL RECKONING OF BRAZIL’S ECONOMIC SUCCESS 
Amidst the ongoing enthusiasm for Brazil, President Dilma Rousseff took office in January 
2011. As the Brazilian economy was already showing signs of overheating in 2010, when 
inflation reached 5.9 per cent, the Dilma government began by adopting measures of fiscal 
austerity and the Central Bank increased interest rates. However, as economic growth waned, 
the government launched by the end of 2011 a new economic guideline, which became known 
as the “New Economic Matrix” (NEM). At its core, the NEM reinforced and widened the fiscal 
counter-cyclical policies that had been adopted in the wake of the 2008 crisis.  
The causes of Brazil’s economic deceleration remain the subject of strong debate. Even so, 
there are two facts on which most observers can agree. The first one is that the government 
failed to prevent a deterioration in the balance of payments, which weakened the Brazilian 
economy. This can be ultimately related to the international dynamics that resulted from 
China’s economic rise. The second fact is that the government’s actions introduced a high 
degree of uncertainty from roughly 2011 onwards, which, when combined with the adverse 
international conditions, worsened the situation of the Brazilian economy.  
This section will examine these two accepted facts and will then discuss the subject which 
scholars and commentators continue to debate – namely, the policy option implemented by the 
Dilma government to combat economic decline. After adopting counter-cyclical policies to 
fight the global crisis, the government was unable to return to the tripod framework that had 
been in place since 1999. Instead, the Dilma government insisted on deepening the measures 
which they identified as having been responsible for Brazil’s recovery from the 2008 crisis. By 
doing this, however, the government disregarded the role commodity prices had played in 
Brazil’s recuperation and ignored the ways in which the Brazilian economy was tied to 
international dynamics.  
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5.2.1   ALL THAT IS SOLID MELTS INTO AIR: THE REVERSAL OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL SCENARIO 
From 2011 onwards, external constraints on Brazil’s economic policy-making gradually 
reappeared. Commodity prices began to slow down in April 2011, a reduction that was partially 
attributed to a downswing in Chinese growth. Weaker commodity prices lowered economic 
growth among commodity-exporting EMDs in general and Brazil in particular. The conditions 
for EMDs were further aggravated by the reduction of capital flows, a decline which can be 
linked to the change in American monetary policy. In late 2013, the Federal Reserve began to 
gradually reduce quantitative easing, the bond-buying program it started in 2009 to stimulate 
economic recovery. Tapering, as the reduction of monthly purchases by the Federal Reserve 
became known, came to an end in October 2014. In December 2015, the Fed announced the 
first rise in US interest rates since they were brought to zero in 2008. This transformation in 
international conditions fundamentally impaired Brazilian economic growth, as noted by a 
senior Brazilian politician and economist: “the change was really an international one; until 
2010 [Brazil] had a tailwind, in 2010-2011 began the headwind, and nowadays the path is much 
more difficult than it was in the past”.220  
The reappearance of external constraints on Brazilian policy-making was mirrored in the 
deterioration of the balance of payments. While the change was clearer from 2011 onwards, 
when the trade balance continuously shrunk, Brazil’s balance of payments began presenting 
signs of increasing vulnerability as early as 2008. In that year, the surplus in the trade balance 
was not enough to compensate for the deficit in the services and income account for the first 
time since 2003. Such incapacity was a manifestation of the low dynamism of Brazilian exports 
which were increasingly dependent on commodities. Nevertheless, amidst a global crisis 
scenario, which had as strong impact on Brazil’s trade as it did for the rest of the world, the 
                                                
220 Non-attributable interview.  
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reduction of exports was perceived as an expected outcome. Then, with the recovery of 
commodity prices, the problem was postponed again until 2011. From 2011 onwards, however, 
Brazil’s trade balance deteriorated steadily and in 2014 it reached its first deficit since 2000 
(Table 5). As commodity prices stopped rising, the value of exports stagnated. The 
deterioration in the trade balance negatively affected the current account, whose deficits 
increased continually until 2014.  
TABLE 5: BRAZILIAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, US$ MILLION, 2008-2014  
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Current Account -28.192 -24.302 -47.273 -52.473 -54.249 -81.227 -91.288 
Trade Balance 24.836 25.290 20.147 29.793 19.395 2.286 -3.959 
Service and Income 
Balance 
-57.252 -52.930 -70.322 -85.251 -76.489 -86.879 -89.251 
Current Transfer 
Balance 
4.224 3.338 2.902 2.984 2.846 3.366 1.922 
Capital and 
Financial Account 29.357 71.301 99.912 112.381 70.010 74.353 98.399 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. Elaborated by the author. 
The balance of payments defined the limits of the improvement of Brazil’s condition and 
exposed the frailties that had been created in the previous years. As observed by a former 
finance minister: “the balance of payments perhaps is the main demonstration of [the 
government’s] mistakes. … [The government] insisted on a redistributive process using the 
exchange rate to control inflation, and practically destroyed the industrial sector”.221 In a 
similar line, a respected Brazilian researcher at the government pointed out that, “it is the policy 
we have seen in the last 10 years: the emphasis on domestic consumption – imports soar, 
exports drop, the balance of payments moans”.222 Interviews with current and former policy-
makers suggest that there was a fair degree of understanding amongst Brazilian economists 
that this path of economic policy was gradually being exhausted, because in the words of a 
                                                
221 Non-attributable interview with a former finance minister. 
222 Non-attributable interview. 
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former finance minister: “the terms of trade are slowly decreasing, and this was one of the main 
factors behind the success of redistributivism during the Lula government”.223  
With the reversal in international conditions, Brazil’s shortcomings surfaced. During the 
previous years, the competitiveness of Brazilian industry was harmed not only by the 
overvalued exchange rate and Chinese competition but also by a lack of investment in 
infrastructure and a poor industrial policy. In the words of a former finance minister: “the 
growth reduction is easy to explain, Brazil does not invest in anything; Brazil did not invest in 
infrastructure during 30 years. Brazil distributed what it has borrowed”.224 In September 2013, 
a special report of The Economist (2013, p.8) on Brazil observed that two thirds of the PAC’s 
biggest projects were late and over budget. Thus, despite the government’s intentions, it did 
not adequately seize on the bonanza period of the commodity boom to invest in infrastructure 
and overcome one of Brazil’s main weaknesses. In the words of an influential researcher at the 
government: 
Lula came with a bet, what was the bet: expand the domestic market, making distribution 
of income, which [the government] called inclusive development, give more income to 
the poor, increase the minimum wage. Since there was the commodity market, it was 
possible to use the domestic market to expand and give dynamism to the economy, 
exports were led by the commodities. And the third part of this process would be 
infrastructure. So the Lula government manages to do some of that, especially the 
inclusive development, Bolsa família and all those income distribution programs that 
engendered enormous transformations in the Brazilian society… but infrastructure does 
not develop for many reasons, we have not solved the issue of the productive structure 
and this model is running out.225 
 
Thus, one main problem was that the inclusive development did not connect to the productive 
structure, as the government had planned, because, as one economist noted, “it leaked to 
                                                
223 Non-attributable interview with a former finance minister. 
224 Non-attributable interview with a former finance minister. 
225 Non-attributable interview.  
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China”.226 In short, Brazil was unable to join the technological revolution that was occurring 
in China and ended up engaging as an exporter of commodities, or in other words, as an actor 
in China’s periphery. As a researcher at the government summarised: 
So [Brazil] did stimulate the domestic market, [Brazil] did made income distribution, 
[Brazil] did expand the domestic market, but the productive structure did not connect to 
it as they wanted; it connected to China, where there was a technological revolution of 
cost reduction happening … so the phenomenon of inclusive development of Lula, of 
Dilma, is the phenomenon of China.227 
 
In addition, the government implemented an industrial policy based on tax exemptions and 
with little counterpart from industry. This strategy ended up impairing the fiscal side, as a 
Brazilian economist commented: “with no benefits from the point of view of industry”.228 She 
added that: “the problem is that the industrial policy was a disaster … and with that [the 
government] penalized the sector that is the most dynamic; that should be the most dynamic. 
And with that it accentuated the peripheral trend in the external side [referring to the balance 
of payments]”.229 As a result, the Brazilian economy remained vulnerable under basically three 
perspectives: “there is the vulnerability because [Brazil’s] currency is not convertible; [Brazil] 
has a vulnerability because of the composition of its financial account; and there is also a 
vulnerability due to the composition [Brazil] is imposing on its exports,”230 as a renowned 
Brazilian economist summarised. 
Brazil’s vulnerability was also evident in relation to the effects of the American monetary 
policy on the economy. After Mantega’s currency war alert, Dilma accused developed 
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countries of a “monetary tsunami” in April 2012, referring mainly to the US’ expansionist 
monetary policy (Talev & Colitt 2012). However, as the US government began to taper its 
bond-buying program, the tailwinds of easy global financial conditions also gradually came to 
an end. Thus, the excessive capital flows were replaced by shortage, disturbing Brazil’s 
economic performance, as a senior diplomat observed: 
[Dilma] coined that expression of the monetary tsunami; now we are concerned with the 
drought of the tsunami… it is almost contradictory, but it shows our vulnerability from 
one side and the other. Excess [of international monetary liquidity], which overvalued 
our currency; and the abrupt, sharp devaluation, which is happening now [early 2014]. 
Both are a problem, which shows that we still have not reach a situation of equilibrium.231  
 
While most Brazilian observers agree that Brazil’s condition has improved relative to the past, 
there is a general agreement that part of the leverage Brazil had previously held no longer 
exists. As a former Central Bank governor exemplified: 
If the crisis came today, [Brazil] no longer has the condition to adopt anti-cyclical 
policies as we had in 2008. In other words, [Brazil] threw away, in my opinion, that 
capacity, and from now on [Brazil] will have to reconstruct it. I mean, [Brazil] did not 
completely throw it away because [Brazil] still has a reasonable amount of international 
reserves. But fiscal policy is greatly compromised.232 
 
Brazil’s large stockpiles of international reserves are in general considered one of the 
remaining strengths from the previous period. Yet the capacity of those reserves to reduce 
Brazil’s constraints in any significant way is limited. In the words of one economist: 
Reserves are an important aspect in the sense of [Brazil] trying to have some autonomy, 
or breathing space from the point of view of overcoming cyclical movements. That is 
good. But in a situation of a real crisis, in two minutes [they are] gone. So it is good 
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because it signals to the market that you have some power, but even the market knows 
that it can quickly disappear.233 
 
In sum, despite Brazil’s relatively quick rebound from the global crisis, it remained essentially 
a subordinated state in the IMS. As noted by one economist: “from the point of view of 
escaping from a peripheral situation, [Brazil] did not; in spite of all the rhetoric, it did not”.234 
Along a similar line, a researcher at the government commented: “substantively, concretely, 
nothing has changed; the discourse changed”.235 Despite its persistent unprivileged position, 
the Brazilian government’s official discourse and the policies it adopted suggested the 
opposite. As will be shown in the next sub-section, the government resisted adapting to the 
new international reality of higher external constraints, which suggests that it was under some 
illusion as to Brazil’s actual position in the IMS. 
  
5.2.2   WHEN THE RISK OF A WRONG DECISION WAS PREFERABLE TO THE 
TERROR OF INDECISION  
While international conditions became less favourable for EMDs in general as commodity 
prices reversed their upward trend in mid-2011, Brazil’s negative economic results especially 
stood out among EMDs. As its economic growth did not resume in 2011, the government 
decided to abandon its short-lived fiscal efforts and instead reinforce the counter-cyclical 
policies it identified as key to Brazil’s post-2008 success through the New Economic Matrix.  
In practice, the government began to gradually reject the central tenets of the macroeconomic 
tripod (inflation target, floating exchange rate, and primary fiscal surplus). This was illustrated 
                                                
233 Non-attributable interview. 
234 Non-attributable interview. 
235 Non-attributable interview. 
 209 
by an increase in government spending (Figure 38) and a higher tolerance towards inflation 
(Table 6), meaning that the Central Bank was apparently focusing more on preventing inflation 
from exceeding the ceiling than in meeting the inflation target. 
FIGURE 38: GOVERNMENT SPENDING, 2000-2014  
 
Source: IMF, World Outlook Database, October 2015. Elaborated by the author. 
TABLE 6: INFLATION AND INFLATION TARGET, 2010-2014  
Year Target (%) 
Tolerance 
Intervals (p.p.) 
Upper and Lower 
Limits (%) 
Actual inflation 
(IPCA, % p. a.) 
2010 4.5 2 2.5 - 6.5 5.91 
2011 4.5 2 2.5 - 6.5 6.50 
2012 4.5 2 2.5 - 6.5 5.84 
2013 4.5 2 2.5 - 6.5 5.91 
2014 4.5 2 2.5 - 6.5 6.41 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. Elaborated by the author. 
Critiques of these economic policies came from both supporters and detractors of the Dilma 
government, all of whom tended to agree that the lack of clear direction in the economic 
policies created an environment of uncertainty. For instance, one Brazilian economist who 













































[The government] has an expansionist policy but says that it is not an expansionist policy. 
They do and they say they are not doing … so from the point of view of forming 
expectations it is very problematic … At the end you have a very strong heterodoxy in 
Brazil but that from the point of view of economic policy it has an alter ego of orthodoxy. 
So it is heterodox, but at the edge gets afraid and pulls back, ending up adopting a policy 
mix … which disrupts everything, because you cannot be heterodox and orthodox at the 
same time. … You give signs everywhere and completely confuses agents; I mean, you 
do not confuse them, agents can see what you are doing, they are seeing you are weak, it 
is basically that.236 
 
Amongst Brazilian economists who disagreed with the course of economic policy, there was 
consensus that a feeling of insecurity had been created by the government. As one of them said:  
There needs to be a strategy in the macro area; there needs to be a better definition of 
what is being done with macroeconomic policy in Brazil, and this nowadays is too much 
in the air. Inflation is high, the fiscal outlook is not terrible but is worse than in other 
times … I think Brazil gave up some of the commitment with macro stability in the last 
two or three years [referring to 2012 and 2013].237 
 
Some observers have further explained the government’s behaviour as a result of a certain 
arrogance regarding international capital that had developed in the aftermath of the global 
crisis, perhaps due to the media attention Brazil received as an apparent “case of success” in 
fighting the crisis. In the words of a senior Brazilian politician: “the government opened every 
tap, there was a sensation of euphoria. And the world reproduced this [euphoria], with very 
little critical view”.238 Likewise, a former Central Bank director said: “I think that at the height 
of euphoria period perhaps the government was contaminated with this vision and began to 
take actions that generated a bad external impact”.239 He added that, “the government also 
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joined the discussion about the concessions in a position that was perhaps a bit unrealistic, 
because it wanted to force return rates below those prevailing in the international market”.240  
The Dilma government increased the state’s intervention in investment rules (The Economist 
2013, p.2). Petrobras, for example, was brought under greater state control at the end of 2010. 
First, the Congress approved an onerous regulatory framework making Petrobras the sole 
operator in the pre-salt fields, with a minimum of 30 per cent share of each project. Second, 
local content requirements were also sanctioned, which even if they did not add too much to 
the company’s costs as the government has argued, such a curtailment denoted an increased 
intervention in the state company. Finally, as oil prices began to climb in 2009, the government 
prevented Petrobras from passing on the higher international prices, making it sell oil at a 
subsidised domestic price to prevent inflation accelerating. 
Another example of increased government intervention was in the energy sector, where the 
government tried to reduce the price of energy but ended up bringing a high degree of 
uncertainty for investments which ironically increased energy prices. The problems began with 
the launch of the Provisional Measure 579 in September 2012, which allowed the renewal of 
concession contracts due between 2015 and 2017 for another 30 years, exempting companies 
from participating in the bidding process. As the proposal entailed the acceptance of a lower 
tariff from January 2013 onwards, the government offered companies a compensation that 
supposedly covered the resulting losses for the remaining period (2013-2015). Leaving aside 
the fact that most companies rejected the compensation value241 (except for the state-owned 
Eletrobrás), the whole process was very clumsy and quite counterproductive for the 
government. For instance, the government asked companies to decide whether they wanted the 
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renewal of contracts or not before converting the Provisional Measure in Law242 and defining 
the new tariff, i.e. before companies could know what were the terms of the new contract.  
The complications escalated for the government due to worse-than-expected hydrological 
conditions in 2013 and 2014 that compromised reservoir levels and, consequently, the supply 
of hydroelectric power. Given the shortage of energy, distribution companies had to buy from 
the spot market, where energy prices soared. While distribution companies had to bear the costs 
of higher energy prices, they could not pass on the price to final consumers, since the price was 
under government control (and the government wanted to keep inflation down). As a result, 
distribution companies became highly indebted and had to be rescued by the National Treasury 
in 2013-2014. To cover the resources lent to distribution companies, the National Agency of 
Electrical Energy (Aneel, Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica) approved an “extraordinary 
increase” in the price of electricity in February 2015, which in practice meant an increase of 
up to 48 per cent (Borba 2015) for final consumers.    
Finally, the government also launched new concessions for airports and for the pre-salt 
exploration (all in partnership with Petrobras) and increased regulations on contracts, 
augmenting, for instance, local content requirements. However, as the government imposed 
profit limits below the market expectations, big investors were not interested (The Economist 
2013, p.2).  
According to some observers, these events amassed to create an environment of uncertainty 
during the Dilma government and to negatively interfere with Brazil’s growth potential. As 
one former Central Bank director summarised: 
The dominant view is that [Brazil] is a country that is falling short of its possibilities, 
more for its own mistakes than because of international circumstances; more for its own 
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options than because of adverse international circumstances … The fact is that the mood, 
the interest, etc. decreased in recent years, partly because Brazil has had a somewhat 
hostile position regarding international capital, “I want this capital, I don’t want that 
capital; ‘good’ cholesterol, ‘bad’ cholesterol; I’ll change the rule, the rule is here, but I 
can always change,” all this has impaired a bit.243 
In a similar line, a high-ranked official at the World Bank observed: 
This was real, Russian hubris, Brazilian hubris; it was real. And with this hubris came 
complacency; what happened with Brazil also happened to a great extent in Russia. The 
quality of governance deteriorated, the excuse for the re-emergence of an entrepreneurial 
state. … While emerging countries, including the BRICS, managed to resist the crisis 
well to a large extent because of good economic policies and structural reforms made in 
the past, since they rested on their laurels and became arrogant, and at the same time 
lenient, the space they had to respond well to the crisis exhausted promptly, which is the 
case of Brazil.244 
 
Implicit to most critiques regarding the government’s economic policies were references to 
Dilma’s political inability (The Economist 2013, p.3). The combination of her centralising 
management style in an economic situation with a low margin of manoeuvre highly contrasted 
with Lula’s negotiation-oriented approach in favourable economic conditions. In short, while 
Lula and Dilma belonged to the same political project, the change in government was not 
innocuous to economic policy-making.  
 
5.2.3   REALITY IS WRONG. DREAMS ARE FOR REAL.   
Despite clear signs of a worsening in international conditions, there is no evidence that 
Brazilian policy-makers realised that this scenario was changing. Indeed, the government’s 
adoption of the NEM presupposed an autonomy that was no longer there. It is interesting to 
note that the NEM actually put in practice the policies the government believed it had adopted 
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in 2006. As argued in chapter 4, despite contemporary discourse, data analysis indicates that 
there was no clear inflection in the policies adopted at that time. However, since 2010 there 
were signs of real change in macroeconomic policies as the government began to increasingly 
intervene in the economy.  
The background for this inflection can be found in the “change of paradigm” discourse of 
international economics that grew in popularity after the 2008 crisis. In short, the global crisis 
challenged the hitherto predominant neo-liberal view regarding government intervention and 
financial market regulation, and consequently the post-2008 demanded non-orthodox measures 
from governments and central banks in the developed world (Helleiner & Pagliari 2011, p.183; 
Helleiner 2010, pp.627–628; Dailami & Masson 2009, p.8). Nevertheless, “when you 
transplanted this paradigm shift to Brazil,” a former Central Bank governor observed, “it came 
in a distorted way, because it meant here a license for [the government] to abandon the more 
orthodox policies, which had been responsible for Brazil’s macroeconomic stability, known 
here as the famous tripod”.245 
This distortion happened because, while the Brazilian economy had been only marginally 
affected by the crisis, the government acted as if Brazil was in the same situation as advanced 
economies. As noted by a former Central Bank governor:  
And this started in 2009, when Brazil had indeed to take some short-term counter-cyclical 
measures, but evidently Brazil was not in a crisis as profound as the United States; we 
had no financial crisis, we had a temporary external shock; we did not have the same 
crisis as Europe, as European banks, or the financial crisis that we saw emerging 
afterwards in the economies of the periphery of the Euro. So we did not have this crisis 
and we adopted the remedies that were taken in the context of this crisis, so it is 
something almost corrupt.246 
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While there is little disagreement among Brazilian economists that the immediate response of 
the Central Bank towards the global crisis was correct (chapter 4), there is almost a consensus 
that the government then proceeded to keep its expansionist policies longer than was necessary. 
In the words of a high-ranked official at the World Bank:  
The Brazilian case, to be honest, is [the outcome] of a change in the international 
framework and also of a response that was not adequate. … The first anti-cyclical 
response in Brazil was perfectly adequate. But then to keep repeating the dosage of anti-
cyclical policies, believing that it would put the economy back on [a] growth [trajectory], 
and combining this with the degree of intricacy in state interventionism, driving away 
private investors? See where we are now.247 
 
One probable reason for the maintenance of expansionary policies was the October 2010 
election.  As a former Central Bank governor commented:  
In 2010 the Central Bank, from my point of view, made several and serious economic 
policy mistakes. 2010 was an electoral year and it was a year that the government, in my 
view, the Central Bank made an election cycle policy. 2010 was not a year to make that 
monetary policy that [the Central Bank] did; it was an extremely loose monetary policy, 
and this made us completely decouple from the 4.5 per cent inflation target. Since then, 
Brazil was no longer able to bring inflation back to the target.248 
In a very similar line, a former Central Bank director stated: 
Brazil exited the crisis very quickly, and the counter-cyclical policies to some extent 
contributed to that. … I think the turning point is indeed in 2010, late 2009 or early 2010, 
because then [Brazil] already had recovered from the crisis. If [the policies] were truly 
counter-cyclical, it was the moment to start bringing them back. … But then you had an 
election to win.249 
 
Dilma’s election and the subsequent change in the balance of power within the government’s 
economic team may go far in explaining the change in the direction of economic policy after 
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2011. To begin with, a former Central Bank director noted: “Dilma was never a big fan of the 
[economic] model [implemented by Cardoso and continued by Lula]”.250 In contrast to Lula, 
she had her own ideas about economic policies, being herself an economist. While the non-
orthodox side was already more powerful because of her, the replacement of Henrique 
Meirelles by Alexandre Tombini as the Central Bank governor further increased the disparity 
in opinions. This substitution represented a subtle but relevant change in the equilibrium of 
forces within the economic team because Tombini lacked the political strength of Meirelles 
(chapter 4).  
The government’s decision to deepen counter-cyclical policies did not generate the results it 
had expected, and Brazil gradually moved towards another economic crisis. This raised an 
intense domestic debate of whether the government’s diagnosis of the problem and its remedy 
for it had been correct. The main disagreement was between those who placed the blame on 
the fiscal effort in 2011 and the revival of the global crisis and therefore believed that the 
government was right to reinforce counter-cyclical measures, and those who argued that the 
government rather than the international crisis had been responsible for the market-unfriendly 
environment and therefore believed that the reversal of the counter-cyclical measures should 
have happened even before 2011. 
Despite the existence of this debate, the government continued to insist on expansionary 
policies, finding villains – the global crisis, the currency war, the monetary tsunami, or the 
tapering in the US quantitative easing policies – to blame for its bad economic performance. 
While it was true that the international reality was worse than previously, Brazil compared 
itself with other EMDs, many of whom were by this time finding their way back to growth. 
This was particularly the case for other South American countries, which led them to gradually 
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disconnect from the region – and from a potential Brazilian influence – to turn towards China. 
As the next section shows, Brazil’s lower economic autonomy had significant effects for its 
external influence. 
 
5.3   BRAZIL’S EXTERNAL INFLUENCE: RESTING ON ITS LAURELS  
From 2011 onwards it became clearer that Brazil’s external influence was to a great extent 
context dependent. The global financial crisis and its immediate aftermath (2008-2010) 
represented a unique opportunity for Brazil to increase its international influence, as described 
in chapter 4. For a brief period of time the failures of developed economies left a power vacuum 
in the IMS which soon occupied by the big EMDs at the time, including Brazil. Yet as this 
section demonstrates, the crisis and its aftermath ultimately did not rupture the prevailing 
system. As will be argued here, in the post-2010 period the IMS has gradually reorganised 
itself according to its previous power division.  
There is, however, one main difference in this arrangement that has emerged from the 2008 
crisis: the elevated position of China. All other EMDs have essentially returned to their former 
positions; the perceived rise of big EMDs like Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa is 
essentially a misconception arising from their close association with China. Through the 
BRICS group these states saw an increase of their international influence with the creation of 
the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), yet this 
was made possible much more because of China’s enormous economic power than the 
individual efforts of the other member states.  
This section explains Brazil’s external influence as the outcome of paradoxical forces created 
by China. The first sub-section addresses how Brazilian representatives and policy-makers 
 218 
dealt with the post-crisis scenario, when the euphoria around the participation of EMDs in the 
IMS began to shrink. The second sub-section shows how China’s rising worldwide influence 
reverberated in South America, where Brazil saw its prestige correspondingly decline. This 
happened through two channels. First, China emerged as an alternative creditor for states facing 
major economic problems, including Brazil’s main regional allies, Argentina and Venezuela. 
Second, states in better economic situations, such as Chile, Colombia, and Peru, together with 
Mexico formed a new trade bloc, the Pacific Alliance, which aimed at furthering trade with 
Asia, notably China. The emerging result is a fragmented South America that harms Brazil’s 
potential as a regional hegemon. The third sub-section analyses the dynamics within the BRICS 
group, which was one of the main focuses of the Brazilian foreign policy from 2011 to 2014.  
 
5.3.1   DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE: OLD 
WINE IN A NEW BOTTLE 
The 2008 crisis triggered some important transformations in global economic governance that 
permanently altered the previous status quo in favour of EMDs in general and of Brazil in 
particular. Even when the height of the crisis was gone and the momentum to discuss 
significant reforms in the IMS gradually faded away, EMDs were still able to exert some 
pressure and to influence certain results. Among EMDs, Brazil played a key role in voicing 
EMDs’ dissatisfactions.  
In the BWIs, for example, the increased influence of EMDs was manifested in the World Bank 
presidential election in 2012 (The Economist 2012; Lowrey 2012), where Brazil joined other 
EMDs to confront the convention of electing an US candidate. As a Brazilian representative 
there related: 
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Brazil had initiatives with the G11 for the election of the president of the World Bank. It 
was an election that, of course, everyone knew that the US would end up winning, but it 
was the first time you had candidates and that you had a platform of discussion which 
forced the US out of a pattern that was always send someone from the state department 
or a banker. … I think that from this election onwards, you will never be able to return 
to the old model, the old policy that was simply put a name there and everyone signed 
below; this created a pressure for discussion.251 
 
Emblematically, Jim Yong Kim is a Korean American, which makes him the first World Bank 
president to come from a developing country. In addition, his professional background is on 
health issues in developing countries, rather than on the political or financial sector as was the 
rule hitherto. The two other contenders were both from the developing world: the Finance 
Minister of Nigeria Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and the Colombian Jose Antonio Ocampo. Despite 
the symbolism surrounding this election, ultimately the US candidate was elected, continuing 
the long tradition of an US national leading the World Bank. 
In the IMF, Brazil’s influence was even more remarkable. In July 2013, the Financial Times 
wrote: “Brazil’s belligerence has grown since 2009 … since then, Guido Mantega, Brazil’s 
Finance Minister, has emerged as one of the most outspoken critics of the IMF, calling for 
greater representation of developing countries on the board” (Spiegel 2013). In September 
2010, Guido Mantega called global attention to a “currency war” triggered by developed 
countries, voicing a general concern shared by EMDs (Wheatley & Garnham 2010). Mantega 
accused developed countries’ monetary policies of increasing the volatility of financial markets 
in the developing world and pressuring the overvaluation of EMDs’ currencies, factors which 
weakened EMDs’ ability to be internationally competitive and their capacity to recover from 
the crisis. In his declarations, Mantega also implicitly referred to China’s monetary policy, 
whose weak currency was also harming the recovery of several EMDs. Brazil’s vocal position 
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contrasted with some other countries, such as South Korea, who were reluctant to include the 
currency war issue in the upcoming G20 meeting in November of that year “partly out of fear 
of offending China, its neighbour and main trading partner,” the Financial Times wrote 
(Wheatley & Garnham 2010). 
Brazil’s currency war concerns were linked to its role in the EMDs’ campaign to change the 
IMF’s view on capital controls (Gallagher 2015, p.1). The Fund eventually recognised the 
negative effects that excessive capital inflows could have on the domestic economy and 
endorsed a new institutional view on capital controls (IMF 2012). This change has been 
regarded by some leading specialists in the field as a manifestation of EMDs’ power (Gallagher 
2015; Helleiner & Pagliari 2011).   
In July 2013, Mantega also challenged the IMF’s methodology for measuring a nation’s gross 
debt: under IMF standards Brazil’s gross debt accounted for 68 per cent of GDP, 10 percentage 
points more than the Central Bank’s 58.7 calculation (Sotto & Parra-Bernal 2013). A respected 
Brazilian economist reflected on this matter: 
On the issue of the public debt discussion, for example, in the past, in the 1980s, 1990s, 
the Fund would never have accepted to open this discussion… In fact, the Fund did not 
accept that very much now either, but received the letter from Mantega with the 
explanations and so… there is a kind of receptivity to this kind of discussion that there 
was not in the past; before the Fund would simply say “no, we do this way and that is it”. 
Nowadays they are much more cautious when dealing with Brazil.252 
Similarly, the Financial Times wrote about this episode saying that: “Brazil’s new confidence 
as a global economic power has also led the country to put increasing pressure on the IMF on 
issues ranging from the acceptance of capital controls in global markets to even its 
methodology for calculating debt” (Spiegel 2013). 
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Within the IMF, the Brazilian executive director, Paulo Nogueira Batista, also had a 
fundamental role as a fierce advocate of EMDs’ interests and has been described as “one of the 
most persistent critics of Western dominance in the IMF” (Dettmer & Reiermann 2013). In one 
famous episode, he abstained to vote in the IMF’s rescue package for Greece in July 2013. 
While Brazil’s abstention had no direct impact on the result, “the move was seen as Brazil 
taking a stand against the IMF in the name of other developing nations,” the Financial Times 
wrote in August 2013 (Politi 2013). In the eyes of developing countries, the IMF’s extreme 
focus on the Eurozone crisis was partially due to the European overrepresentation in the Fund: 
“the euro countries abuse their power within the IMF,” Batista said in June 2013 (quoted in 
Dettmer & Reiermann 2013). Having as a benchmark their past relations with the IMF, EMDs 
felt there was a difference in the way in which the IMF was approaching the Eurozone crisis 
and it was Brazil that voiced this concern (Politi 2013). 
The issue about influence and quota shares within the IMF was a particularly delicate subject 
at that time since emerging countries were also disappointed with the US Congress’s refusal to 
ratify the IMF’s 2010 reform (Wade & Vestergaard 2015, p.2). Batista led a proposal to 
decouple the IMF’s reform to actualise one element of the reform: the increase and realignment 
of quota shares (Batista & Torres 2015). The IMF’s 2010 reform had two main elements: the 
quota increase and the change to an all-elected Executive Board. Only the latter part required 
an amendment of the Articles of Agreement which depended on US congressional approval. 
To avoid this obstacle, Batista proposed to separate the matters, an alteration which depended 
only on a simple majority of the IMF’s Executive Board and 85 per cent of votes in the Board 
of Governors. The proposal, however, was silently refused by the US as its Congress ended up 
approving the 2010 reform in December 2015 (Wade & Vestergaard 2015, p.4). 
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The delay in implementing the IMF’s 2010 reform boosted the BRICS’ proposal of creating 
alternative institutions: “either the institutions and forums adapt to a reality where emerging 
countries have more weight or they will search their own ways,”253 a high-ranked Central Bank 
official said. Similarly, a former foreign minister stated: “look, we have our alternatives here, 
if you do not agree we will not leave the IMF, but we will dedicate more attention to this 
[referring to the BRICS institutions]”.254 
In spite of Brazil’s efforts, Brazil’s image and influence in the IMS gradually shrunk. To begin 
with, Brazil’s economic performance began to deteriorate already in 2011, dismantling the 
picture of a country that was doing better than the world average: “2010 was a year in which 
the world grew little and we grew 7.5 per cent; so it is natural that in that context people had 
more optimism with Brazil. And since then we have grown much less, and less than other 
countries in the region, and this affected Brazil’s image”.255  
Moreover, foreign policy issues in general were downgraded on the list of the Dilma 
government’s priorities, in high contrast to the Lula period. As one Brazilian representative in 
the IMF said: “The truth is that Brazil has had a much higher concept. I think there is also a 
foreign policy element, Lula was very interested in international issues”.256 By the same token, 
a Brazilian representative in the IADB observed: “her interest in international relations is very 
different from Lula, it is much smaller”.257 The Brazil’s executive director position in the 
IADB, for example, was vacant for more than a year simply because the Dilma government 
did not appoint anyone to fill the position.258  
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257 Non-attributable interview with a Brazilian representative at the IADB. 
258 Non-attributable interview with a Brazilian representative at the IADB. 
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For Brazilian diplomats, Dilma’s lack of interest in foreign policy matters was further impaired 
by Brazil’s economic and political context. For instance, one high-ranked diplomat related: 
“you have this conjunction of two inhibiting factors that overlap: lack of money and lack of a 
greater interest as well”.259 Along very similar lines, a researcher at the government stated: 
Lula went 40 times to Africa, visit I do not know how many countries… If I am not 
mistaken, Dilma went four or five times. So foreign policy has shrunk and as the 
Brazilian productive structure is suffering fierce competition, the ability to reverse this 
in the short-term is low. There was a reversal on two fronts.260 
Another high-ranked diplomat explained the setbacks in Brazil’s foreign influence as follows:  
First, I would say a lower commitment of the executive to move forward with the external 
agenda. President Lula was much more proactive in foreign affairs than President Dilma 
is. Second, the party support, Lula had a leadership and a much broader party support 
than Dilma. Third, the external environment was much more benign to the Brazilian 
economy, we were in a time of economic expansion and economic growth, not technical 
recession.261 
 
Another problem for some observers was that China dwarfed the importance of Brazil and 
other EMDs in the global debate: “the BRICS and the G20 would not exist were it not for 
China,”262 a former Brazilian finance minister said. According to one influential researcher at 
the government, Brazil’s international influence was largely dependent on China: 
[Brazil’s economic growth] allowed the country to change its image, and above all 
because there was an important leadership that was Lula… This was reversed. If we think 
of the years of Dilma, as far as I can see in foreign policy, what are the big moves? It is 
the Bank of the BRICS and the contingency agreement; but these are lead by China.263  
 
                                                
259 Non-attributable interview with a high-ranked diplomat.  
260 Non-attributable interview.  
261 Non-attributable interview with a high-ranked diplomat.  
262 Non-attributable interview with a former finance minister. 
263 Non-attributable interview.  
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Thus, from 2011 onwards a more influential role for EMDs in general and for Brazil in 
particular became less likely. At the domestic level, the Dilma government had to deal with 
mounting economic and political difficulties. On top of that, foreign policy was downgraded 
within her government’s priorities. At the international level, the momentum for substantial 
reforms disappeared, not least because many EMDs began facing their own economic setbacks. 
Yet despite this curtailed influence, the BRICS group gained impetus and forwarded the 
proposal of creating alternative institutions, yielding Brazil some global influence.  
 
5.3.2   BRAZIL AND SOUTH AMERICA: ALL ROADS LEAD TO CHINA 
The aftermath of 2008 crisis changed the context that had favoured regional cooperation earlier 
that decade (Fiori 2011, p.9; Carvalho et al. 2009, pp.123–124). Particularly after the fall in 
commodity prices from 2012 onwards, some South American countries began facing mounting 
economic problems. Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela’s economic growth was in fact worse 
than the South American average, averaging 1.3 per cent GDP growth against a figure 4.9 per 
cent for the rest of the region between 2012 to 2014 (Table 7).  
TABLE 7: GDP GROWTH IN SOUTH AMERICA, 2012-2014  
Country 2012 2013 2014 Average 2012-2014 
Argentina 0.8 2.9 0.5 1.4 
Bolivia 5.1 6.8 5.5 5.8 
Brazil 1.8 2.7 0.1 1.6 
Chile 5.5 4.3 1.8 3.8 
Colombia 4.0 4.9 4.6 4.5 
Ecuador 5.2 4.6 3.8 4.6 
Paraguay -1.2 14.2 4.4 5.8 
Peru 6.0 5.8 2.4 4.7 
Uruguay 3.3 5.1 3.5 4.0 
Venezuela 5.6 1.3 -4.0 1.0 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2015. Elaborated by the author. 
The contrast between the poor economic results of Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela, on the 
one hand, and the faster growth rates of the rest of the region, on the other, added further 
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obstacles to an already complicated integration process. Under this less favourable scenario, 
the shortcomings of the Brazilian economic and political regional leadership that were 
discussed in chapter 4 became even more problematic. Notably, Brazil’s lack of economic 
leverage turned into a higher disadvantage when neighbour countries were in need of financial 
help and China appeared as an alternative creditor for needed funding in South America. In the 
words of a high-ranked Brazilian diplomat, “the crisis unfortunately has never helped the 
integration process … but at the moment that you have China expanding, regional crises create 
space for the growth of China’s presence. And this in the long run is detrimental to our 
interests”.264  
From 2005 to 2010, Gallagher et al. (2012) estimate that China lent some US$75 billion to 
Latin American countries. In 2010, China’s loan commitments to the region totalled US$37 
billion, out-financing the combined figures of the World Bank, the IADB and the US Eximbank 
for that year (Gallagher, Irwin, et al. 2012, p.1). Brazil has actually been among the main 
beneficiaries of China’s loans, again symbolising the paradoxical relationship between the two 
countries, as a high-ranked diplomat observed: 
It is an ambiguous relationship in the sense that Brazil is also interested in Chinese 
capital, of course … so Chinese capital is welcome, [but] we see with concern three 
things: the increase in exports of Chinese manufactured in our region, displacing 
Brazilian products; we see with concern the granting of finance, loans to key countries 
in the region, Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador; and we also see with concern the over-
reliance of those countries [in the Chinese capital]. Because is not just funding, today 
there is already a dependency. A dependence that is worrying because the Venezuelan 
government and the Ecuadorian government are getting money in China to be able to run 
their administrative machines … so this is very worrying.265 
In the case of Venezuela, China agreed to fund oil-for-loan deals from 2007 onwards that has 
since helped Venezuela overcome volatility in oil prices. In September 2015, Reuters reported 
                                                
264 Non-attributable interview with a high-ranked Brazilian diplomat. 
265 Non-attributable interview with a high-ranked diplomat.  
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that China had lent some US$50 billion to Venezuela through such agreements since 2007 
(Reuters 2015). As observed by a high-ranked Brazilian diplomat, “for the Chinese it is 
interesting, because this guarantees the supply of oil at a fix price; not at the spot price”.266 For 
Venezuela, the government could not borrow in the international financial system so it decided 
to deepen “its exposure to the Chinese financial system, borrowing resources that the Chinese 
government offers; and it offers in hard currency, dollars, and in yuan as well”267 (see also 
Gallagher, Irwin, et al. 2012, pp.14–17). 
As for Argentina, the drop in commodity prices after 2011 further exacerbated the deterioration 
of the Argentinean economy. As a high-ranked Brazilian diplomat related, “there were 
Argentinean demands to [Brazil] support the creation of credit lines for them, and also of 
special swaps, but the response was negative because the risk is too high”.268  Economic 
conditions worsened further in mid-2014, when the US Supreme Court denied Argentina’s 
appeal against NML Capital, a fund that had opted out of the restructured bonds from the 
country’s default in 2001. The Supreme Court, it should be noted, had already denied 
Argentina’s petition for certiorari in October 2013. Reflecting on this problem a high-ranked 
researcher at the government said: 
Latin America is again abandoned. Last year [referring to 2013] the Argentinians, 
predicting what is going on now [January 2014], came to Brazil and asked: “can we make 
a swap reserves? You have US$380 billions, you lend us US$10 billions, and we improve 
our accounts, we can show that we have dollars”. And this was just for the record in the 
balance of payments, it would still be managed by Brazil; Brazil would not deliver the 
dollars. Then the Central Bank said, “only if the Argentinians buy Brazilian foreign debt 
bonds and deposit as collateral”. Look, if Argentina is strapped for cash, they will not 
purchase Brazilian foreign debt bonds… So we promise, and we do not deliver. Then the 
Chinese came and offered.269 
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269 Non-attributable interview. 
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With Argentina and Venezuela facing acute economic difficulties, regional integration around 
UNASUL and Mercosul was impaired, as a Central Bank high-ranked official said: “Argentina 
and Venezuela are economies that are going through a very complicated situation … so that 
complicates matters within Mercosul, which was the initial project that Brazil had to strengthen 
its leadership in the region”.270  
Increasingly, Mercosul became a political project, with little concern for economic integration 
(Malamud 2011, p.7). In 2012 Venezuela was approved as a full member of Mercosul despite 
Paraguay’s objection, who was temporarily suspended from the block for violating the 
Democratic Clause of Mercosul.271 Mercosul’s political turn and economic isolation has been 
viewed as detrimental to Brazil’s regional interests, as a former policy-maker observed: “these 
international agreements are growing and Brazil does participate in hardly any; it is very 
limited here to Mercosul, and even Mercosul, with the incorporation of Venezuela, has turned 
into a more political forum than [a block] of economic interest”.272 In a similar perspective, a 
senior Brazilian economist and former minister said: 
I am convinced that Mercosul was a very interesting measure, particularly from the 
political point of view. Mercosul overcame a serious problem that we had between the 
armed forces of Brazil and Argentina … after that, Mercosul has never worked, this is 
the truth. And today I am afraid because the world is developing in another place. There 
is a US agreement with Europe; there is a US agreement with Asia; there is China 
advancing in Africa; the South Atlantic will be a cemetery … Mercosul [will be] 
disconnected from the world; it will be there, spinning around itself.273 
Displeased with Mercosul’s political turn, some South American states decided to create a new 
trade bloc, aiming to strengthen trade relations with Asia in general and China in particular.274 
                                                
270 Non-attributable interview with a high-ranked official at the Central Bank.  
271 The impeachment of the then President of Paraguay Fernando Lugo in June 2012 was considered a coup d’état 
by the neighbouring countries.   
272 Non-attributable interview. 
273 Non-attributable interview.  
274 Chile, Mexico and Peru are also amongst the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) members, a trade agreement 
approved in October 2015 by twelve Pacific Rim countries, including the United States. 
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In April 2011 Peru hosted a meeting with Chile, Colombia and Mexico, which resulted in the 
establishment of the Pacific Alliance in June 2012. In March 2012 the four leaders had met via 
videoconference in the region’s first virtual summit (Oppenheimer 2012), symbolising the new 
group’s pragmatism and trade-driven orientation.  
According to a high-ranked official at the Dilma government, “the Pacific Alliance does not 
itself bring any added value,”275 because the included states already had free trade agreements 
among themselves, and Brazil also has trade agreements with them all. According to the official 
discourse, then, the Brazilian government “has no problem with the Pacific Alliance,” not least 
because “the region without Brazil does not act as region”.276 
Nevertheless, upon further consideration this claim seems disconnected from reality. In the 
IADB, for instance, as a Brazilian representative there has pointed out, “the Pacific Alliance 
many times arrives with a closed position; we have observed that they are voting in bloc”.277 
Similarly, a high authority in the World Bank summarised the current condition of South 
America as follows, “the Argentinean President travels to China and signs bilateral agreements 
with matters that are known afterwards by Itamaraty; not to mention the Pacific Alliance that 
is going in another direction. Anyway, the reality is that it has changed”.278 The gradual decline 
of Brazil’s influence in South America was also observed by a leading Brazilian politician:  
What happened [in the recent period] was the predominance of the Chavismo, which did 
not exist [before]; another axis was created, one that Brazil is not part of, which includes 
Nicaragua, Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina and Ecuador. And [in this new axis] Brazil is 
not the leader; Venezuela is. … Brazil lost effective relevance then, and now due to the 
Pacific Alliance.279  
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The rupture of the integration process in South America heightened the dilemmas faced by 
Brazil’s regional strategy (Malamud 2011). As a high-ranked diplomat summarised: 
I would say Brazil is at a crossroads: it can either strengthen its ties with the region or it 
can decouple from the region. What I mean by decoupling from the region is to search 
for markets in other continents, to strengthening the relations with the other BRICS, to 
loosen the Mercosul rules for signing free trade agreements, a diversification of Brazil’s 
markets towards other regions, Africa, Southeast Asia …280 
 
In light of the difficulties presented by regional integration, the question remains whether 
Brazil’s global influence even depends on its role as a regional leader (Malamud 2011, p.8; 
Fiori 2011, p.25; Carvalho et al. 2009, p.132; Hurrell 2000, p.3). The logical argument is that 
Brazil’s global weight increases if Brazil can speak for the region, as a high-ranked researcher 
at the Brazilian government noted: 
I think this is a dilemma of Brazilian diplomacy, or it should be, if we are big enough to 
continue to be invited for the banquet, or if future invitations to the banquet assume that 
you build and consolidate your constituency. I think there is no answer to that, but I tend 
to assume that without speaking on behalf of a group, with the policy that you have here, 
and with the indicators that you have here, it is not the same thing.281 
 
While many current and former policy-makers agree with this argument, the problem remains 
that there exist many impediments to Brazil becoming a regional leader. In particular, there is 
not necessarily a convergence between Brazil’s interests and those of its neighbours and, hence, 
Brazil’s interests might be best served acting independently. In the words of a high-ranked 
Brazilian diplomat: 
The prevailing understanding is that when you strengthen your regional influence, you 
project yourself stronger globally and become more influential globally. … This is the 
theory. But theory and practice are not talking, because [Brazil’s] action in the G20 … 
                                                
280 Non-attributable interview with a high-ranked diplomat.  
281 Non-attributable interview. 
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[ends up] very prisoner of interests that are not ours, are Argentinean interests [for 
example]. Sometimes we end up defending Argentinean interests in the G20 when we 
could be articulating our interests more forcefully.282 
 
Similarly, a Central Bank high official noted that, “the fact is that [Brazil’s] international 
position goes through deepening its leadership at the regional level, and I think Brazil has 
pursued this, but in an environment that we do not have to elaborate very much to see it is 
complicated”.283 Indeed, there are some major differences in terms of economic policy between 
Brazil and its neighbours, including domestic policies, the relationship with international 
financial markets and the treatment of property rights (Carvalho et al. 2009, p.132). The 
hostility of some neighbour countries towards international markets and the BWIs, for instance, 
does not align with the Brazilian position. Another important obstacle is Paraguay’s diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan, which prevents Mercosul signing any agreements with China (Malamud 
2011, p.12). 
Another major complication is the fact that Brazil’s leadership was never recognised by its 
neighbours (Malamud 2011, pp.9–10). As a former Central Bank director said:  
So what I could observe [Argentina] was never a country that has supported us a lot, 
instead always expected much from us. … And Mexico is clearly a country that has the 
ambition to take the lead in the region, so they resent much of the leading role that Brazil 
reached during the crisis.284  
 
Brazil has also reacted to its lack of regional support. For example, in the 2011 elections for 
Managing Director of the IMF, Brazil supported the French candidate Christine Lagarde 
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instead of the Mexican Agustín Carstens. Brazil’s position was especially symbolic in the 
context of the Brazil’s constant advocacy for a greater role of EMDs in global governance. In 
2013, Mexico and Brazil each offered candidates for the Director-General position of the 
WTO, a contest ultimately won by Brazil and its candidate Roberto Azevêdo.  
In sum, the prospect of regional integration and an increase in Brazilian influence in South 
America decreased considerably from 2011 to 2014. On the one hand, as Argentina and 
Venezuela began to face mounting economic problems and, as Brazil was in no condition to 
offer financial support to its neighbours, China took the opportunity to provide assistance. On 
the other hand, the rest of the region, which was growing at faster rates than the regional 
average, created a new economic bloc with the aim of increasing trade relations with China. 
Besides the worsening of international conditions, the weakening possibility of South 
American integration in the post-2008 crisis can be thus understood as the outcome of a 
deficient Brazilian leadership and the alternative posed by China.  
 
5.3.3   ALL THAT GLITTERS IS NOT GOLD: THE BRICS 
From 2011 to 2014, Brazil gradually detached from regional initiatives and invested more 
heavily in the BRICS group. As discussed previously in this section, the BRICS group achieved 
momentum during and in the aftermath of the global crisis because of the member countries’ 
convergent interest in reforming the global monetary and financial architecture. The BRICS 
states share the desire to reduce the US-dominance of global financial governance, a scenario 
they believe can be achieved through the reform of the BWIs where they claim they should 
have a higher quota share. Since their first joint statement in June 2009 (BRIC 2009), the BRIC 
countries (before the inclusion of South Africa) have advocated for a greater voice and 
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representation in international financial institutions and have welcomed the central role 
assigned to the G20 in the context of the 2008 crisis.  
Moreover, the BRICS deem it necessary to move away from a dollar-centric IMS. Implicitly 
expressing their dissatisfaction with a dollar-dominated IMS, the BRICS (2011) have explicitly 
advocated for an increase in the use of the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). China has 
been particularly keen on the proposal for a multilateral alternative to the dollar (Zhou 2009), 
an idea that was endorsed by the 2009 report of the Stiglitz Commission, convened by the 
President of the UN General Assembly (Stiglitz et al. 2009, pp.115–116). Russia has been even 
more categorical in its discomfort with the IMS’ dependence on the US dollar, and declared in 
mid-2009 that it planned to reduce the share of dollar-denominated assets in its international 
reserves (Eichengreen 2011a, p.135). In 2010, the BRIC (2010) collectively declared their 
intention to discuss future opportunities for monetary cooperation, including local currency 
arrangements, further signalling their dissatisfaction with the dollar’s key role.  
Furthermore, the BRICS countries have also expressed their concern about the growing gap in 
infrastructure financing in the developing world (Chin 2014, p.367; BRICS 2013). In early 
2012, the BRICS (2013) began discussing the possibility of establishing a joint development 
bank to address the deficit financing in infrastructure and sustainable development faced by 
EMDs. The discussions resulted in the launch of the NDB in July 2014. On the same occasion, 
the BRICS created the CRA as an additional line of defence against international financial 
instability. 
The BRICS leveraged their convergent interests for reforming the IMS by acting together in 
forums such as the IMF: “the existence of the BRICS creates a greater proximity among the 
members in the discussion of certain issues; so as these issues enter in the BRICS’ agenda, it 
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reinforces their action within the Fund,”285 a high-ranked official at the Central Bank observed. 
Despite sharing similar interests on many topics, Brazil’s agenda in the Fund was not driven 
by any prior articulation of convergence with the other BRICS members. In the words of a 
high-ranked official at the Central Bank:  
It is a situation a little different: if a point is being developed and enters in the BRICS’ 
agenda, then you create an articulation of those five countries that will be reflected in the 
action of their directors in the Fund and, hence, they will have a coordinated position on 
that matter. However, if a topic comes up in the Fund, it does not need to be articulated 
first between the BRICS to [Brazil] determine its position… sometimes there will be an 
alignment of positions that will not necessarily follow the group format, [Brazil] might 
join other countries, there might be very different interests depending on the subject that 
is being discussed there.286  
 
Indeed, aside from certain topics concerning the reform of the global monetary architecture, 
there is little convergence among the BRICS’ interests. This is reflected even in the group’s 
origins, as a former Brazilian minister has pointed out, “the BRICS is an invention of [Jim] 
O’Neil [who coined the term BRIC in a paper written for Goldman Sachs in 2001] … There is 
no connection among these economies, which reveals how myths have a great power. Only 
because it was the BRICS, when they came up with the PIGS287 everyone rejected”.288An 
influential Brazilian economist summed up the BRICS’ trajectory along similar lines: 
This thing of BRICS I think is a serious problem; because it turned out that this thing 
caught on. It was invented by Goldman Sachs; it turned into a geopolitical initiative, as 
these things happen without much pertinence to be honest, because these countries have 
nothing to do with each other. And if you want to say, “but they are BRICS because they 
are large economies, are countries of continental proportions with huge domestic 
markets, etc.,” then I do not know why South Africa is there. Nothing against South 
Africa, but it is incongruous; it makes no sense. But this animal was created; it was sold 
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this way, and then naturally the countries began to try to position themselves in a certain 
way in discussions and debates.289 
 
It is paradoxical that one of – if not the – main focuses of attention in terms of Brazil’s foreign 
policy is, in the words of a high-ranked Brazilian diplomat: “a group that [Brazil] did not create: 
we won it on a silver plate, it already had value in the market when we took it over”.290 This is 
significant because the group that Brazil had truly meant to engage, the IBSA forum, together 
with India and South Africa, lost ground to the BRICS. In fact, a high-ranking member of the 
government has said the inclusion of South Africa in the BRICS was a Chinese initiative, 
“because there was no African country, and [Brazil] could not veto”.291 Indeed, some officials 
in the government speculate that, “China did this to empty the IBSA, … [the group] that brings 
together three democracies”.292 While it is not possible to prove such a Chinese conspiracy 
existed to put an end to IBSA, one cannot deny that China’s interests have ultimately prevailed.   
Apart from the odd way in which the BRICS was transformed from a financial acronym to a 
foreign policy instrument, the BRICS countries in fact have conflicting interests in several 
areas. In geopolitical terms, there are tensions between China and India as they fight for 
hegemony in Asia and between Brazil and China as they both seek to increase their presence 
in Africa. Russia and India, moreover, are strategically concerned with China’s rise (Brands 
2011, p.39). In terms of agricultural policy, Brazil and India also have conflicting interests, as 
a former Central Bank governor commented: 
Does China help Brazil in any relevant international trade forum? No. The big 
protectionist issue that harms Brazil is the agricultural protectionism, where China is not 
with us, nor India, nor Russia, nor South Africa. No one votes with us on these matters. 
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So in this “let us bring the periphery together,” they are from different neighbourhoods, 
with different interests. It is the mountain people and the beach people; there is no 
convergence.293 
 
The BRICS’ conflicting agendas are reflective of their different economic and political 
features. China’s development model, for example, is based on investment and exports, while 
Brazil and India are more focused on their domestic markets. India is competitive in 
information technology services, but Brazil, South African and Russia are competitive in 
commodities. Russia in particular relies heavily on oil. Politically, Brazil, India and South 
Africa are democracies; Russia is still in a transition towards a complete democratic regime; 
and China is ruled by the Chinese Communist Party. Not surprisingly, the BRICS countries 
have not only opposing economic interests but also divergent conceptions of governance and 
legitimacy (Brands 2011, p.39).  
At the same time, these divergent interests can be partly attributed to the power imbalance 
within the group: “at one point, it seemed very relevant to bring together these countries to 
reform the institutions; more than that is to be naïve, because China has a global weight much 
heavier than the others,”294 as noticed by an authority at the World Bank. Illustrative of this 
difference is that fact that, while all the BRICS countries have to deal with the spillovers of the 
monetary policies of developed countries and particularly from the US, they do not have a 
unified proposal for reforming the IMS. Significantly, China’s exchange rate policy also 
represents a discomfort for the other BRICS since its undervalued currency hurts their exports 
and simultaneously poses a threat for their domestic industries. The group has avoided 
discussing this matter, however, leaving the US to confront China. 
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Considering the initial motivation that catalysed the BRICS group – the reform of the IMS – 
the asymmetry of power within the group is not necessarily a problem. On the one hand, while 
China was probably powerful enough to create sufficient pressure on its own, its claim to 
reform the prevailing system became more legitimate when it was supported by other large 
EMDs. As a high ranked Brazilian diplomat stated, “even though China has a very large weight, 
what we feel is that they value the forum [referring to the BRICS], that it is useful to their 
interest in some way, perhaps even to show that they are not isolated, because there is much 
distrust about China everywhere”.295 On the other hand, the other BRICS states relied on 
China’s economic power to exercise a political pressure that would not have otherwise had the 
same weight. Thus, in light of the discussions for reforming the IMS, the BRICS association 
had a win-win outcome: “within the BRICS, [the balance of power] so far has been reasonably 
balanced, not least because there was any instance where you had to measure forces to decide 
[a major issue]… the five countries see the BRICS as a relevant cooperation forum,”296 a high-
ranked diplomat observed.  
During the creation of the NDB, for example, Brazilian representatives considered that there 
was a fair equilibrium among the members. In fact, in the important matter of deciding voting 
power and the value of contributions, China’s position was defeated by the other members, as 
a high-ranked diplomat said: 
China wanted to enforce the idea of different voting weight and share power, of course 
along with different contributions as well… South Africa, even for the sake of a greater 
fragility, was slightly willing to accept, but Russia, Brazil and India did not accept that; 
we made sure that the contributions were equal, at least in the beginning, with equal 
voting power. Somewhat in return they were very keen to bring the headquarters to 
Shanghai, and they put up a lot of money. Russia, India and South Africa competed a 
bit… South Africa ended up taking a regional office. Brazil thought it was not the 
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moment to invest a lot of money, build a building, these things are very expensive. So it 
stayed in Shanghai.297  
 
Nevertheless, already in their second Summit in 2010 (BRIC 2010), the BRICS group began 
to broaden its agenda beyond the reform of the BWIs and the creation of their own alternatives. 
Under such circumstances, the power asymmetries among the BRICS members became a more 
obvious disadvantage for Brazil, one of the least powerful states within the group. Brazil is not 
a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, of which Russia and China are 
part, and it is also not a nuclear power, which Russia, China and India are. As noted by Brands 
(2011, p.39), “as the individual BRIC countries – especially China and India – become more 
powerful, they will probably become more assertive in pressing their particular national 
interests”. Yet despite these asymmetries, the BRICS remains the only international forum that 
still yields Brazil some international prestige. 
In sum, Brazil’s external influence was altered on two fronts from 2011 onwards. First, because 
of its poorer economic performance, Brazilian foreign policy in general had less visibility and 
was considered a lower priority even within the government. Second, it was affected by the 
international trends of i) an environment less propitious for reforms that favoured EMDs in 
global financial governance and ii) China’s ongoing rise. In its turn, China’s rise had mixed 
effects for Brazil’s influence as for while Brazil yielded some international prestige through its 
association with China and the BRICS, it is questionable whether Brazil’s relationship with 
these states in general was in Brazil’s best interest. Finally, the combination of Brazil’s 
economic crisis and China’s ascent resulted in Brazil’s much reduced position of influence in 
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regional matters, which ultimately can be considered a central factor of Brazil’s international 
influence.  
 
5.4   CONCLUSION 
From 2011 to 2014, the international perception about EMDs’ increasing influence in the IMS 
gradually changed. During this period, the relatively better performance of EMDs in 
comparison to their developed peers was substituted for an economic slowdown in the 
developing world. Significantly, the previous global economic conditions of rising commodity 
prices and booming capital flows that had allowed EMDs to rebound quickly from the 2008 
crisis began to fade away. Already in 2011 commodity prices began to slow down. Weaker 
prices, which were partially attributed to the downswing of Chinese growth, lowered economic 
growth among commodity-exporting EMDs. Then in late 2013, the Federal Reserve began to 
gradually taper the quantitative easing, which came to an end in October 2014. This change in 
American monetary policy further served to deteriorate EMDs’ economic results.  
Setbacks in EMDs’ economic performance added to the inertia of reforming the IMS. In 
contrast to the immediate aftermath of the crisis, when EMDs’ economic firepower helped 
them pressure for IMS reforms, from 2011 onwards this became less apparent. In particular, 
after 2011 the G20 gradually lost the prestige it had enjoyed at the height of the crisis. As the 
risk of financial contagion disappeared, developed countries’ interest in increasing monetary 
cooperation shrunk and EMDs’ problems with monetary spillovers from the developed world 
were largely marginalised. 
Despite EMDs’ more fragile economic situation, there were some permanent advances towards 
a more multipolar IMS, at least in comparison to the very outdated pre-crisis architecture. First, 
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although limited, the reforms in the BWIs were significant from a symbolic standpoint. 
Notably, the IMF’s 2010 reform put Brazil, Russia, India and China amongst its top ten 
shareholders. Second, the landscape of global governance was altered in favour of EMDs with 
the establishment of the NDB and the CRA.  
These advances towards a more multipolar IMS were largely related to the need of recognising 
China’s power. China’s emergence as a monetary power ended up creating some positive 
spillovers for EMDs, particularly for the other BRICS countries. For instance, once the window 
for reform was open in the IMF, it was reasonable to increase the share of countries like Brazil, 
Russia and India. Yet what made the IMF reform unavoidable was the necessity to increase 
China’s share. China’s uniqueness among EMDs became blatant with the inclusion of China’s 
Renminbi in the benchmark SDR currency basket in November 2015. The prevailing idea in 
the immediate aftermath of the crisis that EMDs were to have a higher influence within the 
IMS has therefore been replaced by China’s actual gain of hard monetary power. 
Moreover, the consolidation of China’s monetary power can be understood in part as the 
American capacity to preserve the previous IMS, centred on the dollar and on the BWIs, which 
the US continues to rule. In other words, the post-crisis IMS has been gradually reorganised 
from a US standpoint, where China has gained some power and Europe has lost some, but 
American might has remained supreme. To that extent, the IMS proved to be as rigid as has 
been described by IPE theory. 
Meanwhile, the marginal gain of power by EMDs falls short of the high expectations espoused 
in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. In this regard the soft and hard monetary power 
distinction is useful, as it seems that Brazil, along with some other EMDs, made some progress 
in the former and little or none in the latter. In this regard, a respected economist commented: 
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Unequivocally there is greater political and geopolitical prominence of Brazil, while the 
progress in terms of its economic position did not come along; it came, but one walked 
faster than the other, this is undoubtedly true. I think this is and is not a contradiction. In 
normal times, it would be a contradiction, because how could a country gain political 
prominence without an equivalent economic prominence, how would you accept these 
two things? But in view of a non-normal context of the global crisis, which we have been 
living for the past 5 or 6 years, it seems less incongruous to me.298 
This political or soft power gains, according to several Brazilian policy-makers have endured 
in post-crisis period, when Brazil began to face strong economic turbulences. 
In terms of hard power, however, gains were significant only for China. The Dilma government 
was unable to reassess Brazil’s actual power to its benefit. The government’s actions from 2010 
onwards suggest that it believed that it had much more power than it actually did. Ultimately 
this misreading is illustrated by the change in economic policy that took place with the adoption 
of the New Economic Matrix, which meant a gradual abandonment of the macroeconomic 
tripod that had been in place since 1999. In other words, the NEM was the crystallisation of 
the Dilma government’s belief that certain economic policies were behind Brazil’s success 
since 2006. By doing this, the government underestimated the influence of the very favourable 
international scenario EMDs like Brazil had enjoyed. This attitude combined with the 
worsening of international conditions for EMDs can be identified as key to Brazil’s economic 
deceleration that took place from 2011 onwards. 
  
                                                





The fallout of the 2008 crisis generated a puzzle in understanding monetary power. Suddenly, 
emerging market and developing countries (EMDs) appeared to have increased their global 
influence even without issuing international currencies. They had been less affected by the 
onset of the crisis and consequently could become an important part of the crisis management. 
In addition, EMDs’ growing economic weight (share in global GDP, trade, and investments) 
reinforced the idea that they should have equivalent political might in the international 
monetary system (IMS). In the context of the crisis, solid macroeconomic fundamentals and a 
vocal diplomacy appeared to be relevant sources of monetary power and capable of changing 
the landscape of the IMS. Understanding sources of monetary power other than issuing an 
international currency was precisely the initial motivation for studying Brazil’s position in the 
IMS.  
Brazil’s case in particular reveals the complexity of monetary power. While Brazil faces the 
general constraints associated with states that do not issue international currencies, it has 
nonetheless a certain level of political influence in global monetary and financial matters. 
Moreover, Brazil’s transformation from a state dominated by problems of external debt and 
inflation in the 1980s to a rising power in the early 2000s also provided a unique account of 
how changes in external constraints can affect a state’s monetary power.  
This final chapter starts by presenting a summary of findings. The second section identifies the 
analytical implications of this case study of Brazil for the position of EMDs in general in the 
IMS. The third section discusses what the study’s findings on Brazil say about the nature of 
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power in the IMS. The fourth section draws conclusions about the relationship between 
external constraints and domestic autonomy for Brazil in the context of the IMS. The final 
section sets out the limitations of these conclusions and suggests further avenues of research.  
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Chapter 1 set forth the puzzle around the role of EMDs in the IMS in the aftermath of the 2008 
crisis. The main contribution of this chapter was to draw attention to a gap in the existing 
monetary power theory, one that circumscribes the possibilities to understand the role of states 
whose currencies are not internationally relevant nor will be in the foreseeable future. It 
highlighted the significance of this gap by connecting it to the short-lived enthusiasm 
surrounding EMDs. In other words, if currency-related constraints faced by EMDs had been at 
the centre of the monetary power analysis, the predictions around EMDs’ future role in the 
IMS would have been more realistic. Moreover, a major conclusion of this chapter was that, if 
academic literature is interested in understanding the role played by states like Brazil and other 
EMDs, monetary power theory needs to advance in order to incorporate other sources of power 
than issuing an international currency. 
Chapter 2 exposed the extent to which economic policy-making in Brazil was subordinated to 
currency-related constraints from 1944 to 1994. These were mainly the product of Brazil’s 
incomplete domestic financial system, which was at the origins of the problems of external 
debt and inflation. In particular, the chapter showed how Brazil’s dependence on external 
capital translated into its need to fit into the Bretton Woods System (BWS) in order to have 
access to international credit. One major conclusion of this chapter was that even in its weak 
position Brazil’s subordination to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was limited. 
 243 
Significantly, both the Brady Plan and the Real Plan were implemented without the Fund’s 
support. 
Chapter 3 analysed how Brazilian policy-makers dealt with the currency crises in other 
emerging markets from the mid-1990s until the early 2000s, and it considered the consequences 
of China’s rise on the Brazilian economy. Brazil’s weak external position (deficit in the current 
account, low level of international reserves and high share of public debt indexed to interest 
and exchange rates) made the Brazilian currency a target of speculative attacks. Eventually, 
the 1999 attack forced Brazil to devalue its currency and adopt a floating exchange rate regime. 
Propitiously, the economic ascent of China after 2003 prompted a change in the external 
conditions confronting Brazil, creating the opportunity for Brazil to reduce its external 
vulnerabilities, mainly in terms of balance of payments problems. This beneficial change to 
Brazil’s position (rising level of international reserves and surplus in the current account) 
occurred in the context of Cardoso’s macroeconomic tripod and its continuation under Lula. 
The domestic tensions resulting from the continuation of this economic stance likely played a 
key role in establishing Lula’s leftist foreign policy.  
Chapter 4 challenged the argument which attributes Brazil’s sound economic performance 
from 2006 to 2010 to an alteration in the government’s policies. Instead, it argued that the 
external environment, particularly rising commodity prices and high international liquidity, 
was fundamental to Brazil’s relative economic success. When the 2008 crisis broke out, 
Brazilian policy-makers had an unprecedented policy space to implement counter-cyclical 
policies due to its much stronger initial economic position. In addition, the quick rebound of 
commodity prices in mid-2009 contributed to the recovery of the Brazilian economy. The 
reasons for Brazil’s sound performance aside, this chapter showed how Brazil’s relative 
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economic success, particularly during the 2008 crisis, was a source of greater international 
influence.  
Chapter 5 reinforced the argument that the Brazilian government had essentially little power 
to reverse the downward turn of its domestic economic performance in less favourable external 
circumstances. Moreover, it highlighted the paradoxical consequences of China’s rise for 
Brazil, the negative side of which became all the more clear after 2011. In particular, the 
reversal in the rise of commodity prices ended the previous buffer space Brazilian policy-
makers had had to pursue domestic objectives and concurrently exposed the problems 
associated with the primarisation of exports – a subject that had been hitherto disregarded. 
Strikingly, it showed how Brazil was able to retain some of the political influence it had 
acquired despite the re-emergence of external constraints on its economic policy making. 
 
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE POSITION OF EMDS IN THE IMS IN 
LIGHT OF BRAZIL’S CASE 
The case of Brazil is important to understand some of the underlying dynamics in the IMS and 
it shows why scholars mistakenly assessed the power of EMDs at the outbreak of the crisis. In 
the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, Brazil typified big EMDs who failed to fulfil the prophecy of 
becoming inevitable key players in the global economy. Brazil’s quick recovery from the crisis, 
with a minimum recession in 2009 and a strong recovery in 2010, helped to fuel predictions 
that EMDs would be the new engines of the global economy. However, as the global scenario 
began to reverse from 2011 onwards, Brazil and other EMDs were unable to sustain their 
previous performance. Gradually, the international euphoria surrounding the fate of Brazil and 
other EMDs disappeared. 
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Confounding the expectations that the 2008 crisis would mark a watershed in the history of the 
IMS, the years after the financial meltdown unfolded with little threat to the US’ systemic 
dominance (Kirshner 2014; Cohen 2015; Helleiner 2014). Once the global financial contagion 
was controlled, the momentum to reform the global monetary architecture faded away. 
Symbolising this loss of momentum for significant reforms was the fall of the G20’s prestige 
after 2011, when the frequency of summits was reduced to just one meeting a year. The G20’s 
influence was further downgraded by the rebound of the Eurozone crisis, which became the 
highest priority for European and other developed countries. The Eurozone crisis not only 
reduced the G20’s significance but it also helped to restore the IMF’s status quo, where EMDs 
were still under-represented despite their contribution to expand the IMF’s lending capacity 
through the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) in 2009. Consequently, the forum in which 
EMDs had some voice was weakened whereas the forum in which they do not have one was 
strengthened, even though they financially contributed to make it stronger.  
The centrality of the US dollar in the IMS also remained untouched and, hence, American 
monetary policy continued to determine the relevant business cycles for EMDs, particularly in 
terms of exchange rate movements. In the less prosperous period of the global economy 
following the outbreak of the crisis, American monetary policy sparked outrage among EMDs. 
Policy-makers in EMDs, particularly in Brazil, first complained about the Fed’s quantitative 
easing policy, calling it a “currency war” as it triggered a huge capital inflow to a number of 
EMDs. Later, when the Fed announced its intentions of tapering its security purchases in May 
2013, and effectively started to do in December that year, EMDs were equally dissatisfied and 
their economies were negatively affected by capital outflows.  
As Eichengreen and Gupta (2013) have shown, having better macroeconomic fundamentals, 
such as smaller budget deficits, lower public debts, higher levels of international reserves and 
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superior growth rates, did not provide sufficient insulation for EMDs in face of the Fed’s policy 
change. Aizenman et al. (2014) have come to a similar conclusion. Such views are emblematic 
of EMDs’ continued unprivileged position in the IMS, being policy and business cycle takers. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it seems clear that EMDs’ monetary power was overestimated in 
the aftermath of the 2008 crisis and the Brazilian experience elucidates why this occurred. 
Brazil’s economic trajectory can be explained in terms of changes to its currency-related 
constraints over time and by the fact that much of its influence in the IMS was externally 
determined. First, Brazil’s relative economic resilience was to a great extent context dependent. 
The international dynamics inaugurated with the ascent of China in the early 2000s was 
fundamental to the reductions of Brazil’s external vulnerabilities. The rise in commodity prices 
was also a central factor behind Brazil’s surplus in its current account from 2003 to 2007 and 
in its accumulation of international reserves. When these international conditions changed, 
Brazil – and several other EMDs – began to face mounting economic problems. Significantly, 
from 2011 onwards the Brazilian government was unable to reverse its economic crisis, raising 
questions about how much autonomy Brazil actually had over its relatively good economic 
performance in the 2008-2010 period.  
Second, Brazil and other EMDs were already relatively resilient economies and claimed the 
right to greater political influence in global governance before the breakout of the 2008 crisis. 
In a non-crisis context, however, Brazil’s economic weight was insufficient to increase its 
influence. The crisis created the environment in which it was possible for Brazil to bargain and 
increase its political power, due to its relatively stronger position at that moment in time. To 
this extent, Brazil’s case suggests that “doing its homework”299 (becoming a more resilient 
economy) is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to improve a state’s position in the IMS’ 
                                                
299 This term is borrowed from one interviewee.  
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hierarchy. Being a robust economy was not enough to change the IMS’ status quo; the EMDs’ 
increase in political power only happened when more powerful states temporarily became more 
vulnerable.    
EMDs’ limited power was evident in the dynamics of the G20. The G20 leaders’ meeting was 
called by the US, rather than being the outcome of a demand from EMDs. Most significantly, 
the forum maintained its relevance only insofar as it was pertinent to developed countries. To 
that extent, while the G20 put big EMDs at the centre of global governance, its rise was not the 
outcome of EMDs’ power. Precisely because of this, EMDs were unable to sustain the G20’s 
relevance once developed countries had lost interest in it.  
In sum, the study of Brazil’s position in the IMS highlights the importance of currency-related 
constraints. The argument that the position of a country’s currency is central to its position in 
the IMS is further confirmed by the case of China, the only EMD to changed its relative 
position in the post-2008 crisis period. Significantly, the currency constraints faced by Brazil 
and the majority of other EMDs were not entirely applicable to China. Eichengreen and Gupta 
(2013, p.4) have found that among the BRICS only China’s currency did not depreciate after 
the Fed’s tapering talk. China was equally the only economy whose international reserves were 
augmented after the tapering talk (Eichengreen & Gupta 2013, p.4). Put simply, China faces 
much lower currency constraints, particularly since the inclusion of the renminbi in the IMF’s 
Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket in December 2015.  
 
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF POWER IN THE IMS IN 
LIGHT OF BRAZIL’S CASE 
The Brazilian experience suggests that there is more to monetary power than issuing an 
international currency. When asked about the position of Brazil in the IMS, current and former 
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Brazilian policy-makers instinctively acknowledged that it has changed in the past decades 
even though Brazil continues to be a subordinated economy. As one influential Brazilian 
researcher at the government said: “it is very different than it was 15, 20 years ago, 
undoubtedly… [although] obviously [Brazil] is still an economy that continues to be a 
secondary economy in the international arena”. 300  Another renowned economist tried to 
explain Brazil’s improvement as follows:  
I think what happened in the last 10, 15, 20 years perhaps, is that Brazil achieved greater 
macroeconomic stability, with everything that happened in the early 2000s – increased 
participation of Brazil in international trade, the rising commodity prices – and how this 
has benefited Brazil, Brazil being a big country, with a large consumer market, very 
attractive for foreign companies and so on… Brazil achieved a role that it not had in the 
1980s and 1990s. I think there are countries that transited in this pyramid [of the IMS] 
and Brazil is one of them.301 
 
The accounts of current and former Brazilian policy-makers help shed light on the channels 
through which a state may increase its influence in the IMS even if it does not issue an 
international currency. To begin with, many interviewees suggested that having influence in 
the IMS is considerably subordinated to a country’s position as a creditor or a debtor. When 
asked about how Brazil’s position in the IMS has changed, most interviewees remembered 
Brazil’s position as a debtor in the 1980s and early 1990s and how that situation constrained 
the government’s economic policy-making. To that extent, the conclusion of the Brady Plan in 
1994 had a considerable impact on Brazil’s position in the IMS (chapters 2 and 3) and settling 
its debt with the IMF in 2005 also contributed to an increase in Brazil’s influence (chapters 3 
and 4). Becoming a creditor of the Fund in 2009, during a major global financial crisis was 
                                                
300 Non-attributable interview.  
301 Non-attributable interview.  
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thus crucially important to Brazil’s position in the IMS and imbued with symbolism due to its 
history as a traditionally debtor state (chapter 4).  
Although it represents a significant step forward, the simple change from being a debtor to a 
creditor status in the IMS does not per se increase a state’s influence. In the words of a senior 
official at the World Bank: 
The change of debtor to creditor status makes room for influence. This influence, at the 
same time, is not mechanical; is not a linear thing. Because both influence and power are 
not variables that you can quantify and attribute an exact measure… the soft power in 
institutions is the behaviour combined with money that gives influence… This transition 
from debtor to creditor influence is not binary: “I am a debtor so I have no influence; I 
am a creditor, now I have influence”. Because [the influence] also depends on the degree, 
form and agenda brought by the government’s country to these institutions.302 
 
Similar statements were made in relation to a state’s economic stability and performance. To 
be sure, current and former Brazilian policy-makers believe that having good results at home 
increased Brazil’s influence in the IMS. In this regard the Real Plan was recurrently pointed 
out as vital to transforming Brazil’s position into an important player in the IMS (chapters 2 
and 3). Moreover, Brazil’s economic performance from 2003 to 2010, and particularly from 
2008 to 2010, was also frequently mentioned as a factor that contributed to the state’s influence 
(chapters 3 and 4).  
Strikingly, Brazil was able to maintain some of the political influence it acquired during the 
crisis even when its domestic performance began to deteriorate. According to Brazilian policy-
makers, their prestige in international forums remained considerably high from 2011 until at 
least early 2015 (when the last interviews were conducted). They claimed that Brazil wielded 
considerable influence in the international debate about capital flows regulation and that overall 
                                                
302 Non-attributable interview.  
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Brazil achieved a higher reputation than in the past, particularly because of the Central Bank. 
In addition, Brazil succeeded in capturing some level of permanent formal influence in the 
IMS, as is evidenced from its becoming a member of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
(chapter 4). Although the 2010 reform of the IMF was far from ideal from EMDs’ perspective, 
it nonetheless represented a considerable improvement in relation to Brazil’s previous position 
(chapter 4). In the words of a senior Brazilian economist: 
Maybe the results fell short from what we considered great in some areas, but in any case 
these forums continue. So at least there is still the G20, which continues to meet; in the 
FSB we managed to get 3 seats, we had none; and we achieved the reforms in the voting 
power at the IMF and the World Bank.303 
 
Considering the deterioration of Brazil’s performance from 2011 onwards, the formal structural 
influence achieved by Brazil in international forums can actually be considered as an instance 
of Brazil punching above its weight. All of these elements considered, it seems likely that 
Brazil took advantage of a temporary circumstance to permanently increase its political 
influence.  
To that extent, while having a robust economy was an effective starting point to increasing 
Brazil’s power in the IMS, several Brazilian policy-makers noted that it was not the only factor 
behind Brazil’s improved position after the 2008 crisis. As one senior diplomat noted: “it is not 
just the economic weight that counts, it is the ability of diplomatic articulation… there are a 
number of other factors depending on the forum. But undoubtedly the economic stability 
helped us”.304  Along with its diplomatic capacity, Brazil’s representatives, particularly its 
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304 Non-attributable interview with a senior diplomat. 
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president and foreign affairs minister, were accredited as important sources of the state’s global 
influence. In the words of a former finance minister: 
Brazil’s power depends fundamentally on its economic power. But if you have a very 
competent president and a very good diplomatic corps, which Brazil does, that already 
gives us a leverage in relation to other countries… Lula was very competent, Fernando 
Henrique as well, but Lula [was more]. So people can make a difference, and thus the 
policies they pursue can trigger a change… [Brazil] has somewhat more influence in the 
IMF, the G20…305  
 
These more subjective forms of influence identified by Brazilian policy-makers can be 
summarised as two sources of power: diplomatic ability and influential leaders. Diplomatic 
ability refers to the capacity of influence global matters independently from actual capabilities. 
For example, while China was economically more powerful than Brazil, it was Brazilian 
diplomats who put on the table EMDs’ demand to enter the Basel committee (chapter 4). 
Moreover, the fact that Christine Lagarde, the candidate for the post of managing director at 
the IMF, turned to Brazil for support (chapter 5) was not due to Brazil’s voting or economic 
power but most likely due to Brazil’s capacity to influence others. These were concrete 
circumstances where having more economic power was not necessarily associated with having 
more political power. Several interviewees referred to this Brazilian ability – or power – as a 
vocal diplomacy, that is, the capacity of Brazilian diplomats to present demands, negotiate 
autonomously and influence other states’ decisions. A comparison was recurrently made with 
Chinese diplomats, who are much less independent to negotiate on behalf of their government.  
The Brazilian experience also demonstrated how having an influential leader can alter a state’s 
power. For instance, Cardoso’s personal relationship with US President Clinton influenced the 
conditions of Brazil’s agreement with the IMF in 1998 (chapter 3). In addition, the priority 
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given to foreign policy during the Lula government and, hence, Lula’s personal engagement 
with foreign policy issues was often mentioned by Brazilian policy-makers as a fundamental 
element to Brazil’s international influence during his government, most notably in the 2008-
2010 period (chapters 3 and 4). Lula’s government was often contrasted with the Dilma 
government’s low engagement with foreign policy issues, a period that coincided with the 
decrease of Brazil’s international standing (chapter 5). To that extent, a state’s representative 
can himself or herself influence a state’s international power.   
Finally, some Brazilian policy-makers associated a state’s power in the IMS with its 
institutions. As one former finance minister said: 
What forms the bargaining power of a country in international negotiations… I am 
convinced that it is its institutions. I mean, the confidence in a country, if it pays what it 
owes, this has a lot to do with institutions… Institutions in the broad sense of Douglas 
North, that is, not only formal institutions, but a much broader set, including the society’s 
beliefs. So if you are negotiating with a society that is anti-liberal, anti-banks and so on, 
it has a tinge of uncertainty, and this influences the willingness to borrow, the risk 
premium and so on.306 
In fact, many interviewees emphasised the importance of the establishment of a democracy in 
Brazil to the state’s international influence. In the sense of beliefs, another institutional 
evolution mentioned by several interviewees was the development of a society intolerant of 
inflation. Institutional advances such as these were important for, as Brazilian policy-makers 
have recognised, they engendered a higher accountability in Brazil. As one former finance 
minister said: “Brazil created the typical conditions of institutionally developed countries, 
which is the ability to detect and correct errors… Brazil crossed a line from which there is no 
return: there will be no more dictatorship, inflation and unsustainable external debt”.307 Thus, 
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307 Non-attributable interview with a former finance minister. 
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it is reasonable to assume that having credible institutions can also enhance a state’s monetary 
power.  
The findings of this research, therefore, suggest that there are five other sources of monetary 
power other than issuing an international currency: i) creditor position; ii) economic stability 
and performance; iii) diplomatic ability; iv) influential leaders; and v) credible institutions. 
These results add to the existing literature that strives to understand EMDs’ monetary power. 
Helleiner and Pagliari (2011, p.176), for instance, acknowledged the existence of a “different 
kind of ‘market power’ of a number of emerging-market countries,” one that referred to EMDs’ 
influence in the post-crisis global debate about international financial regulation. According to 
them, EMDs were able to exert power-as-autonomy in international regulatory politics 
(Helleiner & Pagliari 2011, p.177). In another remarkable effort to advance the comprehension 
of EMDs’ monetary power, Gallagher (2015, p.12), coined the concept of countervailing 
monetary power to explain “how some EMDs deviated from and countered the structural power 
of global markets, on the one hand, and the power of industrialized countries in global 
economic governance institutions that remains pervasive in the world economy today, on the 
other”.  
Contributing to the existing literature, the findings of this research indicate that understanding 
EMDs’ monetary power is important for two main reasons. First, in light of Brazil’s case, these 
other sources are important because they are forms of power. The second reason is because 
these other sources of power, despite being power, are not as strong as currency power. The 
failure to acknowledge this hierarchy among the different sources of power was likely the key 
to the erroneous assessment about EMDs’ might.  
One way to rectify this issue is to consider the existence of hard and soft monetary power. This 
distinction may help to qualify the case of states that do not issue international currencies (most 
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states) and will allow monetary scholars to incorporate other factors than the currency into 
monetary power theory while still maintaining currency differences at the centre of the 
monetary power analysis.  
Significantly, this refinement in theory will be useful to explain what was the difference 
between Brazil’s position in the IMS in 1994 versus 2014. Brazil’s hard monetary power did 
not change to the extent that Brazil continued to be unable to delay or deflect disequilibrium in 
its balance of payments. However, according to Brazilian policy-makers, Brazil’s soft 
monetary power grew. In addition to their account, Brazil increased its participation in global 
governance both by augmenting its share in the IMF and the World Bank and by joining new 
forums, which represented a permanent higher influence in global monetary matters.  
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS AND 
DOMESTIC AUTONOMY FOR BRAZIL IN THE CONTEXT OF THE IMS 
The findings of this research suggest that the main external constraints for Brazil’s economic 
policy-making in the context of the IMS were currency-related and that the external influence 
exerted by international institutions and ideas were easier to isolate. From 1994 to 2002, Brazil 
suffered several currency attacks, which eventually prompted the abandonment of the exchange 
rate regime in 1999. From 2003 until the eruption of the 2008 crisis, the Brazilian currency 
underwent a major appreciation and external constraints lessened. This was the outcome of a 
transformation in the international economic dynamics (mainly with the integration of China 
into the global economy) rather than a change in Brazil’s domestic policies. While it is true 
that Brazilian monetary authorities were sufficiently astute in taking the opportunity to reduce 
Brazil’s vulnerabilities, their success was only possible due to the reversal in the external 
environment. In the words of a former Central Bank governor: 
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It is likely that at the bottom no one had a choice; because something else was happening 
outside the Brazilian control that was entering too much money here, and that maybe it 
was not us attracting but someone pushing. I think this becomes clearer after 2008, … 
when the American Treasury needed to sell bonds to have resources to save their banks. 
More or less half of this effort, the Federal Reserve took over; and the other half was 
Brazil plus China plus the rest [of EMDs]. … People do not realize that in the end we 
had no choice. And when [Brazil] faced that dollar mountain on the border, then prior 
experience paid to say: “let’s buy this pile of reserves, it is worthless, it will not yield 
anything, but we will never have balance of payments problems again”. So this is our 
sovereignty… Ok.308 
 
In the aftermath of the crisis, external constraints reappeared. From 2011 to 2014, the Brazilian 
economy was less vulnerable than it had been until 2003, not least because it had a higher level 
of international reserves and lower shares of public debt indexed to interest and exchange rates. 
Brazil remained, however, a subordinated economy in the IMS because the nature of its 
currency has not changed.  
Brazil’s currency issue can be associated with other external constraints, such as the one arising 
from Brazil’s condition as a commodity exporting developing country. Being a commodity 
exporting country means that two key determinants of Brazil’s economic performance – capital 
flows and commodity prices – are largely beyond its control (Akyüz 2012, p.8). As argued in 
Chapter 5, Brazil’s condition as a commodity exporting country was reinforced through 
currency channels, following China’s ascension and its demand for commodities. The resulting 
overvaluation of Brazil’s currency (starting in 2003) undermined the competition of Brazilian 
manufactures exports. Increased reliance on commodities exports turned out to be a major 
constraint for economic policy making when commodity prices began to fall in 2011. Being a 
commodity exporting country is an external constraint in itself as it increases macroeconomic 
volatility (Calderón & Fuentes 2011, p.2; Calderón & Yeyati 2009; World Bank 2008). The 
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case of Brazil indicates how the currency issue can reinforce such vulnerability, raising external 
constraints. To that extent, there is a relationship between Brazil’s place in the international 
economy – including its role in the global trade structure, i.e. being a commodity exporting 
country – and its position in the IMS. For its turn, the structure of the IMS reflects the power 
division in the international economy, as already pointed out by Kirshner (2003, p.21), 
Eichengreen (2008; 2011a), Cohen (2015; 2009a), among others.   
The miscalculation of Brazil’s actual power cost Brazil dearly. Following the euphoria 
surrounding EMDs in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, academic literature which attempted to 
explain Brazil’s economic performance gave too much attention to the government’s role 
whilst considerably underplaying the constraints imposed by the IMS. In particular, Brazil’s 
quick rebound from the 2008 crisis has been largely attributed to the countercyclical policies 
the government implemented in the wake of the financial meltdown (Barbosa 2010; Paula et 
al. 2015). In one example, Ban (2013, p.299) highlights Brazil’s robust economic growth of 
7.5 per cent in 2010 to then ask “with what kind of policy regime did get Brazil to this point?” 
There is a strong argument in the academic literature that the reason why Brazil recovered 
quickly from the crisis was because the government changed its previous approach and adopted 
a formula inspired by new- or neo- developmentalism ideas (Cypher 2015; Ban 2013; Barbosa 
& Souza 2010). 
The findings of this research, however, serve to challenge these assessments about why Brazil 
responded differently to the 2008 crisis in comparison to previous crises. In all previous crises 
episodes, Brazilian policy-makers had never had the policy space they had in 2008 to 
implement counter-cyclical policies. Because of Brazil’s lack of autonomy, the toolkit for 
fighting financial crises always including rising interest rates to avoid capital flight and balance 
of payment crises. Interviews with Brazilian policy-makers show that the difference in 2008 
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was more the existence of a policy space for enacting counter-cyclical measures, rather than 
different ideas within the government that resulted in the country’s more successful response. 
Thus, the argument made by Ban (2013, p.304) that “during the 2009 crisis the Central Bank 
did not repeat the mistake made after the East Asian crisis, when its increase in interest rates 
sent the economy into recession” actually ignores the different constraints faced by Brazilian 
policy-makers in each episode. 
The consequences of wrongly assessing Brazil’s actual power became evident after 2011. 
Because the government believed Brazil’s economic recovery had been triggered by domestic 
policies, when the performance began to deteriorate in 2011 it broadened its actions. In 
particular, the government increased public spending because it believed it had the power to 
reverse the deleterious effects of external conditions. Nevertheless, the government’s actions 
were unable to reverse the slowdown of the Brazilian economy after 2011. In that context, 
some scholars stated that Dilma’s government did not incorporate enough of the new-
developmentalist policy framework and turned attention to the international environment, 
emphasising several reasons for the slowdown, such as the drop in commodity prices, falling 
domestic consumption and lower public investments (Cypher 2015, p.635; Paula et al. 2015, 
p.419). 
Certainly there are several reasons associated with Brazil’s slowdown from 2011 onwards. Yet 
it is problematic to attribute Brazil’s success to the government’s policies in 2008 and then 
explain Brazil’s failure after 2011 through other reasons. While the government’s policies were 
certainly important in bringing Brazil out of the 2008 crisis, their success was linked to a 
particular set of international conditions. In other words, the government alone had much less 
power to change Brazil’s path than it thought it had, a fact that became clear after 2011.  
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Rather than relying on explanations that centre on the government’s actions, the Brazilian 
experience can be better understood through the lenses of the international political economy 
(IPE) literature, with a focus on the dynamics of the IMS and Brazil’s place on it. Under the 
IPE perspective, Brazilian policy-makers have been historically constrained by the external 
environment and have had little autonomy to deal with domestic problems. The years leading 
up to the 2008 crisis until 2010 were marked by a reduction of external constraints, which when 
combined with certain domestic policies, led to a temporary greater degree of autonomy and a 
better economic performance. Brazil faced a new external predicament, however, when 
international conditions began to change in 2011. Then the formula that had overcome the 2008 
crisis produced different results. However, because the government apparently believed the 
rebound from the crisis was mainly due to its counter-cyclical policies, it insisted and deepened 
those policies in the subsequent period. As a result, on top of an unfavourable international 
scenario, the Brazilian economy declined still further because of the government’s actions, 
which were premised on the Brazilian state having more autonomy than it did.  
Despite Brazil’s unprivileged position in the IMS, the level of external interference emanating 
from international institutions and mainstream ideas was limited according to Brazilian policy-
makers. To begin with, one of the reasons why the Brazilian economy was less contaminated 
by toxic assets in the context of the 2008 crisis was because Brazilian policy-makers resisted 
the mainstream policy prescription of deregulation and liberalisation of financial markets 
(chapter 4). The notion, for instance, of the stress bank test, which came to the fore of 
international mainstream during the crisis, was long ago part of Brazil’s risk management 
policies. Likewise, Brazil’s high level of reserve requirements were also recognised as a useful 
tool for central banks in moments of crises. Finally, public banks, whose value had been 
questioned in previous times, had an important role in reversing the crisis in Brazil. Thus, it 
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seems right to argue that Brazilian policy-makers were considerably autonomous in relation to 
mainstream ideas.  
When asked about the position of Brazil in the IMS, the majority of the interviewees also 
insisted on the importance of Brazil’s relationship with the IMF. Their insistence reveals the 
importance attached to the Fund and, perhaps, a certain desire of current and former Brazilian 
policy-makers to demystify the influence of the IMF in Brazil.  
In terms of actual constraints for economic policy-making, Brazilian policy-makers asserted 
that the power of the Fund was limited. Even during the 1980s when Brazil was considerably 
dependent on the Fund’s resources, policy-makers were able to circumvent the Fund’s external 
pressure in favour of domestic priorities. A major example of this was in 1982, when the 
government waited until after the general elections to announce it was going to resort to the 
Fund’s assistance. To be sure, at that point Brazilian economic policy-making was 
subordinated to external constraints (mainly because of its exorbitant external debt), but this is 
different than saying the Fund limited the government’s autonomy. To that extent, the IMF 
should be conceived more as a piece of the domestic political game than as an obstacle to the 
formulation of “autonomous” economic policies.  
According to several current and former Brazilian policy-makers, the idea that the Fund 
restricted the autonomy of policy-makers is incorrect; rather, on many occasions the IMF was 
used as a scapegoat to justify unpopular economic policies (see also Almeida 2003, p.2). Their 
accounts challenge some of the existing academic literature about the IMF’s influence in Brazil 
(Tude & Milani 2013; Gonçalves 2005). In particular, following the payment of Brazil’s debt 
with the Fund in December 2005, some scholars have conjectured about the motivations of the 
payment as well as its outcome in terms of an increased autonomy for economic policy-making 
(Tude & Milani 2013; Gonçalves 2005).  
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The findings of this dissertation reveal that the proposal for settling Brazil’s debt with the IMF 
came from the technical area of the Central Bank and it was not a result of political bravado. 
After the proposal was presented to President Lula, the payment of the IMF was used to Lula’s 
political leverage, not least because of the high symbolism denoted by Brazil independence 
from the Fund. Nevertheless, the IMF payment was not politically motivated. Thus, the 
suggestion of some scholars (Gonçalves 2005, pp.178–179; Tude & Milani 2013, p.91) that 
the payment of the Fund was a political movement is wrong.  
Moreover, interviews with current and former Brazilian policy-makers call into question the 
idea that settling the IMF debt represented an increase in the government’s autonomy to 
formulate economic policy. In one example, Ban (2013, p.305) argued that the fiscal policy 
turn after 2006 was possible only when Brazil paid off its debt to the IMF, which was described 
as “one of the most structural constraints bequeathed on [Brazil] by Cardoso’s government”. 
In light of the interviews conducted with Brazilian policy-makers, it is both an exaggeration 
and a simplification to assume that the continuation of Cardoso’s macroeconomic framework 
by Lula was due to the agreement with the IMF.  
While the Fund’s actual intervention in Brazil was low, paying off the debt to it represented an 
increase in Brazil’s influence within the institution. According to Brazilian policy-makers, 
despite its debtor position until December 2005, Brazil always had a certain influence in the 
IMF. A handful of policy-makers mentioned the key role of Alexandre Kafka in sustaining 
Brazil’s strong diplomatic position in the Fund. Kafka worked for more than three decades as 
Executive Director, representing Brazil and a group of Latin American nations until 1998, 
when he retired. Having been Dean of the Board for many years, Kafka’s influential personal 
position somewhat balanced Brazil’s vulnerability.  
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After paying the Fund, however, Brazil changed its relative position, particularly from 2009 
onwards when it became a creditor to the IMF. According to Brazilian policy-makers, this 
transformation had a two-fold significance. On the one hand, Brazilian representatives felt 
more assertive in presenting their proposals. On the other hand, they sensed a positive 
difference in their treatment from their international peers, which continued even when Brazil 
began to face mounting economic problems. 
In light of this complex relationship between external constraints and domestic autonomy for 
Brazil in the context of the IMS, the Brazilian experience makes a strong case in favour of the 
distinction between hard and soft monetary power. While it was impossible for Brazil to escape 
the currency-related constraints posed by the IMS’s dynamics, Brazilian governments were 
somewhat successful in isolating the pressure emanating from international institutions and 
mainstream ideas.  
 
 
LIMITATIONS OF CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
While the case of Brazil serves to enlighten the dynamics of monetary power in the IMS, 
several questions remain unanswered and new ones have emerged during the course of this 
research. In the absence of a benchmark to analyse the monetary power of states that do not 
issue international currencies, the experience of current and former Brazilian policy-makers 
was the main guide from which to decide the topics incorporated in this research. This approach 
represents an original effort to advance monetary power theory in respect to EMDs. It gave 
analytical premium to the real-world constraints faced by policy-makers and thus has the 
potential to be useful even outside the realm of academia. At the same time, however, there are 
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certain limitations to its utility regarding the case of EMDs in general and of Brazil in 
particular.  
To begin with, this research addressed an extensive period of time and a very broad topic. On 
the one hand, the period of analysis had to be long so as to enable conclusions to be drawn 
about the changing place of external constraints in economic policy-making over time. On the 
other hand, to capture the dynamics between economic and political matters and to place the 
developments in Brazil into the broader international context, there was little way out of 
dealing with a substantial amount of literature. To achieve the objective of understanding the 
position of Brazil in the IMS, there was an inevitable trade-off in terms of the level of 
discussion of each topic. Despite the efforts to include all of the relevant literature and touch 
on the most important debates, some topics deserve a deeper discussion. Notably, future 
research on Brazil could delve deeper into Brazil’s response towards the 2008 crisis; on the 
prospects for regional integration in South America and the place of Brazilian leadership in 
that project; on Brazil’s relations with the IMF; and on the implications of the NDB and the 
CRA for Brazil’s monetary power. 
Moreover, the findings of this research are predominantly Brazil-specific and the 
generalisations made about EMDs should be treated with caution. To advance the 
comprehension of monetary power and the position of EMDs in the IMS requires further 
comparative analysis. One particularly interesting area of research would be a comparison 
between the case of the monetary power of BRICS’ states and non-BRICS’ states, such as 
Indonesia, Turkey and Mexico. Judging by the case of Brazil, its association with China was 
instrumental in maintaining Brazil’s influence when domestic economic tensions arose. 
However, the case of Brazil alone is insufficient to draw conclusions about the actual weight 
of China in determining the influence of less powerful EMDs.  
 263 
Furthermore, while this research tried to balance the account of Brazilian policy-makers with 
economic data, it is substantively a qualitative assessment. A major contribution of this 
dissertation to academic knowledge was to reveal the experience of policy-makers in relation 
to monetary power matters. Due to the effort required to collect, transcribe and translate all of 
the interview material, there was limited time to expend to fully consider quantitative measures 
about Brazil’s monetary power. This research analysed data from some relevant measures of 
monetary power, such as debt denominated in foreign currency, level of international reserves 
and share in global trade and investment flows. Yet, there is plenty of room for further 
quantitative investigations on this matter and they will certainly prove to be instrumental in 
better understanding the developments of a country’s monetary power.  
Three areas for future quantitative research must be highlighted. First, even though the 
Brazilian currency has little prospects to be internationalised, some interviewees noticed that 
the real has a discernable influence on South America’s monetary dynamics. It would be 
interesting to explore through which channels and to what extent this influence occurs and what 
implications this has for Brazil’s monetary power (potentially shedding light on Brazil’s 
endless dilemma about its regional role). A second interesting area with potential for a more 
complete quantitative analysis concerns Brazil’s participation in international financial 
institutions (IFIs), particularly in the IMF and in the NDB. Quantitative research on this topic 
can increase the understanding about the significance of shares and voting power. Finally, 
while it seems right to affirm there was an improvement in Brazil’s soft monetary power, 
research is needed to quantify this change. The main challenge in addressing soft monetary 
power is that in all probability it is harder to measure than hard monetary power. For instance, 
what is the difference between Brazil’s and India’s soft monetary power? Scholars can measure 
the increase in the use of a certain currency for international transactions or if a state occupies 
a creditor/debtor position. Yet, how can we measure, for example, the capacity of a state to 
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influence the international agenda or the importance of having the G20 instead of the G8 as the 
prime forum for global macroeconomic coordination? Advancing theoretical work to 
understand other sources of monetary power is far from easy but must be addressed to capture 
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